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ABSTRACT 
This research investigates the role of horizontal cooperation in the adaptive management of regional 
socio-ecological systems (SESs). Horizontal cooperation refers to the collaborative, non-hierarchical 
interactions of actors across sectors, modes of governance and spatial scales. It can allow diverse 
actors to deal with the complexity and uncertainties that characterize SESs and to co-produce public 
benefits.  
The research question is, When does horizontal cooperation contribute to adaptive management in 
complex governance arrangements? The Berg River catchment in South Africa serves as a case study 
to analyze such complex systems. The empirical focus is on the operational level which is responsible 
for maintaining key functions of the water resources in the SES. 
A formal social network analysis is employed to describe and analyze the management of the Berg 
River catchment. The analysis focuses on (i) cohesion and (ii) heterogeneity, which are two network 
characteristics that affect learning and collective action in actor networks. Horizontal cooperation is 
further investigated by examining selected collective action initiatives with the help of Ostrom’s eight 
design principles (1990). Constraints affecting collective action and the capacity to self-organize are 
identified, and the robustness of the governance arrangements arising from horizontal cooperation is 
evaluated. 
The study finds that the behavior of actors towards each other and the SES is influenced by 
incentives provided by informal network structures, market mechanisms and bureaucratic 
hierarchies. Hence, modes of governance intersect at the operational level and consequently 
influence the nature of horizontal cooperation. While the quality of the management of the SES is 
largely determined by the patterns of interactions among the actors that manage the SES, these 
interactions are influenced by other institutional and organizational structures in which they are 
embedded. Unexpectedly, market mode incentives stimulate collective action in the Berg catchment 
and accentuate the need for addressing degrading water quality. Informal relations and emerging 
inter-organizational platforms matter for learning and for providing opportunities for collective 
action. Yet, the incentives (or lack thereof) created through hierarchical steering of the South African 
water governance system by the national government department are often counterproductive. That 
is, so far the self-organizing efforts at sub-catchment level could not be transformed into functioning 
governance arrangements because of constraints imposed by the hierarchical mode.  
The study confirms that self-organization and collective action that arise from horizontal cooperation 
are important for the adaptive management of regional SESs. However, without being nested into 
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robust governance arrangements. Horizontal cooperation at the operational level can only be 
effective when supported by the hierarchical governance mode. 
The thesis contributes to a growing field of interdisciplinary research on SESs, responding to the call 
for greater emphasis on relational patterns, governance, and environmental outcomes. It warns that 
horizontal cooperation cannot by itself guarantee adaptive management. Certain conditions are 
needed so that social and ecological outcomes are achieved and the cost of horizontal cooperation 
remains acceptable. A nested governance structure, in which horizontal cooperation is 
complemented by vertical integration is necessary for learning and collaboration within and beyond 
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1. Chapter: Introduction 
 
 “Water links the local to the regional, and brings together global questions of food security, 
public health, urbanization and energy. Addressing how we use and manage water resources is 
central to setting the world on a more sustainable and equitable path.”  
Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations1 
 
1.1. The Outset: a planet under pressure  
Global climate change, an increasing population, urbanization, and aspirations for better living 
standards are a challenge to planetary sustainability. There is rising evidence that human actions 
have become the main driver for global environmental change and that the depletion of natural 
resources reduces the capacity of the planet to sustain our activities (Rockström et al., 2009). This 
raises serious concerns regarding our future and our aspirations to improve human well-being such 
as the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Bogardi et al. (2012:35) alert that “[t]he 
magnitudes of ongoing environmental transformations, including climate change, are signs of 
unsustainable socio-economic practice at global scale, raising the question how the planet will 
accommodate an additional three billion people by 2050.” Even more unsettling is that those that 
are beginning to pay the costs of the wasteful use and unsustainable management of natural 
resources are the millions of people who have not been able to benefit from the prosperity created 
through current management practices.2  
Considering that all life, human, terrestrial and aquatic, depends on water, water resources should 
be regarded as our most vital natural resources (Palmer, 2010). In particular, freshwater resources 
are essential for human life, economic development, and the functioning of the ecosystem services 
and goods. As the demand for drinking water and water for food and energy production increases, 
existing water resource systems are degrading at a pervasive rate. Until now human water security 
has to a large extent been achieved at the expense of freshwater biodiversity and the functioning of 
ecosystem services and goods that underpin human livelihoods (Vörösmarthy et al., 2010). For a long 
time, the water needs of ecosystems were ignored in policy and management practices. Whereas in 
recent years ecosystems have gained more acknowledgment as legitimate water users, the vital 
importance of ecosystems and biodiversity for sustainability and maintenance of freshwater 
                                                          
1
 (WWAP , 2012:v) 
2
  It is estimated that over two billion people live still without sanitation and about one billion lack access to 
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resources continues to be underestimated (WWAP, 2012; Palmer, 2010). As long as ecosystems and 
biodiversity are not seen as part of the solution to existing and projected water problems, and only 
treated as a casualty of them, the arbitrary and unfair competition between human and ecological 
needs for water will continue.  
Water security is one of the most significant challenges of the 21st century and user conflicts, as both 
a cause and consequence, are on the rise. Yet, the perceived (primarily in water secure industrialized 
countries) and the experienced (primarily in developing countries) water crisis is not an issue of 
global water availability. As Pahl-Wostl et al., (2012:24) emphasize “[t]he most persistent challenges 
for dealing with the emerging water crisis lie in the realm of water governance, and many problems 
can be attributed to governance failures rather than the condition of the resource base itself”. This 
becomes evident when looking at the amount of water that is being wasted, the unequal access to 
water across continents, but also within countries and regions. However, water is still seldom 
acknowledged as a cross-sectoral priority and a cross-cutting issue that demands coordination and 
cooperation among actors involved in the water-energy-food-land nexus3. 
This thesis sets out to make a contribution to the understanding of water governance, which here 
refers to the processes, actor constellations, and institutions that shape the decision-making and 
activities related to the use and management of water resources. Although the water governance 
challenge needs to be addressed at various levels, including the global, national, regional and local 
level (e.g., Gupta et al 2013), the attention in this thesis is directed at the regional4 level of decision-
making. Unpacking governance arrangements at this level is most appropriate for understanding how 
global drivers and local processes intersect and affect place-based management. To do so, this study 
describes and analyses the human dimension of water governance through the narrative of a small, 
yet economically important, South African catchment that is confronted with the degradation of its 
water resources through pollution and alien invasive vegetation. The thesis focuses on the joint 
management of the catchment’s largest river, the Berg. By depicting the relations and behavior 
among the organizations that manage the catchment, and giving attention to the context in which 
these relations have been structured, this thesis advances a relational approach to better understand 
the governance of socio-ecological systems (SESs). Here, the emphasis is on processes considered 
necessary for social cooperation that extend beyond hierarchical structuring. The chief purpose of 
                                                          
3 
The water-energy-food-land nexus describes the intrinsic interdependencies and linkages that exist between 
water, food and energy security.  Hence, achieving long-term security in one area can only be achieved in 
consideration of the other two (Ringler et al., 2013). 
4
 The term regional is used in this study in reference to a spatial scale that is larger than the local level but 
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this study is not necessarily to make generalizations from the findings of the examined case study. To 
a large extent processes and drivers that shape the governance in other regional SESs will differ. 
What the thesis does offer is an analytical and methodological design that can find application in the 
examination of management and governance processes in other regional SESs. In other words, this 
thesis presents a practical approach for the examination of complex governance arrangements in a 
particular setting. By doing so, the thesis provides important insights into the following: How to 
create and maintain robust governance systems that to a large extent have become structured 
around the collaboration of semi-autonomous actors which are not necessary compelled by formal 
obligation to contribute to the management of a specific SES. Robust governance systems are 
understood in this thesis as arrangements capable working satisfactory (i.e. efficient, equitable and 
sustainable water management) in light of changes or disturbances (van Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007; 
Hutjens et al., 2009; Mumby et al., 2014). Hence, they require balancing consistence with 
adaptability and transformability. 
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following way: first, water management is introduced in 
the context of catchments, which are described in this study as regional SESs. This is followed by 
discussing the complexity of regional SESs and the complexity of the arrangements through which 
they are governed, an aspect of governance that is not well-understood. The subsequent section 
elaborates how this research gap is addressed in this thesis. The research aim and objectives are then 
presented, and the chapter concludes with an outline of the subsequent chapters.  
1.2. The rising complexity of regional socio-ecological systems 
Rivers are water resources whose management needs to be looked at in the context of the 
catchments in which they are embedded. Catchments can be understood as regional SESs which are 
defined as “a system which includes societal (human) and ecological (biophysical) subsystems in 
mutual interaction” (Gallopin, 2006: 294). Such systems are characterized by a high level of 
complexity, because of the wealth of interactions, non-linear processes and actors within the system 
(Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Berkes et al., 2003; Poteete, 2012). To illustrate further, catchments 
produce multiple ecological goods and services, of which many interact with one another and whose 
productions are non-linear. At the same time, various user groups (which possess different 
technologies, interests and decision-making power) who depend on specific ecological goods and 
services produced by the resource system, interact with and influence ecological processes through 
their practices at various locations within and beyond the catchment. Basurto et al. (2013) state that 
many problems that arise within SESs are often non-linear in nature, cross-scale in time and space, 
and characterized by an evolutionary character. Another defining characteristic of SESs is that they 
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2004; Janssen et al., 2007). Humans design, for example, physical infrastructure and institutions with 
the aim of improving the performance of the system. The designed components in turn affect the 
functioning of the self-organizing social and ecological components. For a long time institutions and 
physical infrastructure were developed and implemented based on conventional, technocratic, 
command-and-control approaches ignoring important linkages and non-linear feedbacks that are 
critical for the functioning of regional SESs (Holling and Meffe, 1996; Berkes and Folke, 1998; Pahl-
Wostl, 2007). This in turn has led to the degradation of many SESs because important system linkages 
were neglected or misunderstood.  
Another factor that has increased complexity of SESs is that “the temporal and spatial scales of both 
human activity and our impacts on biophysical dynamics has fundamentally changed” (Anderies and 
Janssen, 2013:3). Regional SESs are no longer just shaped by the human activities within a regional 
SES or the dynamic interactions of localized ecosystem processes (Brondizio et al., 2009). Far 
reaching global processes, linked to economic globalization (e.g. market integration) and global 
environmental change (e.g. climate change), are now strongly affecting processes and decision-
making in many regional SESs such as catchments (Young et al., 2006). Brondizio et al. (2009), for 
example, speak of increasing functional interdependencies; that is, the rise in socio-economic and 
biophysical linkages. In this context, Poteete (2012:135) emphasizes that “[f]ailure to recognize 
important components and processes limits understanding of these systems and is an important 
source of uncertainty about the responses to management practices and policies”. This thesis 
therefore aims to reduce this uncertainty. 
1.3. The need for adaptive management in regional socio-ecological systems  
With the growing levels of interdependencies and associated rise in complexity and uncertainties as 
well as the many governa ce failures experienced in regional SESs, more adaptive and integrative 
approaches to the management of SESs have been advocated by both the scientific community and 
policy makers (Folke et al., 2005; MEA, 2005; Olsson et al., 2006). Management principles, such as 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and international frameworks such as the EU 
Water Framework Directive, have been developed to integrate different types of knowledge, to 
account for biophysical boundaries of SESs, and to foster greater stakeholder participation (e.g., 
Jaspers 2003; GWP 2000; Kaika, 2003; EC, 2002). The intention behind these frameworks has been to 
consider important scales and levels5 and to rectify misfits between the institutions that govern the 
                                                          
5
 While the terms scales and level are sometimes used interchangeably, scales are defined in this study in 
accordance to the conceptualisation provided by Gibson et al. (2000). The term scale expresses the different 
dimensions of a specific phenomenon and how these dimensions interact. More specifically, scale refers to 
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SESs and the attributes of the ecological processes and functions of such systems (Kallis and Butler, 
2001). However, in many industrialized and developing countries, legislative and organizational 
reform processes, aimed at transforming existing systems through which SESs are governed, have 
often not resulted in more adaptive and integrative management practices (Lundmark and Jonsson, 
2014; Biswas, 2004; Medema et al., 2008; Horlemann, and Dombrowsky, 2012). That means, while 
formal rules may have changed, dominant actor relations and practices often have not. 
This thesis argues that the unsatisfactory transition towards adaptive management practices can only 
be understood in the context of rising complexity of governance arrangements. Further, the rise in 
complexity has created considerable challenges for achieving the necessary coordination and 
cooperation amongst actors involved in the governance and management of SESs.  
While governance is a contested term (see e.g, Kjaer, 2003; Robichau, 2011), in this study, it is 
understood as “a social function centered around steering human groups toward beneficial 
outcomes and away from mutual harmful outcomes” (Brondizio et al., 2009:256). It refers to the 
processes and structures through which formal and informal institutions are established and 
enforced, power is shared, and collective as well as individual behavior is shaped (Risse, 2011; Young, 
2002). In democratic countries, governance is often concerned with the production of services for 
public benefit (e.g., collective goods and services such as public health, clean environment, public 
infrastructure, basic education or safety). While this has been the primary responsibility of 
governments, it is actually more appropriate to speak of the co-production6 of services for public 
benefit as the role and contribution of non-state actors has increased. This is particularly the case in 
the area of environmental governance, where the production of services for public benefit strongly 
depends on the contribution and collaboration of non-state actors (e.g. Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). 
Because governance sets the conditions under which management has to function, management 
should be understood as an integral part of governance. In relation to SESs, management refers to 
specific activities through which the state of the SES, in particular the ecological processes upon 
which its functioning depends, is kept in a desirable bound (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Water management 
functions include, for example, monitoring, pollution control, water allocation, financial, economic 
and information management. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Levels refer to locations along a scale “with lower levels being constrained by the processes taking place at 
larger levels” (Gibson et al., 2000: 218-219).  
6
  In relation to public goods and services the term co-production has been introduced by E and V Ostrom 
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1.4.  The increasing complexity of governance arrangements 
By trying to account for cross-scale and cross-level linkages, and to create a better fit between 
administrative boundaries and ecosystem attributes, new approaches deployed for the management 
of SESs have contributed to the increasing complexity of the governance systems. Several studies in 
the realm of water management have shown, that problems of cooperation between newly 
established organizations at catchment scale and those organized at traditional administrative 
boundaries (e.g. spatial planning, local government) prove to be a barrier for implementing 
integrated management approaches (Herrfahrdt-Pähle, 2010; Pollard and du Toit, 2011). It has 
become evident that efforts to better fit the social system with that of the ecological system led to 
problems of interplay in the social system (Folke et al., 2007; Herrfahrdt-Pähle, 2010; Lebel et al., 
2013). The rising complexity in governance arrangements and the necessity of cross-boundary 
collaboration has also been prompted by wicked societal problems7 (Rittel and Weber, 1973) and 
claims for the democratization of decision-making processes (Berkes, 2010; Kjaer, 2011), including 
decentralization.8  
As a consequence of these trends, private-public partnerships, community-based resource 
management and private governance arrangements have become an integral part of the governance 
landscape, supplementing bureaucratic hierarchical systems and policy making processes (Newell et 
al., 2012). Many of the arrangements do not follow a hierarchical structuring. Instead they have been 
associated with other modes of governance such as network or market structures (Rhodes, 1997), 
which follow a different internal logic for steering and coordinating social action (Pahl-Wostl, 2009).9 
                                                          
7
  The term wicked problems has its origin in the community planning field. It was coined by Rittel and Webber 
(1973), to describe societal problems that are so complex and incomprehensible that actors disagree how to 
define and solve them. Hence, such problems have multiple dimensions and numerous proposed solutions. 
They are also likely to lead to second order problems because of processes linkages and interactions across 
scales (Chapin III et al., 2008). Such problems need to be addressed through collaborative frameworks and the 
fostering of cross-boundary linkages in the governance system (ibid.).    
8
 According to Larson and Soto (2008) and Berkes (2010) decentralisation (i.e. the shifting of responsibilities and 
authority to the lower levels of decision-making based on the principle of subsidiary) is mainly confined to the 
sphere of government itself and to the assignment of responsibility to lower levels within the government 
system. Devolution refers to shifting rights and responsibilities to local groups including local level government. 
For the purpose of the thesis devolution and decentralisation are combined under the term decentralisation 
which therefore captures downward and outward scaling processes in the governance landscape. 
9
 Carlsson and Sandström (2008:35) for example indicate that networks can entail informal as well as formal (e.g. 
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For example, networks have been more closely related to informal relations and institutions as well 
as self-organizing and emerging decision-making processes (Bodin and Crona, 2009; Duit and Galaz, 
2008; Kickert et al., 1997). Market structures (e.g., supply-chain or agricultural value-chain relations) 
on the other hand, can be seen as a mode of governance that guides actions through demand-supply 
as well as buyer-seller relations (e.g. Lemos and Agrawal, 2006).10 Kjaer (2011) points out that 
institutional arrangements of markets and networks do not displace traditional forms of governance. 
The three governance modes coexist and interact with each other and can create serious tensions 
amongst them. For example, network strategies may be at odds with formal hierarchical operating 
procedures (ibid). In these complex and intertwined governance arrangements the roles of actors 
have become blurred (Pahl-Wostl, 2009), and many actors have become embedded in institutional 
arrangements that often cross various levels, scales or different modes of governance.  
It has become increasingly evident that in these complex multi-actor, multi-level and multi-mode 
governance arrangements, socio-economic activities can no longer be solely steered through 
hierarchical interactions. Consequently horizontal cooperation has gained in importance for societal 
cooperation and coordination. Horizontal cooperation is defined in this thesis as collaborative, non-
hierarchical interactions of actors across sectors, modes of governance and spatial scales. However, 
based on the experiences with reform processes in many countries, it appears that currently many 
constraints to horizontal cooperation exist in complex governance arrangements. This has become 
particularly visible at the operational level. 
The operational level is understood in this thesis as a functional level in a particular governance 
system (e.g. water governance) which in SESs is primarily concerned with maintaining the key 
functions of the SES and the implementation of existing policies. Hence, this level is mainly 
comprised of actors involved in the day-to-day management activities of the SES. In the past, the 
operational level involved a small stable set of actors (governmental technocrats and scientific 
experts). Nowadays it has shifted closer to the user level and to the resource base (e.g., the 
boundaries of the SES). Similarly, through decentralization and greater stakeholder involvement the 
operational level, in many countries the sphere of water governance has shifted closer to the local 
level. That is, stakeholders that have previously been users of rivers find themselves now also in the 
role of managers. This has led to a change in existing relationships among governmental technocrats, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
equated with non-hierarchical structures. They highlight that many networks are indeed hierarchical due to the 
asymmetric power distribution within the network.   
10
 Davies (2005) emphasises that each mode contains elements of the other and other authors have also 
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local stakeholder groups, private sector entities and conservation agencies giving rise to new forms 
of collaboration and cooperation, alliance building but also confrontation.  
Multiple factors exists that can inhibit the required cooperation and collaboration among those 
involved in the management of regional SESs. Collaboration among quasi-autonomous actors, for 
example, requires voluntary cooperation and cannot be imposed (Imperial, 2002). Tension may arise 
because different actors are embedded in different institutional arrangements and adhere to 
different sets of rules or incentive structures that cannot easily be reconciled. Most actors can be 
associated with particular stakeholder groups or sectors that represent specific interests and goals 
which in turn influences their commitment to the management of the SES and specific resources 
therein. Furthermore, actors may face different socio-economic and political pressures that can be 
linked to specific modes of governance in which they are engaged and which will constrain their 
willingness to engage in collaborative relationships that allow for joint management of the SES. For 
example, a farmer may face strong global market pressures (through the supply chain in which he is 
embedded) which propel him to intensify production or to change to a business model that neglects 
sustainable land and water management practices. Local government agencies that are accountable 
to local constituencies as well as state legislation find themselves confronted with resource 
constraints and heighten pressure for service delivery. They may, for example, opt for quick fixes at 
the expense of long term investment into skills and infrastructure related to water management. 
Conservation organizations, which depend on donor money and need to fulfill conservation targets, 
may find it difficult create partnerships with private landowners or government agencies that 
continue to dichotomize economic growth and environmental protection. 
Several challenges, which have been associated with the decentralization processes themselves, can 
constrain the potential for horizontal cooperation among those involved in the management of 
regional SESs. Firstly, it has been noted that in many cases the transfer of responsibilities to lower 
levels of decision-making is often not companied by the required transfer of decision-making power 
and resource allocation to exercise those functions (Berkes, 2010; Larson and Soto, 2008). Secondly, 
without sufficient coordination or support from higher level authorities, decentralization can lead to 
fragmentation of management responsibilities. For example, some activities will be duplicated, 
whereas others important for the maintenance of ecosystem functions in SESs may just be neglected 
on the assumption that it is the responsibility of someone else (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). In addition, 
issues of accountability and transparency may arise (Larson and Soto, 2008; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
For example, non-state actors that take on certain management functions may only be accountable 
to their own interest groups. They therefore, may be inclined to only advance the self-interest of the 
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are often able to control functions and put forward their own interests without necessary 
considering the needs and interest of other less powerful stakeholders (Persha and Andersson, 2014; 
Palmer and Engel, 2007).  
To summarize the preceding claim, two factors have contributed to the rise in complexity in 
governance arrangements; firstly the attempt to attune governance arrangements to the complexity 
and uncertainties that characterize SESs and secondly, the more general opening of the governance 
landscape, exemplified here through processes of decentralization. It has further been argued that 
while horizontal cooperation has gained in importance for social cooperation and coordination, many 
constraints to horizontal cooperation exist in complex governance arrangements. This has had 
considerable impact on the operational level in governance systems which until now is a point not 
well addressed by the scholarship on SESs. Limited capacities, such as resources, knowledge and skills, 
unsuitable incentive structures as well as conflicting organizational interests and values are just some 
of the factors that ultimately impact the potential for horizontal cooperation and the adaptive 
management of regional SESs. The failure to carefully examine the intertwined governance 
arrangements in which actors are embedded (e.g. the effect of the interplay of decentralization and 
more integrative management approaches) has hampered the ability of scholars and policy makers 
to recognize and address constraints to horizontal cooperation in regional SESs. Another unresolved 
issue is that while in the literature on SESs the importance of horizontal cooperation for effective 
governance, understood here as the successful co-production of services for public benefit, has been 
acknowledged (Teisman et al., 2013), the concept of horizontal cooperation has remained 
conceptually and empirical vague. This thesis addresses this research gap.  
1.5. Research approach  
This study adopts a relatio al approach that focuses on actor networks and collective action because 
such an approach captures the degree to which actors interact, commit resources, and comply with 
each other’s rules. From this, important insights can be gained about the nature of, and conditions 
for, horizontal cooperation. Furthermore, using the patterns of interaction among a set of actors 
involved in the management of the SES as a point of departure, allows for the untangling of complex 
governance arrangements. In other words, the proposed approach clearly describes and specifies the 
actors, levels and modes that form part of these complex governance arrangements. While a 
relational approach will not be able to explain complex governance arrangements in their entirety, it 
provides a rich description of the processes that characterize them and in doing so allows for 
strengthened understanding on how conducive these arrangements are for horizontal cooperation 
and the adaptive management in regional SESs. The relational approach that informs this thesis is 
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(i.e. a social network analysis, focus groups and semi-structured interviews). That is, actor relations 
are examined through different means leading to a more holistic description of horizontal 
cooperation and to the cross-validation for specific research findings. 
This study brings together understanding and concepts from different fields of research (see Figure 
1-2) that have been concerned with the functions and dynamics of SESs and with the processes 
through which these systems are governed. What is distinctive to this thesis is the way the concepts 
from the different, yet overlapping, research fields have been combined to allow for a thorough 
investigation of horizontal cooperation in complex governance arrangements. Figure 1-2 identifies 
the different research fields with an indication from which disciplines they have originated. Because 
of their common interest in the human dimension of governance of SESs there has been a substantial 
amount of cross-fertilization between these fields with some of them using similar concepts. To 
avoid confusion in the subsequent chapters Figure 1-2 indicates which of the concepts discussed in 
this thesis are associated with which research field. Chapter 2 provides more information on the 
various research fields, and on how the different concepts have been defined and used in this thesis.  
 
Figure 1-1: The research fields and concepts informing this thesis 
1.6. Case Study Selection  
In this thesis, complex governance arrangements that govern regional SESs are examined through an 
in-depth study of a South African catchment, namely the Berg River catchment.11 More specifically, 
water governance is used to exemplify a governance system in which the operational level is affected 
by complex governance arrangements. The case study has been situated in South Africa because the 
                                                          
11
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country provides a good example where the opening up of the governance landscape and the rising 
complexity of governance arrangements can be observed. While South Africa has its individual 
setting, many of the developments and changes taking place in the realm of water governance can 
be observed in other countries as well: 
 An adaptive and integrative approach to water management has been introduced (e.g. South 
Africa’s National Water Act of 1998 is based on the IWRM principles). 
 The democratization of the country through means of decentralization. 
 The restricted capacity of the government to effectively provide services for public benefit 
particularly in light of population growth and prevailing poverty.  
 The persistent inequalities that exist in society which significantly affects the access to decision-
making processes among the actors that have become involved in water management.12  
Jointly these developments have significant impacted the operational level in South Africa’s water 
governance system and the potential for horizontal cooperation among the actors involved in the 
management of South Africa’s catchments. If these developments and their joint impact on the 
operational level are not accounted for thoroughly there is a risk that the opening up of South 
Africa’s governance landscape will lead to: i. the reinforcement of existing power structures and the 
status quo, ii. that adaptive and integrative approaches for water management may be viewed as not 
feasible, and iii. that current and wicked societal problems can’t be resolved and provision and 
production of services for public benefit is not secured. 
1.7. Research aim and objectives  
The overarching research aim is to investigate the role of horizontal cooperation in the adaptive 
management of regional SESs and to evaluate methods for developing a framework through which to 
measure horizontal cooperation.  Approaching this aim requires conceptual development that brings 
to the fore key variables that need to be considered when evaluating horizontal cooperation. It 
furthermore necessitates the combination and advancement of complementary methodologies 
through which horizontal cooperation but also AM can be assessed. Finally, it demands that the 
proposed conceptual design and analytical framework are tested empirically.  
                                                          
12  One of the major issues is, for example, the empowerment of actors that have been previously 
disadvantaged from political decision-making processes. Many of these stakeholders still lack the human 
(technical skills, formal education) and social capital (strategic linkages to formal decision makers, self-
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To ensure that the research aim is adequately addressed in this thesis the following research 
question has guided the investigation:  When does horizontal cooperation contribute to adaptive 
management in complex governance arrangements? 
 The five research objectives described below will lay out the process in answering the research 
question. These objectives  serve as specific milestones upon which the research and the subsequent 
thesis chapters have been structured.  
Objective 1: Develop a conceptual design to better understand complex governance arrangements 
and the importance of horizontal cooperation by linking the concept of adaptive management and 
the concept of polycentric governance.  
Objective 2: Operationalize the concept of actor networks and the concept of collective action for 
assessing horizontal cooperation in complex governance arrangements. 
a. Introduce network heterogeneity and network cohesion as quantitative indicators for 
assessing horizontal cooperation. 
b. Introduce Ostrom’s eight design principles for identifying key constraints to collective action 
and for assessing the robustness of complex governance arrangements. 
Objective 3: Analyze horizontal cooperation in the Berg catchment through a network perspective. 
a. Identify the actor network involved in the management of the water resources in the Berg 
catchment (i.e. the Berg management network). 
b. Assess horizontal cooperation based on the two network characteristics cohesion and 
heterogeneity. 
c. Demonstrate how network cohesion and heterogeneity in the Berg management network 
influence learning and collective action among the organizations involved in the 
management. 
Objective 4: Evaluate the existing governance arrangements that govern the Berg catchment. 
a. Identify and describe constraints to collective action and self-organization in the Berg 
catchment. 
b. Use Ostrom’s eight design principles as indicators for testing the robustness of the existing 
governance arrangements.  
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1.8. Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 presents the conceptual and theoretical background of this thesis and addresses the first 
research objective i.e. the development of a conceptual design applicable for the examination of 
complex governance arrangements. More specifically complex governance arrangements are 
approached through the focus on adaptive management (AM) and polycentric governance and a 
relational approach that focuses on actor networks. While the concept of AM emphasizes that 
governance arrangements need to cater for learning and collaboration in order to deal effectively 
with uncertainties and complexities that characterize SESs, the concept of polycentric governance 
enables the exploration of the intersection of different governance modes and their impact on 
horizontal cooperation. By linking the two concepts, a more nuanced and critical assessment of 
complex governance arrangements is possible. The third component of the conceptual design is a 
relational approach that is based on the research field of social networks. This approach directs the 
focus of attention to the patterns of interaction that link the various actors engaged in complex 
governance arrangements. These actor networks are the unit of analysis from which complex 
governance arrangements are investigated and their analysis provides the means for assessing 
horizontal cooperation in complex governance arrangements. 
Chapter 3 describes the analytical framework that enables the rather abstract concept of horizontal 
cooperation to be measured by employing the two concepts actor network and collective action. In 
the first part of the chapter the concept of an actor network is discussed in relation to a quantitative 
analysis of horizontal cooperation through a formal social network analysis (SNA). More precisely, 
network heterogeneity and network cohesion are proposed as quantitative indicators for assessing 
horizontal cooperation. To gain a more qualitative understanding of horizontal cooperation i.e. the 
extent to which existing management issues are jointly addressed and key management functions 
are shared, the second part of the chapter focuses on the concept of collective action. Elinor 
Ostrom’s (1990) eight design principles are introduced for identifying constraints to collective action 
and for assessing the robustness of the existing governance arrangements. By addressing the second 
research objective, Chapter 3 provides an important step for executing the assessment of horizontal 
cooperation in empirical settings. 
Chapter 4 provides a rationale for why a single case study and a mixed method approach were 
employed to address the research aim. The chapter, furthermore, elaborates in greater detail how 
empirical data was generated and analyzed and also provides important contextual information on 
the Berg catchment as the research site. 
Chapter 5 describes the findings from the SNA of the actor network through which the Berg 
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objective. The chapter provides the detailed analyses and discussions that are essential to identifying 
and understanding the interacting processes that shape water management in the Berg catchment. 
The nature of the interconnected themes and the need to retain a holistic perspective precludes a 
separation of the analyses on network heterogeneity and cohesion. The chapter starts by first 
identifying and describing the actors involved in the management of the water resources in the Berg 
catchment i.e. the Berg management network. Based on the two network characteristics cohesion 
and heterogeneity, the horizontal cooperation within the Berg management network is assessed. The 
chapter shows to what extent the network cohesion and heterogeneity in the Berg management 
network influence learning and collective action among the organizations.  
In Chapter 6 horizontal cooperation is assessed from a qualitative perspective through a focus on 
collective action. The chapter builds on the understanding gained in Chapter 5 and examines several 
collective action initiatives that have emerged in the Berg River management network. Each initiative 
is inspected with help of Ostrom’s eight design principles which spell out conditions that help to 
account for successful, long-term collective action. In addition to aiding in the identification of 
constraints to collective action and self-organization in the Berg catchment, the design principles 
functions as valuable indicators for testing the robustness of the existing governance arrangements. 
Hence, Chapter 6 addresses research the fourth research objective of this thesis. 
Finally, Chapter 7 synthesizes the understanding gained from previous chapters and in doing so 
addresses the last research objective of this thesis. The first part of the chapter reflects on the 
findings from the two empirical chapters. It does so in the context of the current state of water 
governance in South Africa and the appearance of and required conditions for management of 
regional SESs. The second part of the chapter turns more directly to evaluating the relevance of a 
relational approach for creating meaningful insights into horizontal cooperation and how it can be 
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2. Chapter: Conceptual design 
The main aim of the chapter is to provide a conceptual design that assists in understanding and 
analyzing complex governance arrangements through a focus on horizontal cooperation. The design 
is an attempt to integrate and analyze key variables and processes that shape water management in 
regional SESs. Developing such a design is a challenging endeavor as some of the concepts, upon 
which the design is built, have their origins in different disciplines. A detailed discussion of the 
concepts (such as AM, collective action, self-organization, networks etc.), their original roots, and 
how they are defined and utilized in this thesis will reduce the risk of ambiguous meanings or 
interpretations.  
This thesis approaches complex governance arrangements through a conceptual focus on adaptive 
management (AM) and polycentric governance. An AM approach, based on learning 13  and 
collaboration, is needed to deal with the complexities and uncertainties that characterize regional 
SESs as well as for managing such systems sustainably. The concept of p lycentric governance on the 
other hand provides a framework through which complex governance arrangements can be assessed 
in terms of their potential for becoming functioning systems conducive to AM. In the literature on 
SESs, AM is often associated with network governance (see section 2.2.2). The advantage of making 
use of the concept of polycentric governance is that it acknowledges the existence, hybrid 
expressions and interdependencies of several governance modes (bureaucratic hierarchies, market 
structures and networks) in a governance system. It provides therefore more room for exploring 
their interplay and effect on horizontal cooperation.  
The conceptual design shows how structural elements (e.g. actor networks, polycentric governance 
systems), process elements (e.g. AM, learning and collective action) as well as emerging elements 
(e.g. adaptive capacity, self-organization) in the governance system affect each other. The advantage 
of the proposed approach is that it does not predefine the relations between these elements. Rather, 
it allows them to emerge during the empirical analysis. Indeed the design was advanced through a 
constant conversation between theoretical understanding and empirical findings. The 
methodological tools utilized in this thesis, such as social network analysis (SNA) introduced in 
Chapter 3, made this possible. Although drawing any generalizations from a single case study is 
                                                          
13
 Based on Sol et al. (2013:37, and references therein) learning is understood in this thesis “as 
an interactive process that leads to some form of dissonance as a result to being exposed to alternative ways of 
seeing, knowing and understanding, coupled with a desire to overcome such dissonance by changing one’s own 
thinking in sometimes subtle and sometimes more radical ways”. Learning can lead to changes in perceptions, 
knowledge or behavior can be the outcome of learning processes in individuals or collective entities (such as 
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unlikely, the in-depth analyses of the Berg River catchment allowed the detection and probing of the 
effects of different governance processes and variables on actor relations and vice versa.  
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of why the thesis uses AM as its conceptual foundation, and 
how two of its defining features, learning and collaboration, could be realized in complex governance 
systems. Attention is given to the concept of polycentric governance as it speaks to the realities of 
contemporary water governance in regional SESs and provides possibilities for enhancing learning 
and collaboration through features such as redundancy, flexibility, and diversity. This is followed by 
proposing a relational approach that uses a social network perspective (with a focus on actor 
networks) as a starting point for assessing horizontal cooperation in complex governance 
arrangements. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the proposed definition of horizontal 
cooperation.  
2.1. Adaptive water governance in complex governance arrangements 
2.1.1. Adaptive management 
Chapter 1 highlighted that catchments are SESs in which complexity14 and uncertainties15 have 
become two of the defining system properties. Whereas previous approaches to water management 
have for the most part ignored the complexity of these systems and attempted to reduce 
uncertainties through control, the concept of AM explicitly acknowledges the complexity of SESs and 
their related uncertainties (Walters, 1968; Holling, 1978; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Lee, 1999; 
Pahl-Wostl, 2002 and 2007). Based on the understanding that uncertainties will prevail and need to 
be dealt with explicitly in an open and systematic way, the management goal has shifted from finding 
optimal solutions to increasing the adaptive capacity (AC) to learn from and better deal with 
developments resulting from uncertainty (Brugnach et al., 2008; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Chapin III et al., 
2009). Pahl-Wostl and Sendzimir (2005:5) propose that “[m]anagement must be adaptive and include 
the ability to change management practices based on new insights”.  
While the concept of AM has its origin in several disciplines and practitioner fields (Medema et al., 
2008), most of the understanding in the area of water management derives from the study of 
                                                          
14
 Complexity often occurs in situations where many overlapping features and processes exist and where their 
cause effect relationships are not well understood (Light et al., 2013). It is a product of multiple causality as 
well as emergence and contributes to uncertainty (Light et al., 2013). 
15
 Several types of uncertainties exist which relate to the lack of knowledge of the system (e.g. because of data 
gaps) lack of understanding of the system (e.g. because of non-linear processes and behaviour of system 
components), and the multiple perceptions and frames employed by stakeholders to define and understand 
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ecosystem management (e.g. Holling, 1978; Walters, 1986; Lee, 1993). The concept has evolved from 
a specific management tool mainly used in the management of ecosystems to an interdisciplinary 
research field on SESs that builds on substantial theoretical understandings (Termeer et al., 2010; 
Roux et al., 2006). So has for example, in the realm of water management, AM’s original focus on the 
testing of hypotheses and on carrying out management as an experiment been subsequently altered 
and is now more broadly referred as a learning based approach i.e. a systematic process of learning 
by doing and adapting based on what has been learned (e.g. (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). As the concept 
found more and more application in real-life setting it became apparent that the concept needed to 
more explicitly cater for the multi-stakeholder context in/through which SESs are often managed. 
Some scholars have coined the term adaptive co-management16 and distinguish it from AM to 
explicitly bring attention to the sharing of responsibilities and power and mutual learning among a 
heterogeneous set of actors/stakeholders(e.g. Moberg and Galaz, 2005, Armitage et al., 2007; Berkes 
2009). In this thesis adaptive co-management is situated within the broader research field of AM.17  
When defined and understood as an evolving and encompassing concept as well as research field AM 
sets out to provide a framework that integrates research, policy making and local practices in order 
to deal with the inherent complexity and unpredictability of dynamic SESs (Medema et al., 2008; 
Holling, 1978). Systematic monitoring of and critical reflection on the SES and the governance system 
become essential preconditions for improving management policies and practices through a learning 
based approach. “By re‐evaluating goals, objectives and means by which to achieve them as new 
information and insight become available, AM is more responsive to changing conditions of, and 
demands on, ecosystems as compared with traditional approaches to water resource management.” 
(Huntjens et al., 2011:148). Rather than providing a specific definition, AM is used and understood in 
this thesis as an approach through which a better understanding of the SES, the impact of human 
                                                          
16
 Adaptive co-management is often described as the merging of the concept of co-management (i.e. the 
sharing of responsibility between the state and resource users) and adaptive management (here understood as 
processes of interactive processes of learning and adapting) (Berkes, 2009).  A definition for adaptive co-
management that has been frequently referred was provided by  Folke et al. (2002: 20)  which describes it as ‘‘a 
process by which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, 
ongoing, self-organized process of learning-by-doing’’. This is very much in line with how the concept of AM has 
been described and defined in this thesis.  
17
 Please note that the author of this thesis will not go into the debate on differences between AM and adaptive 
co-management. Important for the reader to know is that contributions from the adaptive co-management 
literature, which are of great value to this thesis have been integrated into the discussion of adaptive 
management. Other authors such as Pahl-Wostl et al. (2007) and Huitema et al (2009) have taken a similar 
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behavior on the SES, as well as the impact of the existing governance system on human behavior and 
the SES can be obtained. Two of its most important features, learning and collaboration, determine 
jointly the adjustment of management practices and institutions to changing conditions and 
prevailing uncertainties. These two features are described in Section 2.1.1.2.  
2.1.1.1. The importance of adaptive management for the  governance system 
One of the primary objectives of AM is to enhance the adaptive capacity (AC) of the governance 
system (Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Broadly speaking, AC is a precondition for a system to be able to adapt to 
change by either altering some of its processes or, if required, to transform some of its structural 
elements (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). In social systems, AC is represented by the set of available resources 
(such as economic capital, physical resources, social capital, institutional arrangements and human 
capital) as well as the ability to mobilize these resources (Nelson et al., 2007). AC is often understood 
as the capacity of actors in a system to influence resilience (Folke et al., 2010).18 Resilience, which is 
understood here as a property of the SES, refers to the “capacity of a system to absorb disturbance 
and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, 
identity, and feedbacks” (Berkes and Ross, 2013:6, referencing Walker et al., 2004). Through AC, 
which is a latent property within the social part of the SES, actors are able to manage the resilience 
of the SES by exercising their agency (Berkes and Ross, 2013; Lebel et al., 2006). Hence, actors can 
anticipate change and use their learning capacities to mobilize the necessary social and political 
means for managing resilience. The flexibility and adaptability which is fostered through the AM 
approach enhances the capacity to innovate and to find policies and practices that enhance the 
resilience and sustainability of the SES (Medema, 2005).  
In light of the wicked societal problems (Rittel and Weber, 1973) that require multi-level and cross-
scale responses, utilizing AC and actually increasing its potential has become imperative (Chapin III et 
al., 2008). AM can enhance AC by taking advantage of, and where necessary reconfiguring, existing 
structures according to where capacities and resources are located in the system (Folke et al., 2005; 
Hahn, 2011). In other words, the aim is to make use of the self-organizing properties of the SES and 
the governance system (Pollard and du Toit, 2011). AC can further be strengthened through joint 
learning processes that lead to holistic problem definitions, to innovative ideas and to collective 
actions through which existing resources are combined and problems can be addressed at the 
                                                          
18
 This line of argumentation implies two things. Firstly, it points to the need for learning about the SES 
(including its dynamics, internal and external inter-linkages, determinants of change, etc.) in order to be able to 
manage resilience in an informed manner (Berkes et al., 2003). Secondly, it also calls attention to the need for 
collective action and collaborative governance, as the management of such a system involves a multitude of 
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adequate levels (Chapin III et al., 2010). While learning, in particular iterative collective learning, has 
always been an integral part of AM (Pahl-Wostl, 2007; 2009), more recently the importance of 
collaboration in AM has been emphasized (e.g., Armitage et al., 2009; Robinson and Berkes, 2011). In 
the context of enhancing AC through AM, collaboration does not only bring about a greater pool of 
resources, it can aid the transformational change (Chapin III et al., 2010) which may be required to 
overcome mismanagement or to move the SES into a more desirable state. Hence, the two features 
of AM, learning and collaboration, are of critical importance for the AC of the governance system and 
the resilience of the SES. It is argued in this study that it is particularly important to mobilize the self-
organizing properties at the operational level so that actors working at this level have the necessary 
resources available to co-produce services for public benefit and to maintain a functioning 
management system.  
2.1.1.2. Two features of AM: learning and collaboration  
Learning, in particular collective learning, is a key feature of AM for several reasons. The iterative and 
inclusive learning processes promoted by AM enhance the ability by a range of actors to create a 
better understanding of the SES as well as its governing system in spite of inherent uncertainties and 
complexity (e.g. Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Lebel et al., 2006). This in turn helps to develop robust policies 
and strategies that improve human behavior towards ecosystems (Biggs et al., 2012). A specific form 
of collective learning is social learning (Muro and Jeffrey, 2008). This form of learning is often viewed 
as an essential precursor for moving towards an AM approach in governance systems that have been 
dominated by the traditional command and control approach (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). Social 
learning19 refers here to “a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual to become 
situated within wider social units or communities of practice through social interactions between 
actors within social networks” (Reed et al., 2010). Social learning facilitates the co-production of 
knowledge, the development of shared meanings, and the reframing and creating of shared mental 
models (Pahl-Wostl, 2002, 2006; Scholz et al.,2013). Social learning processes are not so important 
for establishing a consensus, but are for recognizing and reconsidering existing frames, questioning 
underlying assumptions, and creating a critical level of trust among actors upon which new 
collaborative relations can be built (Sol et al., 2013). A final goal of social learning is to provide the 
necessary preconditions (agree on some ground rules, framing of a problem etc.) that are essential 
                                                          
19
 Within social learning, iterative reflection takes place when experiences, ideas and environments are shared 
(Keen et al., 2005). Social learning is a collective process, but one that has impact both at the individual and 
collective (e.g. community and institutional) level. The interactions among stakeholders may not only 
encourage the co-production of knowledge but also motivate the changing of understanding within the 
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for coming to some agreement on collective action (Muro and Jeffrey, 2008). Hence, social learning 
might be characterized as an important condition for collective action, a specific expression of 
collaboration, which is of interest to this thesis.  
Collaboration has become a defining feature and requirement of AM simply for the reason that with 
the opening of the governance landscape (discussed in Chapter 1), the number of actors involved in 
the management of SESs has increased (Bakker and Morinville, 2013,; Newell et al., 2012). In this 
context, resources and decision-making authority are often disbursed among different actors 
operative at various levels (ibid.). Furthermore, as mentioned above many management issues are 
wicked problems (or at least problems involving multiple scales). These problems can not be 
addressed effectively by individual actors operative at a particular level, thus collaboration is needed. 
Building on Imperial (2005:286 and references therein), collaboration is defined in this study as a 
“joint activity, by two or more organizations intended to create public value by working together 
rather than separately”. More specifically, it describes a sophisticated and enduring form of 
interaction among two or more actors (including organizations) that pools understanding and 
resources to address issues that none of the actors can address effectively on their own (Gray 1985, 
Fish et al., 2010; Emerson et al., 2011). Furthermore, collaboration is an interactive and dynamic 
process involving deliberation, problem definition, goal-setting and the creation of rules and 
structures governing their relationships (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Such a process cannot be easily 
enforced and therefore requires some voluntary commitment by the actors involved. That is, no 
actor has the power or authority to compel others to act (Imperial, 2005). Collaboration can take 
various forms and can be initiated from within a group of actors or externally by means of incentive 
structures. Collaborations can refer to formal engagements between governmental and non-
governmental actors but also to other types of initiatives such as community based co-management, 
private-public, or private-social partnerships. Although they differ in their levels of formality, what 
unites these arrangements is the aim of jointly creating a public value which has been specified in 
this thesis as the co-production of services for public benefit.  
Cross-boundary collaboration, which is achieved through cross-scale and cross-level interactions, has 
been particularly emphasized in AM (Armitage and Plummer, 2010). It speaks to the need to 
establish the linkages among organizations from different administrative levels or different, yet 
related, policy fields (including relevant stakeholder groups) (Huitema et al., 2009, Termeer et al., 
2010). Kallis et al. (2009) emphasize that to be of value for AM, collaboration must go beyond 
choosing between predefined interests to find consensus. Along those lines, Fish et al. (2010) state 
that in order to be an effective governance mechanism for adaptive water management, 
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values through iterative processes of knowledge exchange, dialogue, deliberation and negotiation. 
Hence, in the context of AM, collaboration must be accommodated by learning, in particular social 
learning processes that transcend different scales and levels (e.g. Armitage et al., 2008a; Robinson 
and Berkes, 2011; Wynborn, 2014).  
This thesis is interested in a particular expression of collaboration, namely collective action. Broadly 
speaking, collective action is comprised of a concerted group effort to achieve common interests (e.g. 
Meinzen Dick et al., 2004; Ratner et al., 2013; Vanni 2013). It is a social process that results from 
regular interactions and entails the pooling of resources which then leads to concrete joint activities 
(Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). Meinzen-Dick and Di Gregorio (2004) state that in the realm of natural 
resource management, collective action has become an indispensable element. Similarly, Poteete 
and Ostrom (2004:438) argue that in order “to sustain long-term use of renewable resource 
systems …. collective action is needed to limit resource use and to undertake various forms of active 
management”. The need for collective action is especially evident in the context of economic 
globalization and environmental degradation under which individual actors, in particular the state, 
are no longer able to effectively address on their own subsequent changes and stressors that impact 
SESs. It is not just the increasing awareness of interdependencies among actors sharing specific 
natural resources that makes collective action a viable governance mechanism, but there is also 
increased recognition that collective action allows actors to draw on different resources (e.g. 
knowledge, skills, and technologies) (e.g., Shrestha, 2013). Through collective action, the tangible (e.g. 
material and financial resources) and less tangible (e.g. knowledge, innovation) resources available to 
the actors involved in the management of the SES can be mobilized and distributed. In this way, 
collective action strengthens AC (Marshall, 2013). It allows for risk sharing (Carlsson and Sandstöm, 
2008) and for the sharing of capacities (Adger, 2003; Ireland and Thomalla, 2011). Hence, collective 
action has gained significant importance in the co-production of services for public benefit (in this 
thesis exemplified through joint management of the Berg River catchment) as it provides a means for 
sharing costs and responsibilities (e.g. Vanni, 2013). 
Chapter 3 will explain in great detail how the concept of collective action is specified and 
operationalized in this thesis based on Elinor Ostom’s work on common pool resources. Figure 2-1 
shows how collective action relates to AM, learning, and collaboration. AM takes place where 
collaboration and learning intersect. Although collective action is understood in this thesis as a 
specific expression of collaboration, Figure 2-1 indicates that not all collective action is voluntary. In 
situations where collective action results from coercive or compulsory pressure,20 the willingness to 
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 In conventional hierarchical governance approaches co-operative agreements and practices can also lead to 
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collaborate will be minimal and the cost to sustain collective action will be extremely high. Hence, a 
further assumption is that the cost for collective action will be the lowest where learning and 
collaboration intersect. Joint learning processes, for example, enhance the legitimacy of specific 
decisions and allow for the identification of common interests and goals (Berkes, 2009). Existing 
collaborative relations, on the other hand, can reduce transaction costs because previous 
interactions have already strengthened trust and reciprocity among the actors (Axelrod, 1984).  
 
Figure 2-1: Specifying the relationship among collaboration, collective action and AM 
 
The previous sections demonstrated the importance of learning and collaboration in AM and how the 
two features enhance each other in theory. In real world governance settings, learning and 
collaboration are not easily achievable. Both features necessitate the presence of specific 
institutional and relational capacities within the governance system .21 Learning, in the context of AM, 
requires the constant uptake of (new) information, the integration of different knowledge sources, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
goals and objectives. Decision-making processes remain largely in the control of higher level authorities e.g. a 
national department forces local government agencies to work jointly (Ueteka, 2012). 
21
 Other scholars have also pointed toward the institutional challenges that inhibit the realization of AM. Some 
scholars have even questioned whether current management systems that have evolved in a traditional 
command and control paradigm can provide the structural requirements needed for the implementation of AM. 
Others have argued that learning processes and experimentation are too costly and time consuming, large 
scale experimentation not feasible, ecological and economic risks too high, and not have enough empirical 
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and the subsequent co-production of knowledge (Pahl-Wostl and Hare, 2004). Medema et al. (2008: 
12), for example, state that “[L]earning is information intensive and requires the active participation 
of many stakeholders, who need to maintain a commitment to the learning process throughout.” 
This shows that a learning approach that includes experimentation, transparent and open 
communication systems, and reframing processes is resource intensive in terms of time and costs 
(e.g. Mostert, 2003; Newig and Fritsch, 2009). In particular, social learning requires the presence of a 
certain level of predictability and coherence in the governance system so that enough social capital 
and trust can be developed (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). Furthermore, these learning processes cannot 
just be confined to policy makers or managers but must activate ‘societal’ learning that can change 
prevailing unsustainable practices and governance systems (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Reed et al., 2010). 
Collaboration, on the other hand, necessitates flexible institutions that allow for a pooling of 
resources as well as coordination mechanisms through which actions can be prioritized and existing 
practices changed. 
Furthermore, it needs to be noted that collaboration and learning are not neutral processes but 
often shaped by existing power relations (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Armitage et al., 2008a). In situations 
where strong power disparities among the actors exist “the rules of collaboration are likely to favour 
entrenched, previous organized or concentrated interests (Fung and Wright, 2003: 263-4 in Brown 
2011:3). With regard to learning it is often the more powerful actors that have access to valuable 
knowledge and information and who can decide which knowledge is viewed as legitimate in the 
deliberation processes. Under certain circumstances collaboration as well as learning processes can 
increase the democratic deficit (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). That is, powerful actors can impose their 
interests because they have better access to and expertise in using available processes and 
mechanisms. 
This thesis suggests that one reason for the challenge of implementing AM approaches might be 
based on a conceptual weakness. That is, AM is often associated with network governance. Scholars 
from the field have placed a lot of emphasis on networks as enabling AM (e.g Folke et al., 2005, 
Armitage  et al.,2009, Berkes 2009, Tompkins and Adger 2004,). Theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence have supported the view that network-like governance arrangements can be particularly 
conducive for facilitating learning processes as well as collaboration across levels and scales (e.g. 
Newig et al., 2010). Furthermore, network-defining characteristics such as self-organization and 
emerging properties have also been described as AM principles (Engle, 2011). However, the isolated 
focus on network governance seems to have distracted scholars from paying adequate attention to 
the impact and intersection of other modes of governance (e.g. hierarchies and markets) and 
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“[t]here is a tendency to superimpose the adaptive management process on old, usually bureaucratic, 
institutional structures and processes.” In the context of complex governance arrangements, it is 
important to consider the effect of the different governance modes on horizontal cooperation jointly. 
Otherwise strategies to overcome obstacles to learning and collaboration may not be particularly 
effective. The concept of polycentric governance acknowledges the existence, hybrid expressions, 
and interdependencies of several governance modes in a governance system. The concept 
consequently provides the required conceptual space for assessing complex governance 
arrangements in terms of their potential for becoming functioning systems conducive for AM without 
over-emphasizing a particular mode of governance (i.e. network governance). 
2.1.2. Polycentric governance systems 
Polycentric governance systems consist of multiple, sometimes overlapping, decision-making centers 
that are characterized by partial autonomy and a shared set of rules.22 Proponents of such systems 
argue that they provide opportunities for the realization of AM as their components and processes 
create many opportunities for learning and experimentation and a greater ability to adapt to a 
changing environment (e.g. Ostrom, 2005; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Silveira and Richards, 2013). Their 
institutional design considers a multi-actor, multi-level and multi-mode governance context and 
allows for various degrees of freedom among the diverse centers of decision-making (Folke et al., 
2005; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Ostrom, 2010). This in turn, facilitates self-organization and the subsequent 
adjustments of policies and management practices to local context and available capacities (Biggs et 
al., 2012).  
The term ‘polycentricity’ was introduced by V. Ostrom and his colleagues in their influential article on 
polycentric governance in metropolitan areas (Ostrom et al., 1961). According to them, polycentric 
governance refers to “many centres of decision-making that are formally independent of each other 
[…] to the extent that they take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into 
various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts” (Ostrom, 2010:552). The advantage of effective polycentric systems is that they are able to 
balance bottom-up and top-down processes and establish cooperative links between the different 
centers of decision-making and thus “tend to enhance innovation learning, adaptation, 
trustworthiness, levels of cooperation… and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and 
sustainable outcomes at multiple scales” (Ostrom, 2010:552; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012).  
                                                          
22
 Decision-making centers can refer to individuals, organizations or inter-organizational platforms.  In this thesis 
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One of the main arguments as to why polycentric governance systems are so suitable for 
implementing AM is that they have the ability to provide for the necessary redundancy as well as 
flexibility resultant form the inherent diversity (Biggs et al., 2012; Skelcher, 2005). That is, the 
overlapping realms of responsibility (i.e. political authority) and functional capacities among a diverse 
set of actors provide many opportunities for producing services for public benefit, for addressing 
existing issues at the appropriate scale, as well as for the facilitation of self-organization and 
knowledge co-production across scales (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Biggs et al., 
2012; Lebel et al., 2006). It is further assumed that redundancy allows decision-making centers 
(actors/organizations) to take over functions that others may, under certain circumstance, no longer 
be able to fulfill (Berkes  et al.,2003; Kofinas, 2010). Hence, institutional failure at one level or at a 
decision-making unit is compensated for by actions taken somewhere else in the system (Biggs et al., 
2012; Sovacool, 2011). Furthermore, the participation of a wide array of actors in the production of 
services for public benefit provides ample opportunities for state and non-state actors to “negotiate 
solutions suited to the distinct problems faced by each community” (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011:15). 
In this way, it is assumed, the adequate utilization of available resources and competencies is 
enhanced. Claims have also been made that polycentric systems tend to be more resilient in 
comparison to mono-centric systems (Folke et al., 2005; G laz et al., 2012).  
Another reason for linking the concept of AM to the concept of polycentric governance is that the 
concept of polycentric governance does account for the various governance modes that might be at 
play. In other words, from a polycentric governance perspective social coordination is not steered 
solely through one particular governance mode (bureaucratic hierarchies, markets or networks). 
Rather “[t]op-down, bottom-up, network and side-by- side governance elements exist in parallel” 
(Pahl-Wostl 2009: 363). Although Ostrom never explicit linking polycentric governance and 
governance modes the way she has used and advanced the concept of polycentric governance 
provides the necessary space to explore the intersections of the modes. For this reason polycentric 
governance is used in this thesis as a guiding theory for investigating horizontal cooperation in 
complex governance arrangements. 
Yet, when can one actually speak of polycentric systems and how do they differ from fragmented 
systems or other multilevel systems? Vincent Ostrom and colleagues argue that one needs to look at 
the relationships among the various decision-making units. Only when they function in a coherent 
manner and show consistent patterns of interaction can one speak of a system (V. Ostrom et al., 
1961). Ostrom referred frequently to a shared set of rules. However, what this entails in context of 
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The discussion on polycentric governance systems seems to be even more complicated in the realm 
of water governance. Huitema et al. (2009) point out that in empirical terms all water management 
systems are polycentric. Similarly, da Silveira and Richards (2013:320) argue that “[t]he multiple 
substantive policy areas to be addressed in river basin governance, the diverse scales at which the 
issues driving these policies arise and are managed, and the persistent lack of fit between natural, 
political and administrative spatial units all imply that polycentricity is likely to be a natural 
characteristic of river basin governance”. Focusing more specifically on the operational level itself, 
Marshall (2013) point out that most management functions are interdependent, shifting and 
dispersed across different administrative and sectoral boundaries. In other words, because of the 
interdependencies, the social organization is already structured this way. In many settings the cost 
would therefore be too high to try to enforce or maintain a mono-centric approach on water 
resource governance. Yet, it also has become evident that water governance systems differ greatly in 
their degree of polycentricity and their characteristics. Hence, not all polycentric systems are 
functional nor are all conducive for AM. Therefore, the aim should be to find means to get the 
different decision making-centers in each particular setting to function in an integrated and coherent 
way (Marshall, 2013).  
Theoretical understanding and empirical evidence (e.g. from large scale case study projects such as 
the Twin2go project23 ) have supported the hypothesis that polycentric systems provide for the 
institutional dynamics important for AM. However, the discussion above implies that the limited 
understanding and clarity of the very features that define polycentric systems leave important 
questions unanswered (Galaz et al., 2012). Furthermore, despite the fact that the importance of 
horizontal cooperation in these systems has been acknowledged, how coherence and coordination is 
achieved through horizontal cooperation remains theoretically and empirically not well understood. 
Thus, more nuanced and detailed studies investigating polycentric systems and the role of horizontal 
cooperation are required.  
A focus on the linkages among the decision-making centers seems to be an especially promising 
approach for gaining more insight into the functioning of polycentric systems. (see for example Galaz 
                                                          
23
 Pahl-Wostl et al. (2012) show in their comparative analysis across a range of case studies that polycentric 
systems perform higher than centralized or fragmented systems. In their meta-analysis of 47 case studies, 
Newig and Fritsch (2009:210) came to the conclusion that the “analysis suggests that a highly polycentric 
governance system comprising many agencies and levels of governance yields higher environmental outputs 
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et al., 201224 and Silveira and Richards, 2013). Silveira and Richards (2013), who investigated water 
quality management in the Rhine River basin, Germany, and the Zhujiang River basin, China, point to 
the critical role of functional operational links through which key management functions in 
polycentric systems can be performed.25 They further argue that incentive structures at different 
levels are critical for the establishment of such cooperative links and conclude that “the influence of 
a polycentric governance system on adaptive capacity depends on the internal power dynamics 
among the components of a system” (Silveira and Richards, 2013:319).  
This suggests that in order to understand the functioning of polycentric systems, close attention 
needs to be paid to the patterns of interactions among the decision-making centers within such 
systems. This can contribute to a greater clarity of the key features of polycentric systems. 
Furthermore, by examining the patterns of interactions, the existence and nature of shared rules can 
be probed, and the intersections of governance modes can be explored. A relational focus can also 
aid in understanding how functional linkages are created and maintained in such systems. It is argued 
in this thesis that these linkages need to be investigated not only to better understand how they 
provide for flexibility and redundancy in the system but also how they facilitate coordination and the 
required coherence through which key management functions are maintained.  
To summarize the preceding discussion, the SES community has emphasized that governance 
arrangements need to consider complexity and uncertainties. This can be achieved through adaptive 
management based on learning and collaboration. Yet, little is known about the extent to which 
learning and collaboration (in the expression of collective action) is possible in regional SESs that are 
managed through complex governance arrangements. By linking the concept of AM to the concept of 
polycentric governance, a more nuanced and critical assessment of complex governance 
arrangements is possible. The concept of polycentric governance also addresses a shortcoming of AM; 
rather than limiting the discussion to network governance, the concept enables the exploration of 
the intersection of different governance modes and their impact on horizontal cooperation in 
complex governance arrangements.  
                                                          
24
 Investigating polycentric order through a focus on a global initiative among international organizations Galaz 
and colleagues (2012) showed that the network features of such systems can provide useful insights into the 
degree of polycentricity within a system. According to them polycentric systems are characterized by dense 
collaboration patterns and institutionalization that allows for uniformity and consistency (Galaz et al., 2012).  
25
 The authors (2013:321) define a functional polycentric governance system as “one that has developed the 
internal operational linkages that enable it to perform critical functions, such as the systematic exchange of 
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The discussion above also highlighted the point that so far neither theory nor empirical evidence has 
provided an adequate understanding of the features that relate to horizontal cooperation (including 
coordination and coherence) in complex governance arrangements. A relational perspective, i.e. a 
focus on the patterns of interactions that link the various actors engaged in complex governance 
arrangements, seems to be a promising approach. The next section will therefore turn to the 
discussion of how horizontal cooperation in complex governance arrangements can be assessed 
through a focus on actor networks.  
2.2. Actor networks: a relational approach for assessing complex governance 
arrangements 
The understanding of actor networks put forward in this thesis rests upon the relational approach 
that has been advanced by the literature on social networks (i.e. network research in particular 
SNA).26 The SNA literature views networks as “a way of thinking about social systems that focus our 
attention on the relationships among the entities that make up the system” (Borgatti et al., 
2013:1).27 The following sections provide an overview of the research field and demonstrate why it is 
most suitable for the operationalization of the network concept and analyzing horizontal cooperation 
in complex governance arrangements. Please note that Chapter 3 will in detail describe how the 
network concept is going to be operationalized. Given that the term network has become a popular 
concept in the past few years and is used in various ways in the literature, the section starts with 
clarifying paragraphs that show how the term actor network is understood and investigated in this 
thesis. 
2.2.1. Conceptualizing networks: network governance as mode of governance or actor 
network?  
Over the past decades, networks have become a popular concept in many disciplines, especially 
among those concerned with issues of governance (Börzel, 2011; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Kjaer, 
2011; Sandström, 2008).28 In the literature (e.g. public policy, state theories and organizational 
studies), networks are often associated with a specific mode of governance that can be contrasted to 
hierarchies or markets. They have also been used to describe more dynamic or fluid institutional 
                                                          
26
 Although most studies from that field refer to social networks rather than actor networks the author decided 
on actor networks because it makes it less confusing when terms such as network mode or governance network 
are also discussed in this thesis. 
27
 These entities can be individuals or collectives such as organizations. 
28
 Like the term ‘governance’, the term ‘network’ has been applied in different ways leading sometimes to 
contradicting statements. Another issue is that the term can easily be defined too narrowly or it is applied to 
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arrangements such as shadow networks (High et al., 2005), policy networks (Klijn and Koppenjan, 
2000) or epistemic communities (Haas, 1992). 29 The term network governance has primarily been 
advanced within organizational studies (e.g. Alter and Hage, 1993) and state theories (Rhodes, 1997). 
In its most general form, network governance describes non-hierarchical patterns of interactions and 
political steering among actors that represent different sectors and different levels (Hirschi, 2010). 
Newig et al. (2010) relate network governance to more stable forms of social coordination that have 
a cognitive dimension allowing for information transmission and learning aimed at fulfilling public 
purposes. Networks are often discussed in relation to characteristics such as open membership (i.e. 
the inclusion of state and non-state actors), flexibility (e.g. the emergence of leadership and 
institutions and new actor constellations), informality (e.g. it is often assumed that they are mainly 
governed by informal institutions), non-coercive steering (e.g. social sanctions or reputation), and 
self-regulation (Duit and Galaz; 2008; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Larsson, 2013). It has further been argued 
that many of these characteristics make networks particularly conducive for facilitating learning 
processes, self-organizing as well as cross-level and cross-sector linkages (e.g. Newig et al., 2010).  
Conceptualizing social networks in this way has helped to highlight the fact that the coordination and 
steering of social action30 does not occur only through hierarchical command and control structures 
or market mechanisms. It has further led to the acknowledgement that certain social networks 
should be treated as discrete forms of governance that have “unique structural characteristics, 
modes of conflict resolution, bases of legitimacy, etc.” (Provan and Kenis, 2007: 230). Yet, placing 
networks in direct opposition to hierarchies and market structures seems to be too narrow a 
definition and is not particularly helpful for understanding contemporary complex governance 
arrangements.31 In this thesis, networks are seen as essential features of social systems that capture 
kind and structure of interpersonal relations among actors. Understanding such relations is essential 
to understand various governance arrangements. When viewed from this broader, yet inclusive 
perspective, a network may contain aspects of all three modes of governance, namely market 
structures, bureaucratic hierarchies, and informal networks (see Figure 2-2). This view therefore 
                                                          
29
 Networks have frequently been described as governance mechanisms that are temporary and issue specific, 
and as having been created as problem-solving devices. 
30
 Social action may be understood as a negotiated process which is shaped by the interactions of actors who 
pursue their specific interests within the constraints of the resources and opportunities available to them 
(Coleman, 1990; Carlsson and Sandström, 2008).  
31
 Carlsson and Sandström (2008: 49) for example write that “[a] common misconception about networks is the 
assumption of a non-hierarchical structure. The authors continue to argue that this hierarchical structuring may 
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allows the capturing of formal and informal processes of social coordination, which derive from the 
different modes of governance and their interaction and which find expressions in actor networks 
(the unit of analysis in this thesis).  
 
Figure 2-2: Illustration of how networks are conceptualized in this study 
2.2.2. Actor networks conceptualized through a relational network perspective  
SNA is an interdisciplinary research field with contributions from sociology, psychology, anthropology 
mathematics, statistics, information science, etc. (Scott, 2000). What unites the different disciplines 
is “[t]he use of structural and relational information to study and test theories” (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994:21). Network research has its origin in the 1930s32 and has been used in many different 
contexts that go far beyond the more recent ‘network’ governance debate (Borgatti et al., 2009). 
From a SNA perspective, social networks are made of a set of actors (‘nodes’) which are connected to 
one another through relations (ties) of a specified type (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). More 
specifically, the basic idea is that “[t]he patterns of ties in the network yields a particular structure, 
and nodes occupy positions within the structure” (Borgatti and Halgin, 2012:5). A relationship 
between two actors denotes a flow of resources which can be information and knowledge or 
tangible resources such as money (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
Marsden (1990: 436) writes that “the approach seeks to describe social structure in terms of 
networks and to interpret the behavior of actors in light of their varying positions within the social 
structure”. Through the employment of SNA, the relationships that define the structure of the 
network are modeled, which in turn allows the researcher to study impacts of the structure on the 
functioning of the network and its individual network members (Wassermann and Faust, 1994). 33 
                                                          
32
 A good historic overview is provided in Wasserman and Faust (1994) as well as in Prell (2012). 
33
SNA is for example able to depict how  actors have access to differential opportunities such as social support, 
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This view is based on the assumption that “the characteristics of the social units arise out of 
structural or relational processes” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 7-8). According to this line of 
thinking, individuals do not respond or “react independently to circumstances based on their 
individual tastes, proclivities, and beliefs” and do not just “create new circumstances only by the 
simple aggregation of their actions” (Marin and Wellman, 2011:15). Instead, people’s responses to 
change are the consequences of interactions, and outcomes are caused by the opportunities and 
constraints created by the different network positions (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994).  
Bodin and Crona (2009: 367) point out that “when studying social networks it is important to specify 
which type of relations are being studied and how they relate to the research question”. This 
statement implicitly highlights the fact that from a relational network perspective there is no such 
thing as ‘the network’. It is the choice of tie (or combination of ties) that defines the positions of 
actors in the network. In other words, “each network will have its own structure and its own 
implications for the nodes involved” (Borgatti and Halgin, 2012). 34 In making the choice about which 
tie or ties to focus on, no claim is made that the actors only have relationships with other actors from 
within the actor set. In this way the network perspective does not claim that an actor’s behavior is 
only determined by his or her interactions with actors from the network under investigation. Rather 
the perspective is able to discern key relational structures that link actors to specific governance 
contexts such as water management and to show how those relational structures shape their 
behaviour towards each other and the resource system. 
The SNA approach has several advantages and unique perspectives which can enhance our 
understanding of complex governance arrangements: 
i) It does not classify people according to their personal/ organizational traits (such as race, gender, 
education, sector, profit-orientation) but according to their patterns of relations. It makes it 
therefore possible to reveal drivers and processes that may remain ignored by approaches that 
focus solely on the characteristics of the individuals. This thinking does not deny that to a large 
extent “human action is organized through categorical affiliations (e.g. race or social classes), but 
it is motivated by the structure of social relations in which actors are embedded” (Bodin et al., 
2011:9, referencing Emirbayer, 1997). Focusing only on attributes of actors would fail to detect 
how actors influence and are influenced by the patterns of relations in which they engage. 35  
                                                          
34
 In other words, a network will change its structure and composition for different relations even if it comprises 
the same set of actors. For example, in this study the structure of the information exchange management 
network will look quite different from that of the collaborative management network.   
35
 Borgatti and Mollina (2003: 337), for example, see “the network paradigm as a way to escape from the 
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ii) One of the major contributions that the social network literature has made in the field of 
governance (and particular environmental governance) is that it has been able to demonstrate 
that not “all social networks are created equal” (Newman and Dale, 2005: 1). Bodin and Crona 
(2009: 366) for example, highlight that “significant differences in governance processes and 
outcomes can be expected among networks experiencing structural differences in terms of 
density of relations, degree of cohesiveness, sub-group interconnectivity, and degree of network 
centralization”. Multiple studies have shown that networks enhance (Dietz et al., 2003; Hahn et 
al., 2006; Newman and Dale, 2007; Sandström, 2008), but also could constrain (Ernstson et al., 
2008; Crona and Bodin, 2006) adaptive management as they can facilitate or inhibit knowledge 
and information transmission, mobilization and allocation of resources, development of common 
rules and frameworks, and conflict resolution (Bodin and Crona, 2009). Network properties, 
therefore, play a vital role in the working of the network. 
iii)  SNA measures and techniques are guided by a formal theory that has its foundation in 
mathematics (graph theory and algorithms) (Wassermann and Faust, 1994). As a consequence 
social concepts such as social capital or horizontal cooperation can be expressed and measured 
formally through mathematical equations and hypotheses can be tested empirically (Borgatti et 
al., 2013).  
iv) SNA tries to bridge the structure agency divide by acknowledging the embeddedness of 
individuals in larger structures (Bodin et al., 2011). Individual and collective actions are 
influenced by actors’ previous relations. At the same time, many studies acknowledge the 
importance of agency and emerging structure in the networks (e.g. Bodin andPrell, 2011b; 
Ernstson et al., 2008). These studies point out for example that actors that have influential 
positions in the network (e.g. because they are connected to many others or because they 
connect actors or groups that would otherwise be disconnected) can drive or alter social 
processes, depending on how they use their influence in the network. 
v) A network approach provides a multilevel perspective: it allows the researcher to move between 
actor, sub- group and whole network level (Burt et al., 2013). By being able to shift between 
macro and micro levels of analysis a comprehensive picture of the relational structure of complex 
governance arrangements is created. 
To briefly summarize, through the study of social relations among a set of actors, the network 
concept has been advanced within the interdisciplinary field of social networks (i.e. SNA). The core 
idea upon which a SNA builds is that of “[t]he structure of relations among actors and location of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
analysed solely in terms of the attributes of the individual (e.g. openness to change, stake in the outcome, etc.) 
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individual actors in the network have important behavioral, perceptual and attitudinal consequences 
both for the individual unit and for the system as a whole” (Knoke, 1990:9). The argument put 
forward in this thesis is that the network concept as put forward by the SNA, is able to capture the 
interaction of various governance modes and the emerging structure that arises out of the pattern of 
regular interaction among diverse sets of actors that constitute complex governance arrangements. 
Hence, this relational approach makes it possible to observe the extent to which the emerging 
structure as well as the interplay of governance modes in turn constrains the collaborative behavior 
of the actors. Network analysis based explanations provide, therefore, new important insights on the 
potential in adaptive management and horizontal cooperation in complex governance arrangements. 
2.3. Advancing a concept of horizontal cooperation applicable for complex governance 
arrangements  
This chapter has discussed the phenomenon of complex governance arrangements in relationship to 
the concept of AM and polycentric governance systems. In this context, the importance of horizontal 
cooperation for learning and collaboration as well as for the successful co-production of services for 
public benefit was highlighted. Furthermore, a relational approach that takes the pattern of 
interactions among a set of actors (actor network) as point of departure for assessing horizontal 
cooperation in complex governance arrangements has been advocated. The reason behind this 
choice is that in regional SESs, water management is, to a large extent, the outcome of the patterns 
of interactions among the actors that are participating in the management. However, the plurality of 
actors and the different degrees to which the various actors are embedded in the management 
system necessitates that the patterns of interactions among those actors are not looked at in 
isolation. The behavior of those actors toward each other will partially be influenced by other 
institutional and organizational structures in which they are embedded. An examination of actor 
networks that takes into account how larger governance arrangements affect horizontal cooperation 
is considered an important additional step to provide new insights. Chapter three will elaborate how 
the effect of larger governance arrangements can be taking into account with the help of Ostrom’s 
eight design principles and a focus on collective action.  
Horizontal cooperation was defined in Chapter 1 as collaborative, non-hierarchical interactions of 
actors across sectors, modes of governance and spatial scales. The proposed definition assumes that 
that the co-production of services for public benefit, learning, and collaboration require not only 
sectoral integration but also a coherence36 of governance modes and existence of functional cross-
                                                          
36
 Coherence of governance modes, as described in this thesis, is based on a normative standpoint with a focus 
on sustainable water management. Coherence of governance modes may be expressed through incentive 
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boundary linkages. A focus on sectors is useful with regard to horizontal cooperation because sectors 
often describe needs and interests that specific actors may have in a resource. However, this 
classification appears to be too limited for capturing key variables and processes that shape water 
management in regional SESs. One way of unpacking how actors, which are embedded in complex 
governance arrangements, cooperate at the operational level is by looking at horizontal cooperation 
from a polycentric governance lens. It allows not only reflection on sectoral integration but also how 
the multi-level and multi-mode governance context in which actors are embedded affects their 
decision-making and their willingness to cooperate. Finally, cross-boundary linkages enable actors to 
interact across spatial scales as well as establish the required nestedness across administrative levels. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regardless of which mode their behaviour is primarily steered through, see the need to contribute to 
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3. Chapter: Analytical framework: Operationalizing a relational approach on 
horizontal cooperation 
Chapter 1 states that this thesis sets out to investigate the operational level in South Africa’s water 
governance system (using the Berg catchment as the site of investigation). The main aim of Chapter 3 
is to provide a thorough account of how the two concepts, actor network and collective action, have 
been operationalized in order to assess horizontal cooperation in complex governance arrangements. 
The former concept (actor network37) is primarily discussed in relation to a quantitative analysis of 
horizontal cooperation through a formal Social Network Analysis (SNA). The latter concept (collective 
action) allows for a qualitative analysis of horizontal cooperation. More specifically, it is with the help 
of Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) eight design principles that constraints to collective action are identified 
and a judgment about the robustness of the governance arrangements that govern the Berg 
catchment is made. Figure 3-1 provides a simplified illustration of the analytical framework. By 
linking the quantitative analysis of actor networks with the qualitative analysis of collective action a 
relational approach is sought for describing and analyzing horizontal cooperation at the operational 
level in South Africa’s water governance system. The relational perspective proposed in this thesis 
describes and investigates the functioning of governance systems with a focus on actor relations 
(including the institutions that shape the behavior of the actors to each other).  
                                                          
37 
Note that the set of actors that comprise the actor network under investigation are organizations and not 
individuals. A justification of why the focus has been placed on organizations and not on individuals is provided 
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Figure 3-1: The proposed analytical framework for assessing horizontal cooperation 
The primary intent of employing the SNA has been to examine how the relational structure of the 
actor network affects horizontal cooperation, the potential for learning processes, as well as 
collaboration in the Berg management network. The qualitative investigation into collective action, 
on the other hand, allows the exploration of the extent to which existing management issues are 
jointly addressed and key management functions are shared among actors. Hence, valuable insights 
into the constraints affecting collective action and the capacity to self-organize in the Berg catchment 
can be gained from scrutinizing different collective action initiatives. Collective action, which was 
defined in Chapter 2 as a specific expression of collaboration, can be viewed as an outcome variable 
of horizontal cooperation. This does not negate the insight that collective action is part of an iterative 
process that includes learning, negotiation and horizontal interaction. Consequently, collective action 
is also a feature that can strengthen horizontal cooperation. Both aspects are of relevance to this 
study.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, core assumptions and concepts put forward by the field of 
network research (in particular SNA) are described. Then, the relevance of SNA in the area of the 
management of SESs is described, followed by an illustration of how the properties of actor networks 
can affect social processes such as learning and collective action. Lastly, the two network 
characteristics, network heterogeneity and network cohesion as well as related network measures, 
are discussed in greater detail. From a relational perspective, cohesion refers to the 
interconnectedness between the different actors, i.e. how well connected they are. Heterogeneity 










P a g e  | 37 
 
linkages among them. It is with the help of these two network characteristics that horizontal 
cooperation in the Berg catchment is assessed in Chapter 5.  
In the second part of the chapter (Section 3.2), the concept of collective action is presented through 
a consultation of the work by Elinor Ostrom on common pool resources38. First, characteristics of 
collective action are discussed based on 'the commons' literature. In this context the terms self-
organization and self-governance are introduced. This is followed by turning to Ostrom’s eight design 
principles (1990) and by providing a justification for their value to the analysis of collective action in 
regional SESs. Ostrom’s design principles are then complemented by several organizing themes that 
are intended to detect additional factors fostering or inhibiting collective action in regional SESs. The 
proposed analytical approach for investigating collective action is applied in Chapter 6 which 
examines constraints on the selected collective action initiatives in the Berg catchment. 
3.1. Understanding the management of regional SES through a network perspective  
3.1.1. SNA: Patterns of relations as the primary unit for theorizing  
Marin and Wellman (2011:17) state that SNA “is neither a theory nor a methodology”. They continue 
by saying that SNA provides a specific way of looking at a problem. Borgatti and colleagues expand 
on the discussion by arguing that “…some social scientists, unfamiliar with formal theorizing, have 
misconceived the field as methodology. It does indeed have a distinct methodology that is born of its 
relational view of social phenomena. But the theoretical concepts …such as centrality and structural 
equivalence are just that: theoretical concepts that are part of a distinctive approach to explaining 
the social world” (Borgatti et al., 2013:10, referencing Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). This suggests that 
any study that aims to utilize SNA to help to explain a particular social phenomenon (rather than 
reducing it to a simple methodology measuring a few relations) must have a good understanding of 
the theoretical understandings and explanatory mechanisms upon which SNA builds. Marin and 
Wellman (2011:3) emphasize for example that “[t]aking social relations seriously calls for more than 
knowing how to measure some characteristics of networks, such as the density of their 
interconnections. It requires a set of assumptions about how best to describe and explain the social 
phenomena of interest.” It is for this reason that Box 3.1 captures succinctly what it means when 
patterns of relations between actors become the primary unit for sociological theorizing and 
                                                          
38
Common pool resources (CPRs) refer to “resource systems regardless of the property rights involved. CPRs 
include natural and human constructed resources in which (i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and 
institutional means is especially costly, and (ii) exploitation by one user reduces resource availability for others.” 
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research (Marin and Wellman, 2011). The focus is only on key ideas which have particular relevance 
for this study and which is discussed again in subsequent sections.  
Box 3.1: Key network ideas of relevance to this study 
The cost of relation: 
SNA builds on the assumption that all relations come at a cost (Granovetter, 1973; Ernstson, 2008). It 
is not only the establishment of the relational ties but also their maintenance that require effort and 
costs. Since it is assumed that it takes more effort to establish new relations then existing ones, most 
resources will flow through already established relations. Furthermore, more intense patterns of 
interaction require more effort at maintenance than infrequent and shallow interactions.  
Homophily: 
A concept closely related to that of strong ties (and even cohesive sub-groups) is that of homophily. 
It refers to the tendency of actors who share specific attributes to also interact more frequently with 
each other (Prell et al., 2010; Newig et al., 2010). Because it is easy for like-minded actors to 
communicate and develop a common understanding, they are more attracted to each other (Prell et 
al., 2010). This reasoning is closely related to social influence theory (Friedkin, 2006). 
Modularity:  
Modularity refers to the tendency to form multiple groups within the network (Bodin et al., 2006). 
These cohesive sub-groups distinguish themselves from the rest of the network through high density 
of relations among the group members in comparison to the rest of the network. This allows for the 
development of specialized knowledge generation within the groups (Bodin and Crona, 2009). Yet, 
the development of a group identity may be based on an “us vs. them” demarcation making 
collaboration with other actors or groups from the network less likely.  
Strong ties: 
‘‘The strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional 
intensity, and intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie’’ 
(Granovetter, 1973:1361). Actors sharing strong ties, often also referred to as a bonding ties, tend to 
share similar views, exert strong influence upon each other, and are able to communicate effectively 
and often develop high levels of trust towards each other (Prell et al., 2010). They tend to establish 
within groups of likeminded actors. One of the weaknesses of strong ties is that they often carry 
redundant information (Granovetter, 1973). 
Weak ties:  
They are also referred to as bridging ties and denote less frequent and less intense patterns of 
interactions. They tend to establish among actors that are rather dissimilar in their attributes (Prell et 
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in a network and connect different segments of a network (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 2001; Bodin and 
Crona, 2009). Unlike strong ties, weak ties are fragile in that they can easily be terminated and are 
not conducive to the development of trust or close cooperation (Bodin and Crona, 2009). According 
to Granovetter’s (1973) ‘strength of weak ties’ argument, weak ties provide bridges between 
different segments or groups in the network and are carriers of non-redundant information. Based 
on this understanding, it is assumed that most opportunities as well as innovations will arise out of 
weak patterns of interaction. 
‘Structural hole’ argument (Burt 1992): 
This concept has been developed by Burt, whose work was strongly influenced by Granovetter’s 
strength of weak ties argument. Structural holes denote “missing relations inhibiting information 
flow between people” (Burt et al., 2013:529). It implies that different knowledge is created and gets 
communicated on either side of the hole. Using Burt’s metaphor, “[a] structural hole is a buffer, like 
an insulator in an electric circuit. People on either side of the hole circulate in different flows of 
information” (Burt et al., 2013:529). Actors that can bridge structural holes have the potential to act 
as brokers that fulfill a bridging role in the network (Bodin et al., 2006). 
3.1.2. Network structure and management of SES: linking network properties and social 
processes  
SNA has particular relevance for the area of the management of SESs (Bodin and Prell, 2011b). 
Chapter 1 already highlighted that regional SESs have become to be managed through a wide variety 
of governance arrangements. State and non-state actors are operative as partners, contenders or 
sometimes subordinates to each other. Employing a SNA in circumstances where actors and 
boundaries are not clearly defined can be advantageous because it provides a systematic way for 
revealing the most critical relational configurations that shape the governance and the management 
of SESs and the natural resources therein (Bodin and Crona, 2009). This enables researchers to test 
and question prevailing assumptions about governance arrangements. It can also provide answers to 
questions of how and where to intervene in the system to improve existing arrangements (Prell et al., 
2008; Stein, 2010). 
In recent years, researchers concerned with the management of SESs have started to employ SNA 
analyses to better understand the impact of different governance arrangements (including network-
like arrangements such as co-management) on resource management (Bodin and Prell, 2011b and 
case studies therein; Hirschi et al., 2010, Rathwell and Peterson, 2012; Vance-Borland and Holley, 
2011 etc.). These studies have helped to create more knowledge on the positive and negative 
impacts of the structural characteristics of social networks on the management of SESs. Or, in other 
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specific SESs the researchers were able to show whether or not specific social processes important 
for the management of SESs, such as the development of common rules or the sharing of new and 
important knowledge, were happening. Figure 3-2 illustrates the relationship between network 
characteristics and properties, social processes, and governance outcomes as perceived in this thesis. 
Network characteristics are, for example, cohesion or heterogeneity. Network properties are, among 
others, density or centralization. Social processes include learning which may be based on other 
social processes such as information sharing, negotiation or knowledge generation. Governance 
outcomes could be a management plan, but also a well-maintained river system. 
 
Figure 3-2:The influence of network structure on social processes that determine governance outcomes. 
Arrows indicate the direction of influence. 
 
3.1.3. Network properties and their impacts on learning and collective action 
The conceptual design presented in Chapter 2 has highlighted two social processes: learning and 
collaboration (expressed here through collective action) as important features of AM. To be able to 
investigate how actor relations within the network impact collective action and learning and 
subsequent governance outcomes (such as responses to degrading water quality), several network 
properties that are understood as being influential with regard to the realization of collective action 
and learning processes are highlighted in Table 3-1 below. The table is based on the review of 
previous SNA studies in natural resource management and shows common assumptions that are 
associated with specific network properties. Whereas some of the measures relate to the whole 
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Table 3-1: Presumed impacts of network properties on learning and collective action. 
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Sources: Bodin and Crona, 2009; Bodin et al., 2006; Ernstson et al., 2008 ; Newig et al., 2010; Prell et 
al., 2010; Prell et al., 2008.  
Table 3-1 and empirical evidence from other studies indicate that there is a need to balance different 
structural properties in order to support AM (Bodin et al., 2006; Ernstson et al.,2008; Bodin and 
Crona, 2009; Bodin and Prell, 2011a). Different network properties will enhance particular social 
processes while, at the same time, inhibiting others. Bodin et al. (2006) provide the example of 
centrality within a network. While high centrality is good for the effective coordination of actors it 
may restrict learning and innovation within the network because the communication flow is 
channeled through the central actor and direct information exchange among most actors remain 
limited. Furthermore, when some properties become too dominant they actually can start to inhibit 
the very processes they intended to support. If density, for example, in a network becomes too high 
then this might lead to the homogenization of experience, knowledge, and attitudes in the network 
and reduces the ability to detect and respond to changes in the system (Bodin and Crona, 2009). 
Some studies even suggest that different, sometimes seemingly opposing, characteristics are 
important for different phases in a management or governance cycle. (Hirschi, 2010; Ernstson, 2008). 
In other words, there is no ideal network structure that can cater to all circumstances and all 
management phases (Bodin et al. 2006; Bodin and Crona, 2009). 
3.1.4. Linking network heterogeneity and network cohesion to the concept of horizontal 
cooperation 
The previous section highlighted that it would be too simplistic if an analysis singled out individual 
network properties that may enhance social processes such as learning and collective action. 
Network properties interact, reinforce, or obstruct one another, and their interplay is influenced by 
the socio-ecological context in which they are embedded (Bodin and Prell, 2011). To be able to 
capture the interaction of the different network properties within a particular network and how 
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broader network characteristics of heterogeneity and cohesion are brought into focus39. Detailed 
definitions and explanations of the two terms are provided in the subsequent sections. 
3.1.4.1.  Rationale  for heterogeneity and cohesion 
The choice to focus on heterogeneity and cohesion was influenced by the following three reasons. 
Firstly, both the conceptual design of this thesis as well as the studies mentioned above indicate that 
for an actor network to be able to utilize its learning and collective action capacities, some degree of 
integration and coherence (i.e. cohesion) and enough heterogeneity and openness for the inclusion 
of different types of knowledge in the network structure is required. Secondly, cohesion and 
heterogeneity can serve as indicators for horizontal cooperation. Indeed, their joint investigation will 
provide a more comprehensive picture of horizontal cooperation. As already mentioned in the 
conceptual design it is assumed in this study that one of the main functions of horizontal cooperation 
is to facilitate the co-production of services for public benefit. This necessitates even in complex 
governance arrangements social coordination as well as a certain degree of coherence among 
interacting governance modes. To achieve social coordination through any type of governance 
arrangement requires cohesion. Cohesion is especially important for dealing with internal conflicts as 
well as for mobilizing and coordinating collective action (Sandström and Rova, 2010b). Heterogeneity 
on the other hand is critical for dealing effectively with factors impacting the SES (e.g., it enables the 
detection of problems in the system and provides access to important resources such as skills, 
funding, and knowledge to respond to emerging problems) (Sandström and Rova, 2010a). Access to 
various resources, knowledge sources, and decision-making processes provides flexibility and the 
capability to adapt to changing or new circumstances (Folke et al., 2005). In other words, exploring 
how those characteristics are realized and balanced in the network and through which network 
properties helps to better understand the nature of horizontal cooperation in the network. Thirdly, 
Chapter 2 highlighted the role of cross-boundary linkages for achieving AM. The argument put 
forward here is that cross-boundary linkages assist in balancing the network characteristics of 
cohesion and heterogeneity.  
3.1.4.2. Defining and measuring heterogeneity and cohesion  
Researchers such as Sandström and Carlsson (2008, 2010) have utilized the two network 
characteristics, cohesion and heterogeneity, in previous studies to demonstrate how they affect 
adaptability in co-management systems. This thesis builds on their theoretical understandings40 and 
                                                          
39
 In this study the term network cohesion instead of network closure is used. Both express the idea of 
connectedness among a set of actors.  
40
 The theoretical understanding is based on Burt’s notion of social capital, which he has expressed through the 
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some of their measurements. For example, their proposed hypothesis that networks consisting of a 
heterogeneous set of actors that are centrally and densely integrated facilitate AM processes has 
guided in parts the analytical framework proposed in this chapter.  
However, this thesis differentiates itself from the previous studies in the following ways. Sandström 
and colleagues have mainly focused on rule-making processes in their respective studies. This thesis, 
because of its focus on horizontal cooperation at the operational level, is primarily concerned with 
the implementation process and day-to-day management activities. In this type of context, the 
possibilities for achieving the required connectedness and integration in the network through a 
central coordinating actor is rather limited as too many semi-autonomous actors are involved in the 
various management functions. It is assumed in this thesis that it is not only a few central actors that 
can provide for the cohesion in a network but that cohesion may also be achieved through actors 
that occupy bridging positions in the network and use this position to enhance coordination and 
learning in the network. In other words, a network that consists of several groups in which a certain 
level of connectedness among them is provided by bridging actors may exhibit the necessary 
cohesion for the coordination of action and for trust to develop in order to engage in collective 
action.  
In Figure 3-3, heterogeneity and cohesion are viewed as indicators of horizontal cooperation, and 
their relationship to collective action and learning is shown. The Figure implies that network 
heterogeneity facilitates access to different types of knowledge and resources. Network cohesion 
supports the ability to mobilize these resources, to set common rules of engagement and to manage 
the SES jointly. For the purpose of this study learning is more associated with heterogeneity 
(especially integration of different knowledge sources) and collective action with cohesion (especially 
with the prioritization of activities, the pooling of resources, and the uptake of management 
functions that go beyond self-interest and/or mandate). However, cohesion influences, to a certain 
extent, the learning process, and heterogeneity allows for more choices regarding collective action 
(e.g., the acquisition of more appropriate resources).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2003). It also is closely related to the notion of bonding and bridging ties (Granovetter, 1973; Bodin and Crona, 










P a g e  | 45 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Heterogeneity and cohesion as important indicators of horizontal cooperation influencing learning 
and collective action 
 
For investigating horizontal cooperation at the operational level through an analysis of network 
cohesion and heterogeneity, the following social network measures have been combined: density 
and centralization measures are used for assessing the cohesion in the network. To gain a more 
accurate picture of the cohesion in the actor network several other measures such as degree 
centralization and a sub-group analysis were carried out. Heterogeneity is measured by combining 
attribute data (actor diversity) and cross-boundary linkages (i.e. measurement of interactions among 
sub-populations of the network defined by specified actor attributes). Degree and betweenness 
centrality were the primary measures to locate central actors41 in the network. Other potentially 
influential actors, i.e., those critical with regard to cross-boundary linkages, were identified via the G-
F brokerage method (Gould and Fernandez, 1989). Figure 3-4 provides an overview of all relevant 
network measures and how they assist in assessing cohesion and heterogeneity in the actor network. 
                                                          
41
 Central actors are those that either are connected to many others in the network or are connected to many 
other organizations that otherwise would be unconnected. Central actors have often more advantage as they 
can control information, have easy access to resources available through the network and can influence others 



























































Figure 3-4: Overview of the social network measures used for analyzing cohesion and heterogeneity. 
Network cohesion 
A cohesive network can be described as a well-connected network in which all actors are closely 
linked to each other either through many direct (and strong) ties or indirectly through central 
coordinating actor(s) (Borgatti et al., 2013; Sandström and Rova, 2010b). In other words, high levels 
of interconnectedness characterize cohesive networks.42 It has been argued that actors that are part 
of a cohesive network are more likely to establish common values and norms, monitor each other, 
and to develop trust relations (e.g., Carlsson and Sandström, 2008). For example, Hirschi (2010:9) 
writes, “[f]rom a perspective of network theory, strengthened cohesion among the relevant actors in 
a region… [fosters] a normative environment that facilitates cooperation across different societal 
sectors with diverging interests and objectives.” Similarly, Sandström and Rova (2010b) argue that 
well integrated networks facilitate the formation of common views regarding the system to be 
managed as well as the specific problem definition. Features that are strongly dependent on 
cohesion such as trust, common problem definition, and goal setting are critical for collective action 
(Ostrom 1990; Ansell and Gash 2007). Indeed, Sandström and Rova (2010b) argue that cohesion has 
been positively related to collective action.  
                                                          
42
 In some studies the term network cohesion has been equated with the term network closure (see for 
example Sandström and Rova , 2008 or Sandström, 2011). For the purpose of consistency the term cohesion is 
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Network cohesion is assessed in this thesis by combining density measures with centralization 
measures. These measures are commonly used among network analysts for measuring cohesion (see 
for example Hirschi 2010; Stein et al., 2011; Carcamo et al., 2014). Network “centralization measures 
the extent to which ties hover around one actor, [network] density measures the extent to which all 
ties are actually present” (Prell, 2011: 170). In other words, whereas density focuses on the number 
of ties present, centralization looks at tie distribution. This provides a good understanding of whether 
the interconnectedness in an actor network is reliant upon a few central actors. A more detailed 
description of the measures and why they were combined is provided in the discussion below.  
Network density  
Density provides a good account of the extent to which all actors in the network are linked to each 
other. In other words, density gives information on the overall activity in a network (Prell, 2012; 
Borgatti et al., 2013). Network analysts argue that many ties between actors promote collaboration 
because they strengthen trust and reciprocity as well as decrease the risks and costs of collaboration 
(Bodin et al., 2006; Sandström, 2011). It has also been hypothesized that the higher the density in a 
network the greater is the potential for collective action (Burt 2003; Bodin and Crona, 2009). A 
network in which many actors are directly connected facilitates the development, and compliance 
with, mutual norms and increased information and knowledge dissemination. However, as 
mentioned in Section 3.1.1, too much density can potentially lead to the homogenization of 
knowledge and information (Bodin and Crona, 2009).  
Prell (2012:167) states that density “counts how many actual ties exist in a network, and expresses 
this number as proportion of the potential ties that could exist in the network”. In other words, 
network density can be measured by dividing the number of existing ties by the number of possible 
ties (Scott 2000; Bodin and Crona, 2009). A network in which all actors are directly linked to each 
other has a density of one. A network in with a density score of 0.25 means that 25% of all possible 
ties are present.43  
For the analysis of the Berg management network, density measures were used to: 
a. establish the level of activity within the network [whole network density]; 
b. compare the level of interaction among the organizations with regard to information 
exchange and collaboration [whole network density]; 
                                                          
43
 It is important to note that the number of possible ties in a network with symmetric ties differs from those 
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c. compare the interaction within and between groups of actors identified by specific actor 
attributes (e.g., core WMOs) or relational groups (e.g., collaborative clusters) [group density]. 
In order to accurately interpret the density in a network and to draw conclusions about its cohesion, 
it is vital to consider the size of the network, whether the network is organized in segmented sub-
groups, as well as what the level of network centralization might be (Prell, 2012).44 All of these 
factors impact density (see for example Scott, 2000; Borgatti et al., 2013). If a network consists of 
various sub-groups it is not enough to examine whether sub-groups are present but also the level of 
fragmentation in the network caused by the sub-groups. The possibility of the existence of a sub-
group structure was investigated in this study by using the Girvan-Newman algorithm in NetDraw 
(Borgatti, 2002) and UNCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). A more detailed discussion on sub-group 
analyses in this study is provided in Section 3.1.4. Network density measures were further 
complemented with degree centralization measures based on degree centrality scores of the 
individual actors.  
Network centralization 
As mentioned earlier, network centralization gives an indication of the extent to which ties 
concentrate around particular actor(s) (Scott, 2000; Borgatti et al., 2013).45 Any measure of graph 
centralization, whether it is based on degree, betweenness, or closeness centrality, looks at the 
differences between the centrality scores of the most central actor and those of all other actors 
(Scott, 2000). That is, as a first step, the actor centrality of each actor is determined and then the 
differences between each actor centrality score and the centrality of the most central actor are 
compared (Borgatti et. al., 2013; Freemann 1979). 
Sandström and Rova (2010a) state that degree centralization depicts the level of hierarchy within 
networks. The higher the centralization score the more centralized the network. For example, a 
centralization score of 1 implies that all ties are centered around one actor. This is represented 
through a star-like network graph. A centralization score of 0 means that all actors are equally 
connected to each other. This is represented through a circle-shaped network graph. 
                                                          
44
 Friedkin (1981) for example, emphasises that density is not a good indicator for cohesion in network where 
many cohesive sub-groups exists. These groups have a high level of interconnectedness among their members, 
yet they may have few links among each other leading to a rather fragmented network.  
45
 To clarify the difference between centrality and centralization, Scott (2000) makes a useful distinction. He 
states that the term centrality should be confined to the idea of point centrality (i.e. actor level). Centralization 
on the other hand “refers not to the relative prominence of points [i.e. actors] but to the overall cohesion and 
integration of the graph” (Scott, 2000:82). In other words, centralization is a network level concept and 
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Sandström and Rova (2010a) argue in their study that high network centralization is an indicator of 
network closure (i.e., high network cohesion). Yet, others, such as Prell (2012), do not necessarily 
associate a high centralization score with a network that is cohesive. Prell uses the example of two 
networks that have the same density score but in which one has a high centralization score in 
comparison to the other. Prell points out that the network with the lower centralization score may 
actually be the more cohesive network as the ties are more evenly distributed. This shows that one 
cannot easily jump to conclusions. Rather, it is important to look at the various measures jointly, as 
well as integrate information generated from the qualitative data of the network. To enhance the 
analysis of the cohesion within the Berg management network, the maximum distance (diameter 46) 
between any two organizations as well as the average steps between any two actors (average path 
length) were calculated. A relatively small diameter as well as short average path length means that 
all the actors in the network are in close proximity to one another. Hence, it does not take much time 
for information to travel from one specific actor to another. The final interpretation of the density 
and centralization scores was guided by the qualitative understanding of the network derived from 
interviews and participant observation and by considering network density jointly with other 
network measurements. 
Network heterogeneity  
Borrowing from Sandström and Rova, (2010a: 14) a heterogeneous network is defined here as a 
network “that is comprised of a rich diversity of different types of actors involved in extensive cross-
border collaboration”.47 The concept is therefore concerned with the range of actors involved and 
the resource exchange among them (Sandström and Rova, 2010b). By looking at the diversity of 
actors involved in the network, the researcher can get a first impression of the potential resources 
available to the network as it reflects the different resources, types of knowledge and skills that the 
different actors can contribute to the network. In other words, a network composed of a diverse set 
of actors could increase management performance as it ultimately enhances the acquisition of 
relevant resources (Sandström and Rova, 2010b).48 The actors may possess important resources 
themselves or access them through their linkages to groups or networks outside of the Berg 
management network. Finally, heterogeneity is also understood as being critical for the development 
                                                          
46
  Diameter is the longest geodesic (geodesic refers to the shortest path between two actors) in the network. 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). 
47
 This definition builds also on Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) as well as Carlsson and Sandström (2008). 
48 When assessing the heterogeneity of the network it is important to keep in mind the specific research 
context. In circumstances where only few and highly similar users and managers exist one cannot expect that 
the network will comprise a highly diverse actor set. Therefore the assumption here is that the network should 
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of new ideas and innovative solutions and enhanced knowledge generation (Burt, 1992; Sandström, 
2008). 
Yet, just having different kinds of actors involved does not necessarily mean that these actors 
exchange resources, information and knowledge with each other (Sandström and Rova, 2010b). It is 
important to investigate the linkages between the different kinds of actor as this may provide a more 
accurate indication to what extent existing resources are actually available to the network. Hence, it 
is the level of cross-boundary interaction that needs to be measured in order to establish an 
adequate understanding of the heterogeneity in a network.  
Actor diversity and cross-boundary linkages  
Similar to Sandstöm and Rova (2010b), actor attributes from the organizations were used in this 
study to assess the cross-boundary interactions among the actors involved in the Berg management 
network. Broadly speaking actor diversity can be assessed by counting the number of actors 
representing different stakeholder groups or other forms of relevant categorization (Sandstöm and 
Rova, 2010b). Hence, this is a non-structural measure based on attribute data.  
One way for assessing cross-boundary linkages can by examining the proportion of ties that connects 
actors from specified categories (Sandstöm and Rova, 2010b). However, it is important to note that 
cross-boundary linkages can be defined in various ways. In the context of AM three types of cross-
boundary linkages became the focus of the investigation of heterogeneity in this thesis:  
i. Linkages across governance modes and linkages across sectors (E-I Index); 
ii. Linkages between actors that are ecological knowledge sources and those that are not; 
iii. Linkages and integration of major water users and ‘dependent’ stakeholders (core-periphery 
analysis discussed in section). 
Cross-boundary linkages: modes and sectors 
The definition of horizontal cooperation advanced in this thesis makes specific reference to sectoral 
integration and coherence of governance modes. That is, the level of interaction of actors across 
sectors and modes of governance provides a good indication on the level of horizontal cooperation. 
The assumption is that a high level of collaborative interaction between the different sectors may 
indicate that conflicts of interest (e.g., competing demands, differing sectoral goals and needs) are 
effectively negotiated among the organizations. A high level of collaborative interaction between 
organizations from different modes of governance, on the other hand, may signal a certain level of 
coherence across the modes. It may for, example, be indicated that incentive structures provided by 
the different modes complement each other (e.g., supply chain farm audits and government 
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cross-boundary linkages (for sectors and modes) implies that the heterogeneity of the network is 
effectively utilized and one may speak of a level of horizontal cooperation that allows for the 
effective co-production of services for public benefit. UCINET has a function called the E-I Index 
which enables the researcher to measure and compare inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral interaction 
as well as inter-mode and intra-mode interaction.  
The External- Internal (E-I) index  
The E-I index was developed by Krackhardt and Stern (1988) to compare the number of ties within 
groups and among groups. Hanneman and Riddle (2005) state that the index “takes the number of 
ties of group members to outsiders, subtracts the number of ties to other group members, and 
divides by the total number of ties”. The index has a range from 1 to -1. A value of 1 means that all 
ties are directed towards other groups (external) a value of -1 means all ties are within the group 
(internal). (Krackhardt an Stern, 1988). The E-I Index function in UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) also 
includes a permutation test which assesses the extent to which the observed values differ from the 
expected values based on a random distribution of ties (Everett and Borgatti, 2012). For the analysis 
of the cross-boundary linkages in the Berg management network, a 5000 iteration permutation test 
was done which created a sample to measure significance against. This provided an understanding of 
whether the observed result can be seen as significant and did not just happen by chance alone.49  
 
The E-I Index can be measured at three levels: for the whole network (i.e., percentage of ties that are 
cross-boundary linkages), at the group level (number of cross-boundary ties for each group has and 
number of intra-group ties), and at the individual level (i.e., how many ties a specific actor has to 
other members from his own group and how many he has to non-group members) (Everett and 
Borgatti, 2012; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The information gained at the group level helps in 
understanding the extent to which specific groups are involved in collaborative (cross-boundary) 
linkages and at the individual level it shows the extent to which an actor is embedded in his own 
group. For the purpose of this study the E-I index has been considered for the network and group 
level. The role of individuals in the cross-boundary linkages is further explored with help of the G-F 
brokerage method (Section 3.1.5) which provides more specific information on which groups the 
actor links. 
3.1.5. Sub-group Analyses  
For the reason that sub-group analyses play an important role for examining heterogeneity and 
cohesion in the network (see Table 3-2), sub-groups are discussed as a separate item in this section. 
                                                          
49
 In the permutation procedure the blocked groups are maintained as well as the overall density of ties what 
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Sub-groups, which broadly speaking are sub-populations of the network, are of significance in a 
network analysis in several ways. For example the organization of the network into sub-groups based 
on attribute data (e.g., sector, type of resource users, locality etc.) helps to explore the relationships 
between and within specific stakeholder groups or how specific actor attributes have affected the 
structuring of the network. At the same time, social network analysts may decide to identify and 
define sub-groups from a purely relational perspective. Hence, the focus is on ties between pairs of 
actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). These types of sub-groups are called cohesive sub-groups. A 
cohesive sub-group is referred to as a sub-set of actors who distinguish themselves from other actors 
of the network in that they share many, strong mutual, direct ties (Wassermann and Faust, 1994). In 
other words, they form relational clusters in the network. Given the strong patterns of interaction 
between members of a cohesive sub-group they tend to share similar perspectives values and 
interests (Collins, 1988). They also tend to create a group identify based on implicit knowledge and 
understanding among the group members, and which may not be easily be understandable to actors 
outside the group (Bodin and Crona, 2009).  
In this study, the sub-group analyses helped in interpreting the cohesion and heterogeneity in the 
network (see Table 3-2). For both network characteristics the existence of cohesive sub-groups as 
well as sub-groups defined by attribute data were examined. The reader is referred to Chapter 5 for 
detailed explanation how and for what purposes subgroups based on attribute data where examined 
for the Berg management network. 
Table 3-2: Overview of sub-group analyses  
Type of sub-group Cohesion Heterogeneity 
Sub-groups based on 
attribute 
 core water management 
organizations (WMOs) vs. non-
core WMOs 
 Ecological knowledge sources  
 Sub-groups belonging to a 
specific sector  
 Sub-groups belonging to a 
specific governance mode 
Cohesive sub-group Girvan-Newman algorithm 
 Identifying collaborative 
clusters  
Core–periphery analysis  
 Integration of major water 
users and dependent 
stakeholders 
Cohesive sub-group analyses  
As mentioned earlier, a cohesive sub-group analysis is important for being able to make an informed 
judgment about the cohesion of the overall network. Several methods exist for identifying cohesive 
sub-groups (for an overview see Borgatti et al., 2013 or Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). While the 
methods use different approaches, all of these approaches are concerned with the identification of 
sub-sets of actors that can be distinguished from the rest of the network because of the cohesiveness 
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verify the existence of cohesive sub-groups, it is recommended that several different sub-group 
methods be used to see if they perhaps indicate similar results (Borgatti et al., 2013). 
In the context of this thesis a cohesive sub-group analysis was utilized to detect self-organized 
collaborative efforts (i.e. instances of collective action) through which management issues (e.g., 
degrading water quality) are being addressed. This was done with the Girvan-Newman algorithm. 
Another type of sub-group analysis (the core-periphery analysis) was conducted to identify 
marginalized actors in the network and to investigate how this affects the heterogeneity of the 
network. Both algorithms are discussed. 
Girvan-Newman algorithm (Girvan and Newman, 2002) 
The primary method used for identifying cohesive sub-groups in this study is the Girvan-Newman (G-
N) algorithm. While other methods (such as clique analysis or k-core) are good for identifying 
strongly linked cores of communities, these methods tend to overlook the more peripheral actors 
who may still be part of specific community structures (Newman and Girvan, 2004).50 The G-N 
algorithm addresses this issue. The algorithm is therefore relevant for this thesis since it is interested 
in identifying self-organized collaborative efforts among a diverse set of organizations which do not 
necessary represent closely-knit identity groups.51  
The focus of the G-N algorithm is on fragmentation rather than the interconnectedness upon which 
most of the other sub-group analyses are based. The algorithm identifies the weak spots in the 
network by calculating the edge betweenness of the network ties. In other words, through an 
iterative procedure the ties (edges) that cause the highest fragmentation in the network are 
removed (i.e. edges with the highest edge betweenness score).52 After the removal of the edge with 
the highest betweenness score, the edge betweenness is recalculated until only isolates (i.e. 
unconnected actors) make up the network. 
                                                          
50
 Newman and Girvan (2002:1) define community structures as “groups within which the network connections 
are dense but between which they are sparser”. While the definition is similar to that of cohesive sub-groups, 
the term community implies already less stringent conditions.  
51
From the qualitative understanding of the Berg management network, it was expected that, among those 
involved in the management of the catchment area, many sub-groups with very strong ties will be identified (i.e. 
bonding ties). As mentioned earlier, bonding ties are critical for the development of group identity (e.g., sharing 
of similar views and values) and through them actors can exert strong influence on one another. 
52
Edge betweenness counts the number of times an edge (tie) lies on the shortest path (geodesic) between two 
pairs of nodes (Borgatti et al., 2013). In this study, the geodesic (i.e. shortest path length) was used for 
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The procedure proposes several possible partitions; i.e. hierarchical nested group levels from which 
the researcher can chose. To make a choice about the most appropriate partition for the network, 
the researcher can use the Q-value. The Q-value is a score that is provided for each partition and 
which assesses the modularity of the partition (i.e. quality of a particular division) (Borgatti et al 
2013). Newman (2006:8578) defines modularity as “the number of edges falling within groups minus 
the expected number in an equivalent network with edges placed at random”. NetDraw (Borgatti, 
2002) has a function which automatically provides the Q-value for each calculated partition. The Q 
value can be negative or positive. Positive values, especially with a high value (maximum is Q =1) 
indicate the possibility of a community structure (Newman, 2006).  
Core-periphery analysis 
A core-periphery analysis was undertaken to assess the integration of major water user and 
‘dependent’ stakeholders in the network. The aim was to get a better sense of how well 
heterogeneity is utilized in the network. The assumption is that it is not enough for major water users 
and ‘dependent’ stakeholders to be part of the network but they should be well integrated i.e. form 
part of the core. For organizations that form only part of the periphery it might be more challenging 
to ensure that their interests and needs are considered in the decision-making processes of the 
management network. 
This method divides the network into two groups the core (which should be understood as a single 
cohesive sub-group) and a periphery (a group of actors that don’t form a cohesive sub-group but 
which are a loosely connected to the core). In networks in which a core-periphery structure can be 
observed, actors can be divided into two groups, one being the core and the other the periphery. 
Actors belonging to the core are densely connected to each other and occupy central positions in the 
network (Borgatti and Everett, 1999). Hence, they form one single cohesive sub-group. The actors 
from the core obtain their central positions from the connections among themselves as well as from 
having connection to actors from the periphery. The periphery contains actors that are sparsely 
connected in the network (Borgatti and Everett, 1999).53 Hence, peripheral actors do not form a 
cohesive sub-group. It is assumed that in networks with pronounced core-periphery structures, 
important resources are concentrated in the core, i.e. it is primarily the core actors that have access 
to the resources (Borgatti et al., 2013). In comparison, actors from the periphery depend on the core 
to assure that their interests are considered and that they gain access to specific resources provided 
                                                          
53 An idealized core-periphery structure consists of few core actors that have dense relations to each 
other, while actors in the periphery do not have relations to each other but some actors from the 
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by the network. Hence, core-periphery structures affect knowledge and information acquisition as 
well as resource distribution in the network (Crona and Bodin, 2009). In UCINET the core-periphery 
continuous function was chosen over the discrete function because it is more applicable for 
symmetric data and it provides richer information on the embeddedness of the individual actors 
(Borgatti et al., 2013). 
3.1.6. Influential actors effect on the network: actor centrality and brokerage positions 
Some of the previous sections suggest that that the two network characteristics, cohesion and 
heterogeneity, need to be well balanced to contribute to AM. A high level of heterogeneity that is 
not accompanied by a certain level of connectedness in the actor network will obstruct the 
development of a shared understanding of the management issue at hand as well as the integration 
of the available knowledge. Furthermore, the prioritization and coordination of collective action is 
highly unlikely within a diverse set of actors who are scarcely connected. On the other hand, too 
much cohesion can lead to homogenization, with knowledge and information becoming redundant. 
Nevertheless, a balance between cohesion and heterogeneity does not occur on its own. It often 
requires some steering. In this context, it needs to be pointed out that some actors in the network, 
because of how they are positioned in the network, have a significant influence on the network and 
its working. These actors can, because of the way they are linked to other actors, exert influence on 
other actors and the network as a whole (e.g. they are able to spread their ideas and/ or control the 
information flow of information within the network) (Bodin and Crona, 2008). Such actors have 
therefore a higher potential to navigate between network heterogeneity and cohesion; i.e. integrate 
new knowledge or mobilize collective action. Yet, as the discussion below demonstrates, which actor 
occupies an influential position in terms of enhancing heterogeneity and or cohesion is not a straight 
forward matter but must be considered in relation to the specific research context. 
After a brief description of who qualifies as an influential actor from the network perspective, several 
measures are proposed to identify influential actors in the context of enhancing heterogeneity 
and/or cohesion. This serves as basis for exploring how these actors utilize their positions (e.g. have 
actors connecting sub-groups, the willingness, capacity, and motivations to coordinate sub-group 
activities towards a common goal).  
Structural positions, social roles & agency  
Hanneman and Riddle (2005) state that actors that occupy a favorable position are embedded in the 
network in ways that provide them with more opportunities and fewer constraints in comparison to 
other actors of the network. The authors continue to say that “[h]aving a favored position means 
that an actor may extract better bargains in exchanges, have greater influence, and that the actor 
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Riddle, 2005 Chapt.10). However, it is important to keep in mind that while an influential actor, by 
redirecting specific resources in the network (including connecting other actors or bringing in new 
information) can shape part of the network, he or she cannot influence all relations (Ernstson et al., 
2008). This goes back to the notion that it is ”neither isolated individuals (e.g. rational self-interested 
individuals) nor organic wholes, but related individuals who collectively give rise to emergent 
properties or qualitative novelty, above all, social structure.” (Bodin et al., 2011:8, referencing 
Emirbayer (1997)). 
Several measures exist to describe in greater detail the participation of different actors in the 
network and their influence in the network. The most common actor level concept used in whole 
network analyses to identify key actors (i.e. potential leaders) is that of centrality (Freeman, 1979; 
Prell, 2011). The concept of centrality has been related to ideas of importance, power, and prestige 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Borgatti, and Everett, 2006). In network language, favorable positions 
may be occupied by actors who:  
a) connect other actors in the network who otherwise would not be connected (betweenness 
centrality);  
b) have many direct ties to others (degree centrality); 
c) have direct ties to actors that are themselves well connected in the network (eigenvector 
centrality); or 
d) are within close proximity to many others (closeness centrality).  
To summarize, all of these positions provide actors with an advantage with regard to the resources, 
information and opportunities that may be available in the network. 
Before discussing which of these centrality measures are utilized in this study, it is helpful to briefly 
discuss the notion of agency and the interplay of structural position, personality traits, and/or 
organizational characteristics. Bodin and Crona (2008) convincingly argue that agency54 is a result of 
the personal characteristics of the actor as well as his or her structural position in the network. When, 
as in this study, the actor is a collective entity such as an organization rather than an individual it 
seems to be important to also consider organizational characteristics (e.g. mandate, size, level of 
formality). The assumption here is that it is not only the actor’s network position but also the 
characteristics of the organization that the individual person represents that constrain him or her in 
                                                          
54
Bodin and Crona (2008:2764) state that agency, in particular enabling agency, is realized through “leaders or 
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exercising his or her personality traits55 (see Figure 3-5). The reason why personality traits matter is 
because, although individuals are constrained by their organizational affiliation, they still have some 
leverage to use their personal skills that allows them to utilize the position they occupy (e.g. there 
might be flexibility in interpreting the organizational mandate or which knowledge sources are 
viewed as legitimate). The argument put forward is that if one wants understand how influential 
actors utilize their positions in the network these elements need to be considered.  
 
Figure 3-5: Depiction of Agency: structural position and organizational/ personality traits.  
 
Identifying influential actors: centrality measures and G-F Brokerage roles 
Betweenness centrality and degree centrality were chosen in this study for identifying central actors. 
The G-F Brokerage method has been employed to identify actors that bridge between groups of 
actors that have either been defined by attribute or relational data.  
Degree centrality 
Degree centrality simply counts the number of direct ties an actor has. This in turn shows how active 
a specific actor in the network is.56 Those actors that have many direct ties to others (i.e. a high 
degree centrality) are seen as very involved in the network (e.g. Prell, 2012). Network analysts have 
shown that the more ties an actor has the more opportunities there are because of the many 
alternative options. Such actors depend, for example, less on individual actors for resources and 
information (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Being well informed about the activities in the network, 
these actors are particularly suitable for coordinating actions in the network. Yet, actors that are 
directly connected to many others may actually be limited in their capacity to influence these actors. 
                                                          
55
Personality traits are viewed here very broadly as human capital which includes the educational background 
of a person as well as leadership skills. 
56
 Degree centrality does not take into consideration the other actors and their ties in the network. It focuses 
only on the immediate ties of the actor. It is therefore understood as the most local centrality measure 
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Given the sheer number of ties and the associated cost of their maintenance, most of these ties will 
remain weak (Prell, 2012). 
Betweenness centrality 
An actor with a high betweenness centrality sits on many occasions between two other actors that 
without him would be disconnected (Borgatti et al., 2013). Such an actor gains his influence not from 
the number of direct contacts to others in the network, but from where he is situated in the network. 
He can control the information flow between the two actors that he connects by, for example, 
withholding or distorting information (Prell, 2012). In this way, betweenness centrality provides a 
picture on who connects different segments of the network and who can potentially control the 
resource flow in such a way that can either facilitate or block collective action or knowledge 
generation (Ernstson et al., 2008). 
It has been argued that actors occupying such positions have a higher potential then other actors in 
the network to navigate change (by bringing together different groups for different tasks, etc.) (e.g., 
Rathwell and Peterson, 2012). They have access to non-redundant information and perhaps more 
diversified resources. They therefore can either act as gatekeepers or as brokers in the network 
(Borgatti et al., 2013).57 Bodin et al. (2006) write that “a broker, merely by its structural position, 
gains access to many pieces of group specific information captured inside the different groups, which 
allows the broker to synthesize a large knowledge pool.“ A gatekeeper is someone that occupies an 
influential position in the network but who is unaware of or unwilling to utilize the position in ways 
that can benefit the larger network, e.g. they may deliberately block collective action (Bodin and 
Crona, 2009). Betweenness centrality is measured by counting how many times an actor sites on the 
shortest path (the geodesic) between two other actors (Prell, 2011). 
Identifying brokers: G-F Brokerage roles 
Gould and Fernandez (1989) developed a useful method at the individual level which examines the 
extent to which a node (actor) may connect different groups. More specifically, “they consider the 
relations between triads in which node A has a tie to node B, and B has a tie to node C but has not a 
tie to A” (Everett and Borgatti, 2012:566). B because it is on the direct path between A and C and is 
considered to occupy a specific structural position and consequently a social role (namely the broker). 
Hence, brokerage can be thought of as a situation in which an intermediary actor (the broker) 
                                                          
57
The terms gatekeeper and broker as described in this sections differ slightly from how these two terms are 
discussed in the context of the G-F Brokerage role method. In the G-F method, a gatekeeper is part of a specific 
relational interaction among three actors. Here, the gatekeeper and broker are described in terms of agency is 
used. A broker has then a more normative connotation, i.e. he uses a network's structural advantage to 
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facilitates the transaction or resource flow between two other actors which themselves are not 
connected to each other (Gould and Fernandez, 1989 citing Marsden, 1982). Gould and Fernandez 
(1989) developed a typology of brokerage.58 Depending on the group membership of the two actors 
that the broker connects, the broker may fulfill one of the following 5 brokering roles (Gould and 
Fernandez, 1989; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005): 
 Coordinator: broker connects two members that are part of his own group; 
 Gatekeeper: broker connects an outsider (member from another group) to a member from 
his group; 
 Representative: broker connects one member from his group to an member from another 
group;  
 Consultant59: the two actors that the broker connects are members of the same group but 
the broker belongs to a different group; 
 Liaison: the broker links two actors from two groups without the broker being affiliated with 
either of the two groups. Hence, he is member of a third group.  
For analyzing brokerage roles, actors need to be partitioned into meaningful groups. In the context of 
this study, brokerage roles are considered for the investigation of cross-boundary linkages based on 
sectors and modes of governance, as well as between cohesive sub-groups. 
It needs to be noted that groups organized according to sectors and modes are rather arbitrary and 
may not represent existing ‘community’ structures in the network. In other words, actors belonging 
to these groups may not be relationally connected. For example, an actor that brokers between his 
sector and another sector may have little influence on the other actors belonging to his sector as he 
may or not have many ties to them. Hence, he may also not necessarily represent their needs or 
interests. The capacities of these types of ‘brokers’ in facilitating collaboration across sectors (or 
governance modes) may therefore be limited. However, these brokers are of interest for this study 
since they represent organizations that seem to have the necessary capacities to navigate between 
different modes (or sectors). The situation is slightly different for actors that link across cohesive sub-
groups (which because of the extensive level of interaction often represent community structures). 
These actors tend to be well embedded in their groups and can therefore be important in facilitating 
the collaboration between the groups  
                                                          
58
 Gould and Fernandez (1989) partitioned the actors into non-overlapping sub-groups and only considered 
directed relations. While this study is concerned with symmetric (i.e. non-directed) relations, the method is still 
applicable. The only thing that need to be noted that in a undirected relation only 4 broker roles exists. The 
gatekeeper and representative are the same because in non-directed relations they express the same role. 
59
 Note that Gould and Fernandez (1989) refer to this role as the itinerant broker. Borgatti et al. (2002) refer to 
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Part one of this chapter demonstrates why the field of network research (in particular SNA) is most 
applicable for describing the actor network under consideration and for investigating horizontal 
cooperation at the operational level. It was further shown that network heterogeneity and cohesion 
are fitting indicators for investigating horizontal cooperation in the context of the management of 
SESs. These two network characteristics directly affect learning and collective action, two social 
processes that were identified in Chapter 2 as being essential features of AM. The quantitative 
analyses/ measures that are outlined above help to describe the patterns of interactions and show 
how the resulting network structures has constrained or fostered AM in the Berg catchment. 
 
Despite the advantages offered by a formal quantitative analysis of actor relations for gaining greater 
clarity on the working of complex governance arrangements, it certainly cannot provide answers to 
all questions. The qualitative examination of specific collective action initiatives that have emerged in 
the actor network can provide important insights into the extent of collaboration in the network and 
its suitability for the realization of adaptive management. It is for this reason that a qualitative 
investigation into collective action complements the SNA.  
3.2. Collective Action  
In addition to the formal SNA, horizontal cooperation is further explored in this thesis through the 
qualitative analysis of collective action initiatives in the Berg catchment. A focus on collective action 
can provide another insightful perspective on horizontal cooperation. Looking at how existing 
management challenges are jointly addressed by various actors operative in regional SESs can, for 
example, illustrate the extent of sectoral integration (i.e. the level of coherence and coordination 
among the different stakeholder groups), depict the emergence of self-organization, and provide 
more detailed knowledge about the presence of incentive structures for engaging in joint action.  
Another reason as to why collective action is used in this study for assessing horizontal cooperation is 
that contemporary environmental problems and socio-economic changes require collective action 
among actors who have competing claims on resources that are becoming scarce (e.g. Poteete and 
Ostrom, 2004). In other words, collective action will most likely gain in importance as an essential 
governance mechanism in the management of SESs. Understanding how collective action that 
transcends various scales and levels is achieved is therefore critical. This is particularly the case for 
regional SESs where trust and social capital are difficult to establish and where relevant cross-
boundary linkages may not be easily recognized and fostered (e.g., Marshall, 2013). The interest of 
this research in collective action is primarily directed at processes that contribute to the maintenance 
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among the actors, hence, those processes intended to contribute to the co-production of services for 
public benefit. 
3.2.1. Insights from the study of the commons  
Collective action has been introduced in Chapter 2 as a specific expression of collaboration. Generally 
speaking, it refers to a group effort that entails a wide spectrum of possible activities ranging from 
the coordinating of activities (e.g., development of joint communication tools), resource mobilization 
(e.g., the pooling of resources or division of tasks), and the development of joint institutions (e.g., 
rules for resource management) (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). 
In the realm of natural resources management, the common pool resource literature has focused on 
the emergence of institutions for collective action. Scholars from this field have provided important 
insights into the nature of collective action problems and highlighted critical variables for explaining 
successful collective action in local and regional common pool resource systems (see e.g., Ostrom, 
1990; Feeny et al., 1990).  
Ostrom (2009a) defines collective action problems as situations where it takes the effort of multiple 
actors to achieve joint outcomes and where some actors may opt for a free-rider strategy as it is 
difficult to exclude anyone from the benefits of the actions taken by the collective. The likelihood of 
collective action problems to occurring in regional SESs is quite high. Many resources and services 
that regional SESs provide, such as catchment areas, are non-exclusive (i.e. it is difficult to exclude 
actors from the use/ consumption of the resource) and subtractable (i.e. use by one actor reduces 
the benefits to others), or they are non-exclusive but their consumption does not diminish the 
benefit to other users. For a long time, based on the Hardin’s influential work ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons’ (1968) and Olson’s ‘The Logic of Collective Action’ (1965), it was argued that collective 
action problems could only effectively be addressed through state control or market regulation 
(privatization). The argument was based on the assumption that actors are selfish, fully rational 
individuals and ignored the fact that actors are embedded in pre-existing relationships. However, 
over the last decades, Ostrom (e.g., 1990, 2005, 2009) and other scholars (e.g. Marshall 2008; 
Termeer et al., 2013; Sarker et al., 2014) have shown that groups of actors can under certain 
conditions establish and enforce self-imposed institutions through which they jointly manage their 
resources sustainably.60  
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Note that Ostrom and her associates did not question the validity of Hardin’s and Olson’s conclusions, but 
they questioned the generalization of the ‘conventional theory’ that developed from these conclusions 
(Ostrom, 2009 or Wilson et al., 2013). Ostrom showed that user self-governance can be an effective third policy 
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Before turning to the specific conditions under which actors will replace a free-rider strategy with a 
strategy of reciprocity, it is important to introduce two other terms: self-governance and self-
organization. Kooiman (2003:79) refers to self-governance as “the capacity of social entities to 
govern themselves”. In the context of natural resource management, Ostrom (2005:132) states that 
self-governance implies that “actors who are major users of the resources are involved in making and 
adapting rules within collective-choice arenas regarding the inclusion or exclusion of participants, 
appropriation strategies, obligations of participants, monitoring and sanctioning and conflict 
resolution”. Self-governance is understood in this thesis as sub-set of collective action. It refers to 
joint actions that have emerged from self-organization and entails the creation of a joint system of 
rules through which the SES or specific activities related to the SES are managed.  
 
Figure 3-6: Specifying the relationship between collaboration, collective action and self-governance 
Self-organization is often discussed in relation to community-driven initiatives through which local 
stakeholders attempt to manage their resources with a certain level of autonomy. In this thesis a 
broader notion of community is used. It refers to a set of actors within a regional SES (the Berg 
catchment) that are not only users of water resources but are also partially engaged in their 
management. This community is made up of organizations representing stakeholder groups and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
government regulation and privatization can also play important role in dealing with collective action problems 
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government agencies that have different preferences and responsibilities regarding the use and 
distribution of the resources. In regional SESs the emergence of self-organization may differ in scope 
and scale. It can be restricted to a specific stakeholder group, be location-specific (e.g., management 
of a tributary) or issue specific (e.g., clearing of alien vegetation). Some forms of self-organization are 
more permanent (e.g., a water distribution system shared among members of an IB) whereas others 
may dissolve after the management goal has been achieved (e.g., an alien species clearing activity). 
Self-organization remains a critical feature of robust governance arrangements in regional SESs 
because it allows groups of actors to come together and respond promptly to emerging problems 
and changes. However, in comparison to local SESs, the changes and tasks in regional SES require 
different types of actors to come together and self-organize (related to the case study: different 
parts of the Berg management network). This means organizations must have the capacities and 
linkages that allow them to organize. 
The literature on the commons has highlighted several motivating factors that can trigger self-
organization. Among them are the level of dependency on the resource, a specific crisis situation, 
and the protection of existing property rights (Seixas and Davy, 2007; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). 
With regard to the management of SESs, this presupposes that a common understanding of the 
condition of the SES exist (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001) that leads to joint problem definition and 
goal setting (Pretty, 2003). Hence, access to legitimate information about the state of the resource is 
vital for motivating self-organization (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). Ostrom and Ahn (2003:10) 
emphasize that for local stakeholders to establish effective collective action processes, they need 
“sufficient local autonomy to invest in the social and physical capital involved in building systems and 
monitoring performance”. Following Basurto (2013) and Ostrom (2000), autonomy is understood 
here as the right and ability of the resource user to develop their own institutions (e.g., determine 
access and user rules) without external authorities challenging them. Given the presence of multi-
level linkages in regional SESs, the actions and decisions by higher level authorities will often directly 
affect the incentives for individuals or groups to engage in the design and maintenance of institutions 
for self-governance (Basurto, 2013; Ostrom, 1990). 
The sections above suggest that various interacting factors can facilitate or obstruct collective action 
and self-organization. Many of these factors are context specific and tend to increase with the size of 
the “community” or SES. Elinor Ostrom (1990, 2000, 2005) has powerfully demonstrated that, 
regardless if one refers to self-organization at the local level or to collective action in larger, more 
complex regional SES, societal cooperation is based on three key building blocks: communicative 
processes, reciprocity, and trust. Based on her extensive empirical work, Ostrom has developed a set 










P a g e  | 64 
 
maintained for societal cooperation in form of sustained collective action. Findings from empirical 
studies across the world suggest that robust governance arrangements are those that incorporate a 
large number of these design principles (Anderies et al., 2007). In relation to governance, robustness 
is defined in this study as the capacity to maintain specific performance objectives even when faced 
with changes or shocks (van Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007; Hutjens et al., 2009; Mumby et al., 2014). 
Performance objectives relevant to this study would be the maintenance of key water management 
functions, the efficient response to water management challenges and the equitable and 
accountable distribution of cost and benefits. The design principles are introduced in the subsequent 
sections below. They guide the empirical investigation into the collective action initiatives presented 
in Chapter 6. 
3.2.2. Ostrom’s eight design principles for guiding the assessment of collective action  
Ostrom understands the design principles as elements or conditions that help to account for 
successful, long-term collective action (i.e. the compliance to the rules which safeguard the 
sustainability of the resource (Ostrom, 1990). “The design principles work to enhance participants’ 
shared understanding of the structure of the resource and its users and of the benefits and costs 
involved in following a set of agreed upon rules” (Basurto and Ostrom, 2009:52). In doing so, they 
help groups of actors to sustain and build cooperation over a long period of time (Ostrom, 2009a;) 
and to establish robust, yet adaptive, governance arrangements. Wilson et al. (2013: 22) go so far as 
to state “that the principles have a wider range of application than CPR groups and are relevant to 
nearly any situation where people must cooperate and coordinate to achieve shared goals. Table 3.3 
lists the eight design principles that are important conditions for trust and reciprocity. They also 
serve in this thesis as indicators for robust governance i.e. governance arrangements that can sustain 
key management functions and address management challenges in light of socio-economic and 
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Table 3-3: The eight design principles- conditions for trust and reciprocity  
(adapted from Ostrom, 1990: 90; Cox et al., 2010)
61
 
Principle 1: Well-defined boundaries:  
a. Group boundaries: it is important to identify who has a right to use the resource(s) and who 
should pay for the cost of maintaining these resources.  
Ostrom (2005:261) writes that “this principle enables participants to know who is in and who is 
out of a defined set of relationships and thus with whom to cooperate.” The principle, 
furthermore, helps to clarify mutual responsibilities and benefits. In the context of this thesis, 
group boundary determination relates to identifying who the relevant users and managers in the 
Berg catchment are. Who is benefiting to what extent from the resources and who pays for what 
cost. 
b. Resource boundaries: the boundaries of the resource system should be clear to all involved.  
Clarifying and agreeing on the resources boundaries allows the separation of the system from 
the larger bio-physical environment (Cox et al., 2010) and specifies which components are part 
of the system. 
Understanding and agreeing on the group and resource boundaries is important for assessing 
positive and negative externalities. Ostrom (2009a) points out that boundaries must be defined 
by the users themselves. Given the complexity of regional SESs these boundaries will most likely 
be negotiated and overlapping. In the context of this thesis it implies that it is important for 
those involved in the management of the Berg catchment agree and are aware of the boundaries 
of the system as well as of all other organizations involved in the management activities.  
Principle 2: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
a. Cost must be perceived as at least equal to benefits: rules for distribution of costs must 
match rules for distribution of benefit (Ostrom, 2009a) 
Principle 2a refers to the fairness of cost-benefit distribution in the system. That is, rules that 
allocate the benefits should be proportional to the inputs of the actors. If it is made clear how 
inputs to the collective action (or for maintaining the SES) relate to the benefits actors gain from 
the SES, then the willingness of the participants to contribute to collective action is enhanced 
(Ostrom, 2005). 
b. The rules must match environmental conditions. For example, how much water to abstract 
                                                          
61 Principle 2a and 2b are used in this thesis in the same manner as used in Ostrom (1990). In contrast Cox et al. 
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in which locations and in which season. 
Principle 3: Collective-choice arrangements 
Actors involved in the collective action must be able to participate in the design, enactment and 
modification of the rules that are supposed to govern their behavior. This enhances the 
likelihood that rules match local and social conditions (e.g., principle 2a) and that they are 
perceived as fair. This in turn enhances rule compliance. Ostrom (1990) states that if actors are 
not involved in modifying these rules over time, the information about the benefits and costs as 
perceived by different actors is not fully taken into account in the efforts to adapt to new 
conditions. As a consequence, actors may begin to perceive the costs of their inputs as being 
higher than their benefits. They therefore will start no longer complying with the rules. 
Principle 4: Monitoring 
a. Monitoring of environmental condition: 
Informs about changes in the SES, effectiveness of management practices as well as creates a 
better understanding of the SES 
b. Monitoring of the human environment interaction: includes user and management 
practices 
Monitoring appears to be one of the most critical principles because not only does it inform 
about the behavior of others and level of rule compliance but also what the effects of the 
governance arrangements have on the resource system. In order for monitoring to become a rule 
compliance mechanism, it is important that the monitoring activities are viewed by all as 
credible. That is, monitoring must take place systematically and regularly and the monitors must 
be accountable to those participating in the collective action.  
Principle 5: Graduated sanctions  
Like monitoring, graduated sanctioning is an important mechanism for rule compliance. 
Graduated sanctions help to maintain community cohesion. This mechanism signals that wrong 
doing is noticed by others and not tolerated. But it also provides room for redressing errors and 
for establishing reasons behind the rule violation.  
Principle 6: Conflict-resolution mechanisms  
Easily accessible and low cost conflict resolution mechanisms are necessary for assisting with 
rule interpretation as well as negotiating trade-offs or conflicts of interests that may arise.  
Principle 7: Minimum recognition of rights 
The rights of local stakeholders/managers to devise their own rules needs to be granted by 
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same time increasing the likelihood of receiving higher level support and legitimacy for self-
organized arrangements.  
Principle 8: Nested enterprises 
The organization of governance activities (e.g., monitoring, conflict resolution and other 
management activities) in multiple layers of nested enterprises is particular relevant for complex 
and larger SESs. Nesting allows for the necessary cross-boundary cooperation in larger SESs. 
Since smaller units are maintained, it is easier to develop the trust and reciprocity necessary for 
initiating and maintaining cooperation within the units (Ostrom, 2010). By nesting each level of 
organization in a larger level, externalities between groups can be addressed in larger 
organizational settings that have a legitimate role to play in relation to the smaller entities” 
(Ostrom,2000:8). 
Cox et al. (2010) state that nesting may occur between user groups and larger government 
jurisdictions or between user groups themselves. It is important that the smaller units partially 
keep their autonomy and are not fully absorbed into larger units (Marshall, 2008). Marshall 
(2008) further points out that nesting allows for effectively dealing with vertical assurance 
problem (maintaining a certain degree of autonomy and collective choice rules) and horizontal 
assurance problem (higher level assists, e.g., rule enforcement, sanctioning, monitoring) 
Some authors have cautioned that findings from studies of small-scale SESs (i.e. local commons) may 
not easily apply to collective action in regional and global SESs (e.g., Young, 2002; Cox et al., 2010; 
Stern, 2011; Brondizio et al., 2009; Hutjens et al 2009). In contrast to small-scale SESs (which are 
often governed by one or two identifiable spatial communities) larger systems are characterized by a 
greater complexity in terms of actors, relations among them as well as ecological sub-systems (Lebel 
et al., 2006). Any kind of self-organization, for example, will often need to take place in heavily 
regulated policy fields. Hence, governmental authority and market structures are involved too. 
Furthermore, in regional SESs, collective action may not necessary originate from the self-organizing 
efforts. As previously mentioned, large numbers of actors with multiple interests and perspectives 
make it challenging to arrive at a shared understanding of the issues especially when resources for 
collaboration and collective learning are limited. External actors can play a key role in initiating 
collective action especially among groups of actors that either differ substantially in their respective 
interests or among groups that may not have the necessary means to establish the required 
deliberation and collective learning processes. However, if collective action is externally initiated, 
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(Vollan, 2012). External interventions can, for example, change underlying incentive structures to 
cooperate and thus crowd out the basic motivation to cooperate (Bowles, 2008 in Vollan, 2012).62  
It is argued in this thesis that Ostrom’s design principles remain of great value to the study of 
regional SESs because trust and reciprocity continue to be the foundation for collaborative relations 
in such systems. That is, while regional SESs are often part of highly state-regulated and market-
driven policy fields, it is through interpersonal relations that the arrangements which govern these 
systems are being negotiated and structured.  
Other studies have already used the design principles in rather complex institutional settings (e.g., 
Termeer et al., 2013). Cox et al. (2010:13), who conducted a thorough review of 91 case studies to 
evaluate the validity of the design principles, state that several of these principles may be relevant 
for the management of larger resource systems: “the proportionality of costs and benefits, conflict-
resolution mechanisms, nested institutional arrangements, and effective and participatory collective-
choice arrangements seem particularly relevant”. Similarly, Stern (2011:229), after a comparison 
between local and global CPR, concludes that “Ostrom’s pioneering work has considerable relevance 
for commons that are quite different from those she studied. Ostrom’s institutional analysis 
approach and its focus on self-governance institutions seems to have useful lessons to teach to those 
involved in governing larger commons, who often pay insufficient attention to the potential of such 
institutions.” 
Finally, it needs to be noted that while this thesis is interested in the possibility and feasibility of 
catchment-wide collective action, the assumption is that an important part of collective action in the 
catchment is comprised of smaller overlapping collective action initiatives (which are either issue or 
location specific). These initiatives may to a certain extent be subject to the similar dynamics that 
determine self-governance and collective action in the SESs studied by Ostrom and her colleagues. 
The argument put forward in this chapter is therefore, that lessons from successful CPR governance, 
articulated through Ostrom’s eight design principles, are a good starting point for understanding 
collective action and horizontal cooperation in complex regional SESs.  
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Vollan (2012) argues that communities often lack resources for sustaining collective action that is initiated 
from the outside as issues of coordination, transparency and leadership may arise. His findings suggests that 
measures taken by external actors (in his case the South African government) to stimulate collective action 
within communities (e.g., via the establishment of single purpose committees) can lead to a decline of social 
capital (i.e. a negative effect on trust and reciprocity) within the communities. This shows that it is not easy to 
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3.2.3. Relating the design principles to features of AM and polycentric governance 
Looking at the functioning of the principles from a broader perspective (see Figure 3-7), Anderies et 
al. (2004) have pointed out that Principles 1, 2 and 3 create the conditions that reduce the problem 
of free-riding and assist in negotiate the problem of subtractability (here broadly understood as 
negotiating acceptable trade-offs so that most needs can be met). Principles 4, 5 and 6, on the other 
hand, provide important feedback controls on the actions of others and on the SES. Finally, Principles 
7 and 8 are of importance for creating the necessary linkages within larger more complex SESs while 
at the same time allowing for space for self-governance in smaller sub-units. Principles 7 and 8 are 
furthermore vital for enhancing the functioning of the other six principles.  
Relating the design principles (listed in Table 3-3) now to the key features of AM (introduced in 
Chapter 2), it becomes evident that Principles 1, 2 and 3 are critical for establishing important 
conditions for collaboration. Principles 4, 5, and 6, on the other hand, provide opportunities for 
learning and knowledge generation about the SES. Finally, Principles 7 and 8 facilitate cross-boundary 
linkages which allow the development of effective multi-level governance arrangement. Hence, 
conceptually the design principles create a critical linkage between AM and polycentric governance. 
From an analytical point of view the design principles allow the assessment of the extent of AM and 
of polycentric governance in the governance arrangements through which the Berg catchment is 
managed, which in turn allows the drawing of conclusions about the robustness of the existing 
governance arrangements. In other words, it is assumed in this study that governance arrangements 
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3.2.4. Accounting for additional factors fostering collective action in regional SESs 
Ostrom’s eight design principles are not treated in this thesis as a ‘tick list’ to show whether or not a 
collective action initiative is successful. Rather, they serve as a point of reference for evaluating if 
these collaborative efforts have the capacity to become robust and adaptive governance 
arrangements. To be able to compare the collective action initiatives that were identified with the 
help of the formal SNA and to allow for a systematic investigation of their individual and joint 
contributions to AM, the selected initiatives are organized according to specific themes. They cover 
the motivation for, internal dynamics within, larger context, and potential contributions to 
management functions for each initiative (see Table 3-4). The themes were developed with the 
intent of detecting additional factors that may shape collective action in regional SESs. While most of 
Ostrom’s work has focused on institutional analysis, the proposed themes provide the space to 
explore the influence of agency (leadership, champions, bridging organizations) and emerging 
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Table 3-4:  Organizing themes for comparing and assessing collective action  
Motivation: 
 internally initiated (self–organized) or externally initiated incentive structures 
 type of incentive structures 
 level of crisis perception 
Internal dynamics:  
 Shared problem definition among participants 
 Existence of learning processes: frequency of meetings and level of participation 
 Integration of ecological knowledge 
 Prioritization of activities: e.g. joint management plan 
 Pooling of resources 
Uptake of key management functions: going beyond one’s self interest (internal) 
 Leadership type: top down or emerging  
 Champions: actors that try to find innovative ways to advance the new ideas or approaches 
in order to transform or change a situation or their organization  
 Level of cooperation with other collective action initiativ  
 Bridging actors (to other initiatives) or processes 
Larger context: 
 Support structures: access to financial resources and skills 
 Access to scientific information  
 Integration into the larger catchment management processes  
Outcome: 
 Uptake of key management functions: going beyond the interest of the specific initiative 
(catchment wide) 
 Strengthening of cross-boundary relation: internal: among participants, external: within the 
larger catchment  
To summarize the intended approach: Ostrom’s eight design principles are utilized as the primary 
tool for identifying constraints affecting collective action and the capacity to self-organize in the Berg 
catchment. The organizing themes, on the other hand, provide the space to explore factors other 
than the design principles that may be critical for collective action in regional SES. 
3.3. Summarizing the proposed analytical framework: actor networks and collective 
action  
In this chapter, the two concepts of actor network and collective action have been operationalized in 
ways that allow the description and assessment of horizontal cooperation in complex governance 
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networks through a formal SNA helps to tease apart how social structures created by patterns of 
relations enhance or hinder AM of SES. Furthermore, a strong case has been made why network 
cohesion and network heterogeneity are valuable indicators for assessing horizontal cooperation in 
the context of learning and collaboration. It was further shown how those two network 
characteristics can be quantitatively assessed through a variety of complementary network measures.  
Section 3.2, on the other hand, convincingly argued that Ostrom’s eight design principles provide a 
valuable point of reference for identifying constraints to collective action and for evaluating the 
robustness of the governance arrangements that have evolved from the existing horizontal 
cooperation. Perhaps the most exciting and valuable contribution that section 3.2 makes is that it 
clearly was able to demonstrate how the design principles bring to the fore key features that 
characterize AM and polycentric governance In doing so the principles create, by implication, a 
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4. Chapter: Methodological considerations and  
introduction to the research site  
Chapter 3 provided a rationale for combining a SNA with a detailed investigation of collective action 
for the evaluation of horizontal cooperation. Furthermore, an argument was made for the suitability 
of the concept of actor network and of Ostrom’s design principles for examining the governance of 
regional SESs. This chapter provides a detailed introduction to the Berg catchment as the research 
site. Furthermore, the chapter elaborates on the design, content and execution of the SNA and 
describes the methodological steps taken for the qualitative analyses of the collective action 
initiatives. Apart from familiarizing the reader with the Berg catchment, it will enable her to grasp the 
qualitative and quantitative analyses in the preceding chapters. Before addressing the chapter’s aim, 
the benefits of choosing a single case study in combination with a mixed method approach for 
addressing the overarching research question are discussed. The subsequent sections describe how 
the relational data for the SNA was generated and analyzed. Besides defining the network 
boundaries, the reader is also informed about the researcher arrived at the final actor set and the 
collaborative network (the multiplex network N). Following an overview of the various qualitative 
research method techniques, the chapter concludes with a reflection on the limitations of this 
research and ethical considerations.  
4.1. Single case study approach 
The previous chapters have already indicated that conceptually and methodologically it is not a 
straightforward endeavor to examine horizontal cooperation in regional SESs characterized by 
complex governance arrangements. It is therefore appropriate to focus on a single in-depth case 
study to examine how actor relations enhance or hinder learning and collective action. The 
advantage of using a single case study is that it allows for a thorough and detailed inquiry into the 
observed phenomenon (Yin, 2003). As the study is interested in the relational factors that shape AM, 
a rich and in-depth inquiry allows the development a holistic account of patterns of interactions 
among the identified actor network, as well as how those relational factors and specific social 
processes shape each other. Although case study knowledge may not always be generalizable, it 
produces important context specific knowledge which helps to improve the understanding of 
complex phenomena and to test existing scientific explanations of those phenomena (Eisenhardt, 
1998; Flyvbjerg, 2006). Its strength derives from its consideration of the background, development, 
current conditions, and interactions of the research subject(s) (Yin, 2003). Adopting such an 
approach for this study meant that the actor network could be examined in its wider context rather 










P a g e  | 75 
 
Furthermore, an in depth case study can tell us how various quantitative analyses from the SNA 
might be complemented with qualitative methods in order to situate actor relations and social 
processes within the broader context that provided the conditions for their emergence. This in turn 
may lead to a systematic methodological framework that can be employed in other case study 
research. 
Yin (2003) points out that one of the greatest challenges is to select a representative case study 
which can either communicate or challenge existing theories and which allows for the generalization 
to other case studies. Although some might question the representativeness of the chosen 
catchment, the characteristics of the actor network, and the context in which it is embedded, are not 
unique but represent a situation that can be detected in other regional SESs catchment areas in 
South Africa and across the world. Following Yin’s (2003:97-105) suggestion, the study combined 
multiple sources of evidence, such as focus groups, semi-structured interviews, participant 
observations, document analysis and a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the actor relations to 
be able to describe and analyze horizontal cooperation in regional SESs. 
Case study research requires from the researcher an intensive engagement with the case. This can 
lead to two types of challenges. Firstly, the researcher may lose her or his objectivity. Secondly, the 
researcher may start feeling overwhelmed by the large amount of data and information that are 
obtained from the various techniques used in the case study. Regarding the first challenge, it needs 
to be noted that scientific inquiry is never completely neutral. Hence, a certain degree of subjectivity 
and arbitrariness is bound to remain. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to be transparent in 
the different research steps and to remain impartial towards the actors participating in the research. 
With respect to the second challenge, to avoid losing sight of the research objectives when dealing 
with the substantial amount of data derived from the various techniques, all quantitative and 
qualitative data was systematically organized from the beginning. How this was achieved is described 
in later sections of this chapter.  
4.2. Mixed method approach 
According to Johnson et al. (2007:113) mixed method research is an “approach to knowledge (theory 
and practice) that attempts to consider multiple viewpoints, perspectives, positions, and standpoints 
(always including the standpoints of qualitative and quantitative research)”. In this study the main 
reason for using a mixed method approach was to lead to thicker and richer data on horizontal 
cooperation and to allow for the synthesis of the different concepts introduced in Chapters 2 and 
3.Furthermore, mixed methods strengthens triangulation, i.e. the same phenomenon (e.g. learning) 










P a g e  | 76 
 
Figure 4-1 shows the sequential approach used; where first the qualitative pre-study informed the 
design of the quantitative research instrument (SNA survey) and the findings from the SNA provided 
the basis for the qualitative interpretation and analysis in Chapter 6. Empirical data that was acquired 
through the research process, via the various qualitative research techniques, helped in the 
interpretation of some of the quantitative findings.  
 
Figure 0-1: Sequence of the mixed method approach 
The main argument against using mixed methods stems from the view that the paradigms upon 
which qualitative and quantitative methods are based have different views of reality and therefore, a 
different view of the phenomenon under study (Sale et al., 2002). However, it is exactly this point 
which the researcher considers the strength of the approach. The complementary application of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods in this study allow the researcher to establish a more 
holistic and complete account of horizontal cooperation as the factors and processes that that 
influence and are influenced by horizontal cooperation can be explored from different angles. As 
Eisenhardt (1989: 538) writes “[q]ualitative data are useful for understanding the rationale, or theory 
underlying relationships revealed in the quantitative data” whereas quantitative data may “indicate 
relationships which may not be salient to the researcher”. In this sense the qualitative data can 
almost be seen as the required bridge between the relational data derived from the quantitative 
network measures and the responses to degrading water quality. 
4.2.1. Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is the operational level of South Africa’s water governance system. This level is 
exemplified in this thesis through the actor network with the ultimate responsibility for the 
management of the Berg catchment. Actors are organizations rather than individuals, as explained in 
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In this study, actors are defined as organizations involved in the management of the Berg River and 
its larger tributaries. The focus on organizations rather than individuals is a reasonable choice, as the 
river is primarily managed by organizations rather than individuals. 63 Even private land owners are 
part of larger organizations or associations that represent their interests in the management of water 
resources. Furthermore, organizations tend to provide more stable ‘nodes’ (in network terms) in 
comparison to individuals. Although their formation takes time, the institutionalization process that 
characterizes most organizations makes them more durable structures (Ernstson, 2008). Hence, 
many organizations will outlive specific individuals. Finally, organizations as a whole also tend to have 
access to a wider pool of resources, whereas individual members of the organization may have 
limited access to those collective resources (Ernstson, 2008). 
The overarching criterion for organizations to be included in this study was that they actively 
participated in the management of the Berg River. This could either be directly through the physical 
observation and modification of the river system including adjacent land (e.g., monitoring, 
management of abstraction and discharge etc.) or indirectly through activities such as the generation 
and provision of ecological knowledge or the provision of incentive structures (e.g., financial or 
technical support, directives) that enhance the willingness of organizations to contribute to water 
management. Potentially relevant organizations were elicited through key expert interviews (pre-
study), document analysis (e.g. the register of the CMA Reference group), participant observation 
(e.g. public water management meetings) and the survey respondents (adding names to the recall 
list). 
4.3. Research Site: The Berg River catchment 
Before describing the Berg catchment a brief explanation is provided for its usefulness as a research 
site for investigating South Africa’s water governance system at the operational level:  
i. The Berg catchment is a complex SES with many different users that have competing 
demands and interests on water resources from the Berg River system. Establishing a 
sustainable and effective water management system that is capable of dealing with emerging 
challenges is therefore vital for the region’s water security. 
ii. Water management in the Berg catchment has to be carried out without a functioning CMA64 
in place and without the guidance of a Catchment Management Strategy. This is a situation 
that can be observed in many of South Africa’s catchment areas. 
                                                          
63 
A similar approach was used by Ernstson et al. (2008) and Stein et al (2011). 
64 
The lack of an existing CMA is especially useful due to fact that this study is concerned with revealing regular 
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iii. The Berg catchment is a well-resourced catchment in terms of expertise and financial 
possibilities. It seems therefore reasonable to think that actors, despite all the existing 
constrains related to the slow implementation of the reform process in the water sector, 
have the necessary capacities to self-organize themselves in ways that enable them to 
manage the catchment effectively. 
The Berg catchment is located in the Western Cape north of Cape Town and spans an area of 7,715 
Km². The Berg River, which has a length of 285km, rises in the Franschhoek and Drakenstein 
Mountains and discharges into St. Helena Bay on the West coast. It has nine major and six minor 
tributaries. The Berg River is a major source of the region’s water security. It serves a population of 
650,229 in the Cape Winelands region and 320,929 in the West Coast, of which 79% live in urban 
areas and 21% in rural areas (Berg River Task Team Report, 2009). It is part of a very complex water 
supply scheme that connects the catchment to the neighboring Breede catchment and to the City of 
Cape Town which receives a large part of its drinking water from the Berg through the scheme. 
Land use within the catchment consists of mainly dryland wheat farming, irrigated agriculture, 
livestock farming, natural conservation, and urban areas ((status quo report Western Cape). These 
uses along with a steady population growth65 caused by in-migration to the metropolitan area of 
Cape Town and its surrounding municipalities, due to the region’s robust economic growth rate, have 
placed considerable pressure on regional water resources.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
phase of this study the two existing CMAs (Breede CMA and Inkomati CMA) were just in the process of being 
established. Hence these organizations still needed to create their organizational capacities (e.g. employment 
of staff) and had not established regular patterns of interactions to other stakeholders in the respective 
catchment.  
65 
Population growth rate for the Cape Winelands region and for the West Coast is 0.4% and 2% respectively 
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One of the major stressors in the catchment is the poor and degrading water quality in the river, 
which is primarily a result of pollution (DWA, 2004b). According to the Berg River Quality Task Team 
Report 2009 (2009: 6-7) among the major causes for water pollution are: 
 Spillages from ‘non’- functional or inadequate sewage plants and pump stations; 
 Spillages due to heavy rains when storm water is diverted to Waste Water Treatment Works; 
 Raw sewage and household waste dumped into storm water drainage channels; 
 Grey or black water being drained into legal and illegal storm water channels; 
 Illegal discharges from industry and agricultural practices; 
 Salination of rivers and dams through run over geology and fertilizers. 
Of great concern is the pollution caused by untreated or poorly treated sewage. “This pollution 
emanates from two types of sources - informal housing areas without proper sanitation services and 
systemic failures of the wastewater treatment works and sewage systems of towns in the area” (Berg 
River Quality Task Team Report, 2009). The local municipalities, especially from the upper catchment 
area, have had significant impact on the river in terms of discharge and related pollution problems.  
Climatic stresses66 are likely to exacerbate the problem of degrading water quality as the projected 
hotter temperatures and shorter rainfall periods, for example, will lead to a greater water 
evaporation rate, reduced water quantity and higher concentration of nutrients in the rivers. (pers. 
comm. Barnes, 2009). More intense rainfall events over shorter periods of time, on the other hand, 
will exacerbate the problem of flooding “of storm water channels and the ‘popping’ open of drainage 
systems causing raw and untreated effluent to spill onto the surface which eventually flows back to 
the river” (Berg River Quality Task Team Report, 2009). Enhanced climate variability and future 
climate change therefore are a significant threat to the region’s water resources; socio-economic 
activities67; and livelihoods (productive livelihoods and health)68 that are dependent on adequate 
water quality. 
                                                          
66
 The region in which the catchment is located has been identified as a ‘climate hotspot` – being very 
vulnerable to enhanced climate variability and future climate change (Midgley et al., 2005). Climate change 
projections for the Western Cape indicate “a weakening of winter rainfall…, a shift to more irregular rainfall of 
possible greater intensity, and rising mean, minimum and maximum temperatures” (Midgley et al., 2005: i). 
The drier and warmer climate will have serious implications for water resources in the Western Cape in terms 
of water supply and quality.  
67
 One of the sectors highly dependent on good water quality is the fruit export sector. During the 2004/5 
season the sector was in danger as retailers from the EU threatened to cancel fruit imports from the region due 
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Given the significance of the problem, degrading water quality and related issues present a fitting 
context for investigating how the Berg management network jointly deals with problems and 
changes in the catchment area. Furthermore, the specific focus helped to specify the boundaries, 
actors, activities and relations that are the focus of this study. 
To be able to put the processes that are taking place in the Berg catchment in a historic context and 
to familiarize oneself with important water management organization from the South African water 
governance system the reader is referred to Appendix 4.5 and 4.4 respectively. 
4.4. Social Network Analysis  
4.4.1. Data Generation  
4.4.1.1. Network boundary: 
One of the major tasks when studying natural resource management and governance is to define the 
system under investigation; i.e. which parts and processes of the SES to include. Deciding on the 
adequate boundaries of the system and the actor network to be studied is a challenging endeavor. 
Within the field of SNA identifying appropriate boundaries entails theoretical as well as 
methodological considerations (Bodin and Crona, 2011). From a theoretical standpoint, the boundary 
is to a large degree defined by the overarching research question and the applied theoretical 
framework. Methodologically it is vital to employ appropriate techniques and approaches for 
identifying the relevant actor set and the most important pattern of interactions pertaining to the 
research question (Borgatti et al., 2013). 
Two different ways of specifying network boundaries are commonly used in SNA. The nominalist 
approach “is based on the theoretical concerns of the researcher” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 32 
referencing Laumann, et al., 1989). The realist approach, on the other hand, “focuses on actor set 
boundaries and membership as perceived by the actors themselves” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 
31 referencing Laumann, et al 1989). Rather than viewing the two approaches as incompatible, they 
are often combined to allow for a more accurate identification of the network boundary (Marin and 
Wellman 2011; Borgatti et al., 2013). 
While the criterion that all relevant organizations had to be involved in the management of the Berg 
catchment is more consistent with the nominalist approach, this study placed greater emphasis on 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regional economy conducted by Daan Louw estimates that the loss in value-added could be as much as R735 
million, which equates to a loss of 60% market share (Louw, 2008). 
68
 Most affected are people living in informal settlements as they are the ones exposed to the contaminated 
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the realist approach for identifying the network boundary. The realist approach ensure that 
important actors and ties are not ignored in the study. It does so through a focus on self-reported 
ties that actors have to identify with each other. The approach is particularly applicable for actor sets 
characterized by fuzzy boundaries, a situation that can be observed in the present case. Given that 
South Africa’s water governance system is currently transforming, having a formal mandate for water 
management in the Berg catchment does not imply that this organization is indeed actively involved 
in the management of the catchment. The lack of capacities or incentives may prevent an 
organization to from doing so. At the same time, an organization not formally linked to water 
management may play a critical role in some management activities either directly (e.g. through 
monitoring) or indirectly (e.g., through the provision of scientific ecological knowledge or incentive 
structures). It is therefore vital to look beyond formal jurisdictional arrangements, organizational 
boundaries and hierarchies. This was accomplished in this study by asking all organizations to identify 
those who are part of the network. Hence, all survey respondents were asked to mark those 
organizations on the recall list that they perceived as being active in the management of the Berg 
River. This was complemented by an additional measure: An organization was considered to be part 
of the Berg management network if it received at least two confirmations69, and had regular 
collaborative interactions with at least one other organization from the network. 
4.4.2. The SNA survey: design & execution  
The relational data of the Berg management network was generated through a tailored survey that 
was conducted as part of face to face interviews. The structure and design of the survey was based 
on established approaches (Ernstson , 2008; Stein, 2010) and builds on the understanding of the 
catchment gained during the preliminary study.  
4.4.2.1. The Pre-study 
The aim of the pre-study was to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of the Berg 
catchment and to aid the development of the SNA survey as well as the creation of the recall list. 
Through the pre-study relevant organizations and practices as well as dominant issues relating to the 
management of the Berg River were identified. In this process, key individuals from different sectors 
(such as conservation, agriculture, provincial and local government, research and consultancy) were 
interviewed and asked to name all the organizations that they believe are active in the management 
of the Berg catchment. A total of 13 individuals were interviewed.70 In addition relevant policy 
documents (e.g. Berg WMA: Internal Strategic Perspective 2004) such as existing reports (e.g. River 
                                                          
69
 More specifically, at least the 2 other organisations had to verify that they interact with tat specific actor on a 
regular basis. 
70 
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management strategy for the Berg WMA of Western Cape Scoping Report Oct. 2008 , Berg River 
baseline studies 2007, Berg River water quality task team report 2009) and previous studies (e.g. 
Gueze and Jonker, 2008 ).were reviewed. 
4.4.2.2. The SNA Survey  
The survey was organized in three parts and entailed relational as well as context specific questions. 
Another central component of the survey was a recall list. Such a list is commonly used by social 
network analysts as a robust method of generating network data on established patterns of 
interactions (Marsden, 1990). The recall list contained the names of all relevant organizations and 
also includes adjacent empty columns in which the respondents could mark their relations to the 
other organizations. In this way a recall list assists respondents to provide information about the 
interactions they may have with the other organizations mentioned on the list (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994). Based on the findings from the pre-study a recall list containing the names of 57 
organizations was created in this study. At the end of the recall list, space was provided for the 
respondents to add names of additional organizations that they considered important but that had 
not been mentioned on the recall list.71  
Section one of the survey, which was used in conjunction with the recall list, contained questions 
about the respondents’ relations to the other organizations operative in the catchment area. Section 
two elicited information on key characteristics of the respective organization (actor attributes). The 
third section had the intent to get a better understanding of the quality of the relations as well as to 
gain insights into how issues of water quality have been framed and responded to. The complete 
survey with all questions can be found in Appendix 4.1. 
The SNA survey was conducted over an 8 months period from February 2011 to September 2011. All 
surveys were carried out by the researcher. The average interview was 1.5 hours with longest being 4 
hours. Carrying out the survey as part of personal interviews reduced the risk that the interviewees 
would misinterpret questions or leave out important information. It was also important that the two 
terms, information exchange and collaboration, be discussed first before turning to the specific 
questions. Prior to each survey interview all respondents were made aware of their right to not 
participate in the survey and verbal consent was requested. The researcher also showed examples of 
visualized network graphs to the respondents to illustrate the output of this research and provided a 
lengthy explanation about the usage of the data collected by the study. 
                                                          
71 
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In order to create a better understanding of the manner in which actor relations enhance or hinder 
AM in regional SESs, the organizations were asked to report on their collaborative relationships. Two 
relationships were investigated in greater detail through the survey: 
 regular information exchange among the organizations on the issue of degrading water 
quality and the environmental status of the Berg River 
 regular collaboration among the organizations on the issue of degrading water quality  
The two relations were chosen because they capture information flow, and the coordination as well 
as integration of practices and institutions among the organizations. More specifically, the level of 
horizontal cooperation in the network was investigated through these two relations. The focus was 
on finding evidence of cooperation and coordination among core WMOs, the formation of collective 
action initiatives, the integration of ecological knowledge, as well as the representation of different 
sectoral interests and needs.  
The reason for making a distinction between information exchange and collaboration is based on the 
assumption that each relation demands quite different levels of engagement from the organizations. 
While information exchange can be performed quite informally, collaboration demands that a 
greater part of the organization be involved, and often an organizational decision needs to be taken 
prior to venturing into collaboration with others (Ernstson et al., 2008). Additionally, collaboration 
tends to institutionalize a certain pattern of interaction. For example, Schneider et al. (2003) 
highlight that collaboration between two organizations creates mutual knowledge about the 
workings of each organization, and administrative and contractual agreements that can be re-used, 
making the next collaboration more effective. Thus, one could assume that collaboration, since it is 
more demanding, should have a greater influence on the structuring of the network as compared to 
information exchange.  
In order to better understand how actor attributes may impact network dynamic and to be able to 
test some assumptions, data on specific characteristics of the organizations was included in the 
analysis. These include:  
 Type of organization; 
 Sector; 
 Mode of governance; 
 Mandate for managing water resources; 
 Type of ecological knowledge that an organization posses, focus has been on sources of 
scientific ecological knowledge and experiential ecological knowledge; 










P a g e  | 85 
 
 Scale of activity: upper catchment , lower catchment, outside catchment, whole; 
 Type of WQ issue addressed by the organization (alien or pollution. 
4.4.3. The Analysis and interpretation of the network data 
All network data (relational as well as attribute data) generated through the SNA survey was first 
captured in an Excel spreadsheet. The relations were recorded in Excel by creating 54x54 square 
matrices. The matrix format was also used for handling the attribute data. For each attribute a 
numeric coding system was created. These attribute matrices contained 54 of rows and 1 column for 
the specific attribute. The data sets were then analyzed with the help of UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) 
and NetDraw (Borgatti, 2002). The two programs are commonly used by network analysts for 
measuring specific network properties (UCINET) and for visually illustrating and interpreting 
(NetDraw) the network data.  
To be able to reveal the underlying structure that supports the Berg management network only 
reciprocal ties among the organizations were considered in this study. That is, a tie had to be 
acknowledged by both organizations. A focus on reciprocal ties has the advantage that it reduces 
concerns related to reporting accuracy (Marsden, 1990; Wasserman and Faust, 1994) and also directs 
the focus towards the stronger and more stable pattern of interaction in the network72. For most 
analyses the two network relations, information exchange and collaboration were combined into one 
single multiplex network. The reader is referred to Appendix 4.3 for a detailed explanation on how 
the final reciprocated network N was created. 
Chapter 3 Section 3.1 discussed in great length which network measures have been employed to 
describe and analyze the structural properties of the Berg management network. In this context, it 
was explained how the two network characteristics, cohesion and heterogeneity, are assessed with 
the aim of providing a better understanding of whether the existing horizontal integration in the Berg 
catchment is conducive to AM.  
The interpretation of the quantitative data of the identified network was aided by qualitative data 
from interviews, participant observations, workshops and document analysis performed between 
2009 and 2012. This information created a better understanding of the nature of network relations, 
the role of individual actors, as well as expressions of self-organization and collective action. The 
qualitative data also helped to validate the quantitative network data. 
                                                          
72
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4.4.4. Challenges for generating and analyzing network data  
Several methodological problems may arise in the generation and analysis of social network data 
which can impact the validity and the reliability of the network data. A social network analyst needs 
to be aware of potential pitfalls and take measures to avoid or at least minimize them. The following 
section will summarize how issues such as missing data and informant accuracy were addressed in 
this study.  
Network data that is missing, but also to the inclusion of data that is not valid, will ultimately lead to 
the misinterpretation of the network (Borgatti et al., 2013). Missing data can either arise because the 
network was incorrectly specified (i.e. a boundary issue) or because relevant actors refuse to 
participate in the study. The in-depth pre-study and the combination of the realist with the nominal 
approach enhanced the potential of accurately specifying the network boundary and therefore the 
actor set. Conducting the survey as part of personal interviews led to a high overall response rate of 
88%, and ensured that in most cases all sections of the survey was completed. The measures that 
were taken to reduce the negative impact of missing data from non-respondents has been discussed 
in Appendix 4.7. A  whole, these steps provided the basis for generating robust relational information 
on the organizations operative in the Berg catchment.  
Informant inaccuracy resultant from the way in which questions are phrased and from the 
differences in perceptions of respondents with regard to the relations they have to one another 
(Marsden, 2005). In order to ensure that survey questions were phrased correctly and did not lead to 
any confusion the survey was tested prior to its finalization on one key informant and one colleague 
of the researcher. Further, the personal interactions with the respondents during the administration 
of the survey made it possible for the researcher to clarify any questions.  
In this study, the respondents were specifically asked to only report on regular interactions relating 
to the management of the Berg River. This focus on more routinized interactions increases the 
reporting accuracy as people tend to report more accurately on regular interactions as compared to 
than sporadic interactions. Focusing the greater part of the analysis on reciprocal ties, also minimized 
the problem of the accuracy of information given by the respondents. Reporting accuracy was also 
strengthened by focusing on reciprocal ties, so that both actors had to confirm their relations which 
each other. Follow-up interviews were carried out in cases where there was a big discrepancy in the 
answers relating to the relations that two actors had with each other. 
Prell (2012) states that the validity of the data is largely determined by the research questions 
through which we attempt to measure the network under investigation  are the questions able to 
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information exchange, has been based on the assumption that they are expressions of horizontal 
cooperation. Chapter 3 discussed in greater detail why and how the two network characteristics of 
cohesion and heterogeneity were linked to the concept of horizontal cooperation. 
Before concluding the section on the SNA it is important to respond to one of its commonest 
criticisms. It is often claimed claim that an SNA only captures a static view of the network; or that it 
can only provide a snapshot at a fixed point in time of social processes that are dynamic and 
changing. However, it is important to point out that the structures which determine the functioning 
of the Berg River management network do not change easily even if certain properties or positions in 
the network may change. As mentioned in Chapter 3, all relations come at a cost; it is not easy to 
establish and maintain new relations 
4.5. Qualitative methods and data generation techniques  
Although SNA forms a key method (and theoretical framework) for analyzing actor relations on its 
own, it is an insufficient tool for answering the stated research question because it cannot explain 
the external influences or drivers that shape horizontal cooperation in regional SESs. For this reason, 
the study includes qualitative methods namely semi-structured interviews, focus groups and 
participant observation and the collection and analysis of policy documents and other written 
material (e.g., minutes and agenda of past meetings). These qualitative methodological techniques 
are of significance to this study as they are “oriented towards analyzing concrete cases in their 
temporal and local plurality, and starting from peoples expression and activities in their local context” 
(Flick, 1998: 13). Table 4-1 provides an overview of the different qualitative research techniques used 
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Table 0-1: Overview of the qualitative research techniques  







 Identification of relevant actors 
for recall list 
 Informed SNA Survey 
Collective action initiatives 35 
 Understanding forms and 
outcomes of collaboration within 
and across the selected initatives 
SNA survey (Open questions 
SNA Survey) 
51 
 Greater clarity on actor relations 





Water Indaba (2) 
Stakeholder meetings 
organized by DWA Western 
Cape (3) 
Stakeholder meetings 
organized by DEA&DP (2) 
n/a 
 Interactions of the different 
stakeholder groups, 
 who attends such meeting and 







Adopt a River Stellenbosch 
(3) 




 How actors addressing a rinsing 
issues, prioritize activities and deal 
with conflicts among the members 
Focus groups 




 Identification of constraints to 
catchment-wide collective action 




 Barriers to the transformation of 
South Africa’s water governance 
system as perceived by DWA 











 How different stakeholders 
describe their relation to the Berg 
River 
Semi-structured interviews were an important research technique throughout the entire field work 
period (2010-2012) because they provided the freedom to explore emerging topics “while ensuring 
at the same time that all relevant themes are covered and all necessary information is collected” 
(Corbetta, 2003: 270). Focus groups is an interactive technique that was used to generate in-depth 
information on how the organizations perceived the functioning of the catchment and to identify 
major constraints to effective water management. Furthermore, the relatively informal and open-
ended discussions that took place within the focus group settings allowed the respondents to explain 
in their own words the current state of water governance in South Africa. The dynamics of the 
discussions resulted in insights that would not have emerged in individual interviews. Two focus 
group meetings formed part of two workshops which had been organized by the researcher and her 
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the Berg catchment (See Appendix 6.2). Another set of structured focus groups targeted 
representative from DWA national and DWA regional office (Western Cape).  
Participant observation was used at public meetings that concerned water management in the Berg 
catchment. These events included among others, public stakeholder group meetings initiated by the 
DWA or DEA&DP. In addition, the researcher attended the membership meetings of inter-
organization forums that were created with the aim to address specific management issues in the 
catchment. This allowed the researcher to observe common social practices that occur in the 
network. It was especially interesting to observe how the organizations interact and how they 
communicate their interests and concerns to others. Participant observation also served as a check 
to ensure that the findings of the SNA survey correspond with the observed interactions (e.g. do 
actors identified as holding central positions in the network lead the group discussions?). As Flick 
(1998) writes, the observed spontaneous activities and statements that the researcher witnesses 
during participant observations may be more reliable than responses to the researcher`s questions in 
the semi structured interviews or focus groups. The researcher is aware that the attempt to observe 
events as they occur might be compromised, since the presence of the researcher at those events 
may influence the behavior of the actors. However, as most of these observations took place in 
public settings, in which many individuals participate, the presence of the researcher would not seem 
so ‘alien’ to the observed community.  
All qualitative data derived from semi structured interviews, observations and focus group 
discussions were recorded in field notes. Summary reports highlighting the most important 
discussion points and emerging themes were constructed after each round of data collection. In 
addition to the data collection methods mentioned above, the researcher also engaged in a detailed 
document analysis. 
4.6. SNA specific ethical considerations  
In order to protect research participants from harm, extra care needs to be taken when undertaking 
network studies. Borgatti and Molina (2003) highlight several ethical issues that need to be 
addressed in SNAs. They point out that “anonymity at the data collection stage is not possible” as the 
respondent needs to name the people with whom he or she has a relationship. Another issue is that 
of data display. More specifically, when seeing a diagram or graph, it is quite easy for respondents to 
identify themselves or others even if the names of the respondents are not disclosed (Borgatti and 
Molina, 2003). Yet, another concern is that in SNA studies data can be collected on people that are 
not included in the study, from whom no prior consent has been obtained (ibid.). Related to this is 
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Finally, it is important to acknowledge that most respondents are not familiar with network analysis 
and the data it can reveal.  
All of these ethical issues were addressed in the following manner: as mentioned above, the SNA 
survey was conducted through face-to face interactions. Prior to starting the survey the method of 
SNA was explained to each respondent. To aid the explanation a sample network graph was used to 
illustrate how the data is processed, displayed and what conclusions can be drawn from the data. 
After providing the respondents with a detailed description of the nature and content of SNA and the 
purpose and scope of the study, he or she could decide whether to participate in this study or not. All 
interviewees provided a verbal consent. They were also informed that they still had the option to 
stop their participation in the study at any given time. In addition, a letter outlining the research and 
its purpose was sent to each interviewee through email when the initial contact was created.  
While it was not possible to grant the anonymity of the participating organizations, all names of the 
individuals representing the organizations were kept anonymous and the information that they 
provided has been treated confidentially. This was done by giving all respondents untraceable 
identification numbers. The data will be used for academic purposes only, and will not be shown to 
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5. Chapter: Assessing horizontal cooperation through a network perspective: 
network cohesion and heterogeneity in the Berg management network 
5.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter analyzes horizontal cooperation at the operational level in South Africa’s water 
governance system through a relational approach based on a network perspective. To achieve this 
aim, the chapter makes use of a formal SNA to characterize information flow and collaboration in the 
Berg management network. This enables the identification of opportunities and constraints for 
learning and collective action among the organizations that play a role in the management of the 
catchment’s water resources. Several of the quantitative analyses are complemented by qualitative 
analyses of the nature of network relations, the role of individual actors, as well as expressions of 
self-organization and collective action.  
Operative in a regional SES, the Berg management network73 exemplifies the operational level of 
South Africa’s governance system. In order to assess the functioning of the network, this study 
examines how the organizations have organized themselves in order to address the issue of 
degrading water quality in the catchment. The advantage of the network perspective employed in 
this study is that it is able to capture this multitude of actors and the complexity of their interactions, 
leading to a more holistic understanding of water management in the Berg catchment.  
As described in Chapter 3, the understanding gained through a SNA can help explain how actor 
relations influence social processes (e.g., learning and collective action) and lead to specific 
governance outcomes (e.g., responses to water quality issues or the lack of implementation of the 
water reform). Based on the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3, and assisted by the 
quantitative relational data generated from the SNA survey, this chapter has the following objectives: 
 To identify the actor network involved in the management of the water resources in the Berg 
River catchment.  
 To assess horizontal cooperation based on the two network characteristics cohesion and 
heterogeneity; 
 To demonstrate how network cohesion and heterogeneity in the Berg management network 
influence learning and collective action among the organizations involved in the 
management; 
                                                          
73
The organizations comprising the actor network operate at various localities and administrative levels and 
their engagement with water management differs widely. Yet their combined activities determine whether the 
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 To explore if a relational approach can provide new insights into sectoral integration and the 
coherence of governance modes. 
The chapter is structured in the following way: after a brief introduction of the relational data, a 
general overview of the overall composition and structure of the Berg management network is 
provided. Here the organizations that participate in the management of the catchment are 
introduced and initial statements of how they relate to each other are made. This is followed by 
detailed analyses of the two network characteristics of cohesion and heterogeneity, which are used 
as indicators for horizontal cooperation at the operational level. From a SNA perspective, cohesion 
refers to the interconnectedness between the different organizations, i.e., how well connected they 
are. Heterogeneity refers to the diversity of actors involved in the network and the extent of cross- 
boundary linkages among them. Based on the argument put forward in Chapter 3, it is assumed that 
cohesion among the organizations operative in the Berg catchment is of great importance to the 
mobilization and coordination of collective action. Cohesion is assessed by examining the 
interactions among the core water management organizations (WMOs). Additional information on 
the cohesion in the network is gained through the inspection of the existence of cohesive sub-groups 
in the network. These cohesive groupings reflect the strongest collaborative patterns of interaction 
in the network and give an impression of how the network has organized itself. They also provide 
initial ideas of where capacities are located in the network and the extent of sectoral integration and 
coherence of governance modes. Heterogeneity is evaluated through the examination of the 
participation of major water users and of stakeholder groups highly dependent on the Berg River in 
the management of the catchment. In addition, the embeddedness of ecological knowledge in the 
network is assessed, and cross-boundary linkages are explored in view of sectors and modes of 
governance. Finally, the chapter discusses the role and impact of influential actors in the Berg 
management network. The chapter ends by returning to the four objectives posed in the beginning 
of the chapter. Reflecting on the findings, plausible answers are provided as to why existing 
collaborative efforts in the Berg catchment have not resulted in effective management actions that 
address issues of degrading water quality. 
Table 5-1 provides an overview of the different analyses, first introduced in Section 3.1. The table 
shows how these analyses relate to the two network characteristics cohesion and heterogeneity, 
which network of interest they concern, and what the intended aims of the specific analyses are. The 
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Table 5-1: Overview of the specific network analyses and aims  
(DWA = Department of Water Affairs, IBs = Irrigation Boards, core WMOs = core water management 
organizations, eco= ecological) 
 Analysis Method Aim Network 
 Basic whole 
Network 
measures  




To identify relevant 
actors and the level of 
interaction among them.  
 
To assess how well the 
network is connected and 
how power and exchange 
(info and resources) are 












Group density and centralization: 
a. Core WMOs vs. others 
b. Comparison of four groups: 




c. Sub-population IBs  
 Visualized sub-graph 
 Ego network central 
actor  
d. Sub-population 
municipalities & DWA 
 Visualized Sub-graph 
 Ego network central 
actor 
To assess the cohesion 
among core WMOs and 







Density and composition To assess how the 
operational level self-
organizes. 
To assess variation in 
mandated and non-
mandated actors, 








Girvan-Newman Algorithm To identify ‘collaborative’ 
clusters i.e. organizations 
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G-F Brokerage method 
(gatekeeper and representative) 
To identify actors 


















To detect marginalized 
organizations. 
Network N(v) 
 Identification of eco knowledge 
sources  
 No. of ties from sources to 
other non-eco actors  
 No. of sources non-eco actors 
have direct access to (w/o 
considering the DWA) 








E-I Index (modes) To examine information 
exchange among modes 




























  G-F brokerage roles of specific 
actors  
To examine the role of 
individual actors in 
establishing cross-scale 
linkages for: inter 
sectoral integration, 
bridging of governance 
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5.2. Composition and structure of the Berg management network: a first impression of 
cohesion and heterogeneity  
The relational data that is discussed and analyzed in this chapter was generated through a SNA 
survey which was carried out in the form of interviews (containing a structured questionnaire) from 
February 2011 to September 2011.74 For a detailed discussion on the choice of organizations and the 
network boundary, the reader is referred to Chapter 4. 
In total, relational data from 54 of the 58 identified organizations, which actively participate in the 
management of the Berg River, was collected, giving a response rate of 88%. This is a sufficiently 
valid data set that captures to a great extent relational information on the operational level in the 
Berg catchment. Since the survey respondents were able to add any organizations that the original 
recall list may have missed, it is assumed that the final actor set represents the most relevant 
organizations and their collaborative interactions relating to the management of the Berg catchment.  
A network analyst can gain more clarity in complex governance settings by specifying and using the 
relations that are presumed to connect the most relevant organizations in a specific governance 
context. As stated in Chapter 4, in this study, two collaborative relations were investigated in greater 
detail through the SNA survey: 
 Relation 1 (Information exchange): The regular information exchange among organizations 
relating to the issue of degrading water quality and the environmental status of the Berg 
River. 
 Relation 2 (Collaboration): The regular collaboration among the organizations on the issue of 
degrading water quality.  
For the purpose of this study, only reciprocal relations, i.e. those patterns of interactions that were 
acknowledged by both organizations, were considered. For most calculations, the symmetrical, 
binary, multiplex network N, which combined the two relations information exchange and 
collaboration, was used.75 The valued network N(v) was used to identify the strong ties among the 
actors. These ties provided the basis for investigating the existence of cohesive sub-groups in the 
network. The reader is referred to Appendix 4.3 for a detailed explanation on how the relations were 
                                                          
74 Chapter 4 provides detailed information on the development and implementation of the survey instrument. 
Appendix 4.1 and 4.2 lists the survey and the recall list. 
75
The two relations were combined into a single (multiplex) network through linear combination of their 
adjacent matrices (N(v)=INFO +COLL), which was then dichotomized to a binary network N with all values 
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combined. Table 5-2 specifies which analyses were done in which network and how the networks are 
referred to in the chapter. 
Table 5-2: Overview of the various networks used in the SNA analysis.  
Network Referred to as Measurements 
Multiplex Network N: 
symmetric, binary  
Berg management 
network 
 Whole NW measures: density, centralization, 
Degree and betweenness centrality, distance 
measures,  
 group density  
 G-F brokerage analysis 
 
Multiplex Network N(v): 
symmetric, valued  
 General composition 
 Core-periphery analysis 
 
Information Network: 
symmetric binary  




Collaboration  Cohesive sub-group analysis 
 Group density 
 G-F brokerage analysis 
 E-I Index Sector and Modes 
Figure 5-1 is a graphic representation of the Berg management network and shows a diverse actor 
set of 54 organizations that are actively involved in the management of the Berg River catchment. 
The graph conveys that all organizations are either directly or indirectly connected through 
collaborative relations. In other words, the Berg management network is a fully connected network 
comprising one component without any disconnected groupings or isolated individual organizations. 
This implies that theoretically every organization can reach all others. Of the 312 ties that link the 
organizations, 122 connect actors that exchange information as well as collaborate with each other. 














Figure 5-1: The Berg management network N(v) 
The symbols show which organizational type each node (i.e. organization) represents and the thickness of the lines (i.e. 
ties) connecting the nodes indicate the tie strength. A value of 1 means that the organizations either exchange 
information or collaborate and a value of 2 means that they exchange information and collaborate. 
 
54 organizations 
Total ties: 312 total 
Tie strength = value 1   (190 ties, grey lines) 
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The survey further revealed that 23 of the 54 organizations are engaged in river management 
without having a legal mandate that would obligate them to do so (See Figure 5-2). This suggests a 
certain level of voluntary engagement on part of some organizations, or at least the presence of 
incentives. Of the 31 organizations that have a formal mandate with regard to the management of 
the catchment, 24 organizations have a mandate for water management, the other organizations 
have mandates more specific to land management or environmental conservation. The 24 
organizations with a mandate for water management are from here on specified as core water 
management organizations (WMOs). Also notable is the significant number of consultancies (six in 
total). A great surprise was to find a retailer among the organizations in the network. While this 
organization occupies a peripheral position, the qualitative data revealed that the retailer’s 
engagement had a lot of potential to make positive contribution to the management of the Berg 
River. 
 
Figure 5-2: The Berg management network N(v): mandated (blue nodes) and non-mandated organizations (grey 
nodes) 
The organizations that comprise the actor set vary substantially in their level of formality as well as 
organizational structure. In addition to the 47 organizations which have more permanent and 
formalized structures (such as government departments and NGOs), seven inter-organizational 
platforms (e.g., specific forums or reference groups), which tend to be more fluid and temporary, are 
          Mandated  actors 
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also part of the actor set.76 Capturing the different organizational forms in the network made it 
possible to detect that some organizations are in more than one way engaged and represented in the 
network. For example, the West Coast District Municipality is an actor in the network, however it is 
also a member of the Berg Estuary Management Forum. Inter-organizational platforms such as the 
Berg Estuary Management Forum cannot just be represented as links between the organizations but 
constitute a node (actor) in the network as this platform has a collective purpose that goes beyond 
the objectives of the individual organizations.  
Table 5-3 lists different administrative levels (national, provincial and local) to which the 
organizations involved in the catchment belong. While there is a significant number of national 
organizations, they all have a physical presence in the province, with several of them having their 
headquarters in the Western Cape Province. Not surprising is that local actors make up of 60 % of all 
organizations. It is notable that the majority of inter-organizational platforms are local initiatives.  
Table 5-3: Administrative level of the organizations 
Administrative level Type of organization Total # 
National 
2 government departments 
1 national program 
1 corporate -retailer 
3 NGOs (WWF, WESSA, Bird Life) 
2 research institutions 
1 consultancy (Aurecon) 
10 
Provincial 
5 government departments  
3 NGOs 
2 consultancies 






7 local municipalities 
2 district municipalities 
3 consultancies (Wright, JB) 
6 local inter-organizational 
platforms 
33 
Table 5-4 displays several network measurements that give a first impression of the cohesion among 
the organizations that compose the Berg management network. Of the 2862 possible ties, 312 are 
realized in the symmetrized binary network N. Although only 10,9% of the possible ties in the Berg 
management network are realized, the greatest steps (maximum distance) between any two 
organizations was five, with the average step (average path length) between any two organizations 
being 2.546. For a network of this size, one can still speak of a sufficient level of reachability among 
                                                          
76
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the organizations. The relatively high level of the centralization score of 29.83% suggests that the 
network may contain central but also several marginal organizations. The variances in the centrality 
scores, which are provided in Appendix 5.2, confirm this presumption. The betweenness centrality 
score also suggests that some organizations occupy positions that allow them to operate as 
gatekeeper or broker in the network. Hence, they can create linkages among organizations that 
otherwise would not be connected to each other. 
Table 5-4:  Descriptive statistics of the Berg management network (N) 
Size = total number of organizations; Density = observed number of ties as a proportion of the total number of 
possible ties based on the network size; Degree centralization= a measurement of variation in the number of 
ties an actor possesses. Betweenness centralization= a measure of variation in the number of times 
organizations sit on the path between two other organizations. Diameter= greatest number of steps between 
any two organizations in the network; Average path length= average number of steps between any two 










312 10.9% 29.83 % 28.09% 5 2.546 5.78 
Table 5-5 lists the ten organizations with the highest scores for each centrality measure. In addition, 
the two graph representations of network N in Figure 5-4 visualize the degree centrality and the 
betweenness centrality scores of the different organizations (through the different node sizes). Based 
on the centrality measures, the network seems to be organized around two central organizations. 
The table and the graphs show that the Department of Water Affairs (DWA)77 and one of the 
Irrigation boards (IBs) appear to be the most influential organizations it the network. This means 
these organizations have ties to many others in the network (degree centrality) as well as provide a 
link between many organizations that otherwise would be disconnected (betweenness centrality). 
That the DWA has the highest score of all organizations does not come as a big surprise given its 
regulatory role in water management. A valid interpretation of why the DWA has been able to obtain 
this favorable position in the network could therefore be its legal authority. Yet, if one looks at the 
other core WMOs (i.e. municipalities and IBs/WUA), this argument no longer applies. Significant 
variation within these two groups exists. The organizations that according, to their connectedness in 
the network, would have a significant amount of influence in the network are a forum, a consultancy, 
a conservation organization, and a provincial government department (see rankings in Table 5-5). 
This indicates that variables other than legal authority need to be investigated in order to better 
                                                          
77
While a distinction must be made between the DWA national and the DWA regional offices (see Chapter 4 for 
a detailed explanation), the SNA showed that only the DWA regional office Western Cape is actively 
participating in the Berg management network. When the DWA is discussed in this chapter, the reference is 
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understand why some of the organizations are more central and influential than others. Some of the 
subsequent sections intend to provide answers to which organizations occupy influential positions 
and whether these organizations are able to utilize their positions to advance the management of 
the Berg River.  
Table 5-5: The ten highest centrality scores for degree centrality and betweenness centrality for the symmetric, 
binary network N 
Gov =government organization, Gov (WMO)= governmental water management organization, Non-Gov (WMO) 
= non-governmental water management organization, Gov (Consv) = governmental conservation organization, 
Cons= consultancy 
DEGREE BETWEENNESS 
ID Type  Score  ID Type  Score  
DWA  Gov (WMO) 21 DWA  Gov 
(WMO) 420.888 
Main IB Non-gov 
(WMO) 
18 Main IB Non-gov 
(WMO) 283.592 
IB pollution  Non-gov 
forum 
17 IB pollution  forum 
158.610 








13 Wright  Cons 
124.988 
WfW Gov 12 CapeNature Gov 
(Consv.) 106.916 




12 DS_M Gov 
(WMO) 97.165 
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Figure 5-4: Degree and Betweenness centrality of the organizations 
Actors with the highest score can be identified by the size of the note  
The basic network measurements suggest that the Berg management network is quite 
heterogeneous in its actor composition (administrative levels, type of organization, mandated and 
non-mandated etc.). Indeed the wide variety of organizations involved suggests that the 
organizations could theoretically draw from a diverse set of resources (ranking from scientific 
ecological knowledge to technical know-how, to access to different decision-making processes, and 
to financial support). While the level of density is not especially high in the network, the rather short 
distances for information or resources to travel between organizations, and that no groups or 
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management network. Furthermore, the existence of several central organizations in the network 
may be of assistance in directing information flow and in coordinating collaborative efforts in the 
network. From this, one may expect ample opportunities for learning and collective action among 
the set of organizations. 
Although these first exploratory network analyses reveal patterns of actor relations which should be 
supportive of collaborative management, they stand in sharp contrast to the realities that confront 
the Berg catchment. The degradation of water quality in the Berg River continues to be a prevailing 
issue and the qualitative data obtained from the preliminary study, the survey respondents as well as 
document analysis, suggest that water management in the catchment is of poor quality.78 All of this 
indicates that the operational level is not functioning well. In order to understand the real extent of 
horizontal cooperation among the organizations, or the lack thereof, the cohesion and heterogeneity 
in the network needed to be assessed in more detail. Only then is it possible to draw any conclusion 
on how existing relations among the organizations impact their learning and collective action 
opportunities. 
5.3. Cohesion: patterns of interactions among core water management organizations 
and the existence of cohesive sub-groups  
This section provides greater clarity on the existing cohesion among the organizations involved in the 
management of the Berg catchment. All measures discussed in this section were done on the binary 
multiplex network N. The assessment starts by examining the interactions among three types of core 
water management organizations (WMOs), namely the DWA, the irrigation boards/ water user 
associations (IBs/WUA), and municipalities. The interest in the interconnectedness among the core 
WMOs (i.e. those which a specific mandate concerning the management of the Berg River) is based 
on the assumption that given their formal roles in water management, one would expect a significant 
level of information exchange and collaboration among those organizations. In this context, the 
interactions of core WMOs with other organizations from the network are also compared. This allows 
evaluating collaboration among the core WMOs and providing a first impression to what extent they 
also interact with other organizations. The analysis is complemented by an investigation into the 
extent to which the network has organized itself into cohesive sub-groups. A cohesive sub-group 
analysis provides a more accurate picture of the tie distribution in the network. It therefore enables 
the researcher to make an informed statement about how well the network is integrated as a whole 
(e.g. Prell, 2012). The analysis is also valuable in identifying those parts of the network that 
distinguish themselves from the rest of the network through their high internal activity (Hanneman 
                                                          
78
 See Appendix 5.4 for a list of survey respondents whose qualitative data informed the discussions below. 
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and Riddle, 2005). Wasserman and Faust (1994:251) state that “cohesive sub-groups are theoretically 
important … because of social forces operating through direct contact among sub-group members, 
through indirect conduct transmitted via intermediaries or through relative cohesion within as 
compared to outside the sub-group”. These ‘collaborative’ clusters (characterized by dense and 
strong ties) may in turn be expressions of collective action at sub-network level. 
5.3.1. Exploring the collaborative interactions among core water management 
organizations (WMOs) 
The National Water Act of 1998 has placed specific responsibilities on several organizations with 
regard to water management at the catchment scale. Of those organizations that are displayed in 
Figure 5-4, three types of organizations are of relevance for the analysis of the Berg management 
network. They are marked by red circles in Figure 5-5 and refer to the DWA (in particular its regional 
office in the Western Cape), several municipalities (local, district and metropolitan) which function as 
Water Service Authorities (WSA)79 and in some cases also as Water Service Providers (WSP)80 as well 
as IBs/WUAs. IBs are not displayed in the Figure 5-5 as they, according to the National Water Act, 
should have been transformed to WUAs (RSA, 1998). The reader is referred to Appendix 4.4 for a 
detailed description of the core WMOs and to Appendix 4.5 for a historically embedded overview of 
South Africa’s water governance system.
                                                          
79
 A WSA is responsible for the management of domestic and industrial water use. The main focus is on bulk 
water supply and sanitation services. The role can only be fulfilled by local or metropolitan municipalities 
(Schreiner and Hassan, 2010). 
80
 A WSP is responsible for the practical implementation of water service provision. The municipality (WSA) can 
fulfill this role or it can contract another organization, e.g., a district municipality. Hence, WSPs don’t need to 














Figure 5-5: Core water management organizations and the envisioned relations among them  
Adopted from Mazibuko, G. & Pegram, G (2006) 
(The DWA = Department of Water Affairs, RO = Department of Water Affairs Regional Office, CMA = Catchment 
Management Agency, CMS = Catchment Management Strategy, WSA =Water Service Authority , WSP=Water 
Service Provider, CMC= catchment management strategy ). 
In the case of the Berg catchment, all IBs except one, which has been transformed into a WUA, still 
operate as IBs. The incomplete transformation of these organizations is expressed through the red 
half circle in Figure 5-5. Organizations that are marked by dotted red circles are WMOs that have 
been called for by the National Water Act (1998) but do not currently exist in the Berg catchment. 
They are a catchment forum and a catchment management agency (CMA). According to the National 
Water Act (1998), CMAs plays a critical role in coordinating activities within a catchment. Since the 
regional offices of the DWA are supposed to act as proto-CMAs in catchments where CMAs still need 
to be established (Herrfahrdt-P hle, 2010), it is assumed that the collaboration among the other core 
WMOs should not be too constrained by the missing CMA in the Berg catchment. Important to note 
is that a catchment forum (the CMA reference group being representative of key stakeholder groups) 
existed from 2005 to 2007 in the Berg catchment (Interview S-1; Gueze and Jonker, 2008 ). The 
forum did substantial work on preparing the process for the creation of the CMA and the CMS 
(Interview S-1). However, the forum disintegrated in 2007 because of the realignment process within 
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Figure 5-6: Geographic locations of core WMOs at the local level  
The IBs/WUA are captured in the left map and the locations of the local municipalities are displayed in the right 
map. 
 
Figure 5.6 shows two maps of the catchment that display the geographical locations of the IBs/WUA 
and the municipalities. The left map shows where the 14 IBs and the individual WUA are situated in 
the Berg catchment.81 One can see that most IBs belong to an umbrella organization, the Main IB 
which is marked by a circle with a dotted blue line. Two organizations, the WUA and one IB are 
located at tributaries of the Berg River. The right map shows how the municipal boundaries relate to 
the catchment. The catchment is within the boundaries of six local municipalities. While Cape Town, 
a metropolitan municipality, is located outside the catchment borders, it receives a significant 
amount of its water from the Berg River and is consequently an important stakeholder (DWA, 2007). 
All of the six local municipalities act as water service authorities (WSAs); three of them also fulfill the 
role of water service providers (WSPs). The West Coast District Municipality (WCDM), for which 
boundaries are not shown on the map, is also formally involved in water management activities.82 
The WCDM is the WSP for Bergriver Municipality, Swartland Municipality and Saldanha Bay 
Municipality.  
                                                          
81 Besides two larger IBs that are directly located along the Berg River, the others are small IBs that are not 
adjacent to the river. They receive their water from the Berg River through pumping schemes (Interview S-2). 
82
 Part of the district municipality are the Bergriver Municipality, Swartland Municipality and Saldanha Bay 
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It is important to note is that while the DWA’s responsibilities are primarily focused on water 
management and resource protection, the municipalities and IBs have quite a large number of other 
responsibilities that are not related to the water sector.83 Yet, despite the differentiated prioritization 
of water management among the core WMOs, one would expect a strong level of interaction among 
the WMOs when compared to the rest of the network. If indeed regular communication linkages 
(expressed through many ties, i.e. high density) among the WMOs exist, then it also seems 
reasonable to think that the core WMOs will be likely to jointly address issues of degrading water 
quality.  
To assess the interconnectedness and cooperation among the core WMOs, several measures were 
calculated in the multiplex network N. First, the three core WMOs were placed into one large group 
and the interaction among them was compared to the group of organizations representing the rest 
of the network. Then the group containing the core WMOs was divided into 3 sub-populations (the 
DWA, municipalities, IBs/WUAs). What remained was the sub-group containing all other 
organizations. The number of linkages between the four groups and within the four groups were 
measured and compared. This was followed by the examination of several relational properties that 
characterize the sub-population containing the municipalities and the sub-population containing 
IBs/WUA. Then, based on the observed patterns of interactions, opportunities for learning and 
collaboration within each group was evaluated.  
5.3.2. Comparing cohesion of the core WMOs with rest of the Berg management network  
Table 5-6 shows that both, the group of core WMOs and the group containing all other organizations 
(non-WMOs), have more internal linkages than external linkages. The density measures further 
reveal that the density among the 24 core WMOs does not differ greatly from the group density of 
the 30 non-WMOs. The same can be said about the reachability among the actors within each group. 
Reachability denotes whether information can be transmitted from one organization to another 
either directly or indirectly through intermediate organizations and the time it takes for information 
to travel i.e. a longer path equates to more time (Wasserman and Faust, 1994))If one compares the 
centralization scores in Table 5-7 then it becomes clear that the ties are actually more evenly 
distributed among the group of non-WMOs. With a centralization of 54.1% the group of the core 
WMOs appears to depend on a few central organizations for its cohesion. That this is the case 
becomes strikingly clear when one looks how the organizations are organized around two focal 
actors in the left sub-graph at the bottom of Table 5-7. The measures suggest that the interaction 
within the group of core WMOs is by no means greater than the interaction among the non-WMOs. 
                                                          
83
Representatives of IBs are commercial farmers and their primary focus is on agricultural production. The 
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Indeed information exchange and collaboration among the WMOs seem highly depend on the two 
central actors.  
Table 5-6: Cohesion of core WMOs in comparison to cohesion of all other network actors based on density 
measures.  
The scores on the diagonal are refer to intra-group tie density. 
 Core WMOs Non-WMOs 
Core WMOs  
(n= 24) 
0.124 0.099 




Table 5-7: Key network measures to compare cohesion of core WMOs to cohesion of all other actors 
 Core WMOs (n= 24) Non-WMOs (n= 30) 
Density 0.124 0.112 








5.3.3. Cohesion among and within the core WMOs  
In Table 5-8, the group of core WMOs was further split into three sub-population in order to evaluate 
the extent of interaction among the core WMOs. The group of non-WMOs was also included in the 
analysis to show the extent of communication of the three groups to the non-WMOs. The density 
measures imply that the DWA interacts with all municipalities but that the interactions among the 
municipalities themselves are rather limited. Indeed, it is only the group of IBs/WUA that have more 
internal (0.133) than external ties. All other groups have more external than internal ties. Noticeable 
is the high centralization score for the group of IBs signifying the crucial role of one central actor (the 
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DWA is excluded, then the group of non-WMOs actually has on average more internal ties (3.6) than 
the core WMOs. While the municipalities have on average 0.75 direct ties, the IBs have on average 
1.86 direct ties. 
Table 5-8: Density and centralization between and within the core WMOs groups 

















1.00 0.107 0.042 0.073 42.6 0.75 
IBs/WUA  
(n=15) 
0.067 0.042 0.133 0.073 83% 1.86 
Non-WMOs  
(n= 30) 
0.4 0.108 0.073 0.124 16% 3.6 
When focusing on the sub-graph of the core WMOs in Figure 5-7, several observations can be made. 
The IB located in the left corner is completely disconnected from the other core WMOs. Furthermore, 
the graph appears to be divided into two clusters, with each cluster organized around one of the two 
central organizations. The color of the nodes indicate that the left cluster contains most of the IBs 
which are all directly linked to the Main IB. The cluster on the right includes the municipalities and is 
centered around the DWA. The WUA has no collaborative relations with the IBs and interacts on a 
regular basis only with a local municipality. The graph also implies that only the Drakenstein 
Municipality and the WCDM engage in regular interactions with some of the IBs (including the Main 
IB). Based on the qualitative data that was generated about the nature of relations, it appears that 
the Drakenstein Municipality and the group of IBs, through regular informal interactions (which 
started off highly confrontational), have been able to develop a more collaborative and trustworthy 
relationship. The engagement was initiated by the Main IB and later fostered through the chair of the 
IB pollution committee that forms part of the group of IBs.84 The sizes of the nodes in the sub-graph 
represent the degree centrality score of each actor and highlight again the central role of the DWA 
and the Main IB among the core WMOs. Given their positions, the two actors actually have the 
possibility to act as gatekeeper or broker among the two groups as well as within their respective 
group. 
                                                          
84
Through the regular informal meetings, both parties became aware of each other’s needs and constraints, 
especially.the internal and external constraints that the specific municipal departments are faced with in the 














Figure 5-7: Sub-graph of the core WMOs   
Pink nodes =Municipalities, black nodes =IBs/WUA, yellow node =DWA 
5.3.3.1. Relations between the IBs (sub-population) 
This section examines the collaborative relations among the IBs and describes how the observed 
collaboration is reinforced by the activities of the Main IB. Figure 5-8 shows the sub-graph of the IBs. 
Except for the two isolated organizations on the left the pattern of interactions display almost an 
ideal star-like network structure, with a few IBs forming triads.  
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In the network literature, a star-like network structure is viewed as being optimal for the 
coordination and mobilization of collective action as it provides for quick information flow through 
the central coordinating actor (e.g. Borgatti et al., 2013; Ernstson, 2008). It enables the group of IBs 
to be well connected without all actors having to invest in a lot of relations (Ernstson, 2008). The 
triads in Figure 5.8 represent strong cooperation among the most important IBs in the group, namely 
the Main IB as well as the two IBs adjacent to the river (Lower IB and Upper IB) and the largest 
pumping scheme IB. 
The investigation also highlights that just because the IBs belong to the same stakeholder group does 
not mean that they interact with each other on a regular basis on water management issues. 
Geographical location and the sharing of infrastructure systems seem to be contributing factors. For 
example, the reason as to why the WUA and one IB (the 24 River IB) are not connected to the other 
IBs is geographical. The two organizations receive their water from the tributaries of the Berg River. 
Therefore there is no need to have formal ties to the other IBs. Indeed, the IBs belonging to the Main 
IB are connected via formal relations which set the rules for water distribution among the IBs and 
their contributions to the maintenance of the infrastructure. However, the relations among the IBs 
go far beyond formal contracts. Many of the chairmen of the IBs have been neighbors for generation 
(Interview S-2). They are friends, business partners, and sometimes competitors on the agricultural 
market (Interview S-5). One of the main reasons why they decided to establish the Main IB was not 
to coordinate their internal affairs. Coordination among the pumping IBs was previously organized by 
the Upper Berg IB (Interview S-6). The Main IB, which is composed of chairmen of all IBs, was 
established to present to the political decision makers the interests and concerns of all IBs and their 
members along the Berg River.  
To gain more legitimacy and to create political pressure, the IBs took their collaborative efforts even 
further. Under the Main IB they established a pollution task team committee (from here on the IB 
pollution committee) that includes representatives of the IBs as well as several experts.85 With the 
information generated by the committee, the IBs have been able to provide evidence that the local 
municipalities in the upper catchment are some of the largest polluters. This has put pressure on 
some of the municipalities to engage with the IBs and to start discussing measures that could be 
taken to address the problem.  
                                                          
85
 The IB pollution committee meets on a regular basis to discuss emerging issues and to provide water quality 
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Figure 5-9 displays the Ego-network86 of the Main IB which illustrates how well connected the 
organization is to its member organizations, to various experts that contribute to the pollution 
committee, and to political decision-makers.  
\  
Figure 5-9:The Ego-network of the Main IB: Shows direct ties of the Main IB (red node) to important decision 
makers as well as experts participating in the pollution committee. 
 
The qualitative data from the survey also support the impression that the IBs are bound together 
through trust relations. In the interviews all chairmen of the IBs said that they completely trust the 
Main IB with their external affairs and that they support any decision the Main IB makes. Some even 
went so far to say that they only view information on the Berg River provided by the Main IB as 
legitimate information as they neither trust information coming from DWA nor from the 
municipalities.  
To summarize the investigation into the patterns of interaction among the IBs: A high level of 
cohesion, which is based on trust relations and maintained through one central actor, characterizes 
this group. The self-organizing capacity of the IBs (structurally explained by the star-like relational 
structure) allows them to mobilize internal resources which leads promptly to effective collective 
action (see Figure 5-8 and table 5-9). The creation of the IB pollution committee, for example, made 
it possible to establish important linkages to scientific experts and to lobby political decision makers 
at different administrative levels. By having access to valuable and legitimate knowledge concerning 
the river through the committee and a self-organized water quality monitoring system, the IBs are 
able to intervene in political decision-making processes concerning the river.  
                                                          
86 Ego-networks consist of one focal actor (called ego) and the actors to whom ego is directly connected (e.g. 











P a g e  | 113 
 
Table 5-9:  Major information exchange and collaboration activities within the group of IBs 
Information exchange  
relevant to Water Quality 
Collaboration 
 Monthly reports on the WQ of the Berg sent 
by IB pollution committee to all member IBs  
 Informal sms alert system in the event of a 
pollution incident  
 Official meetings (twice a year) 
 Quarterly meetings of Main IB 
 Monthly to bi-monthly meeting of IB 
pollution committee 
 Establishment of the Main IB to represent 
interests of all IBs to political decision 
makers 
 Establishment of IB pollution committee to 
provide scientific evidence of the pollution in 
the Berg River and to lobby political decision 
makers 
 Establishment of a water quality monitoring 
system covering most of the Berg (12 sites) 
While the strong cohesion among the IBs has enabled them to become effective and competent 
actors in the network, the high internal cohesion may not always be beneficial. Although the IBs have 
access to different knowledge sources, most of the information gets filtered through the Main IB. 
Learning occurs primarily within IB pollution committee and is not necessarily diffused to the IBs as a 
whole. Indeed, the qualitative data supported the impression that currently most of the knowledge 
gained is used strategically to advance the interest of the IBs without having much impact on their 
own land and water management practices. This potentially negative effect of cohesion based on a 
star-like network structure on learning has also been observed in other studies. Ernstson (2008: 32) 
for example, highlights that such relational structure can in the “longer-term undermine social 
learning because it reduces the access of individual actors to multiple sources of information.” 
Furthermore, the strong cohesion among the IBs has reduced the freedom of the individual IBs to 
collaborate with other organizations from the Berg management network. The 24 River IB and the 
Tulbagh WUA, that have no regular collaborative relations with the other IBs, differ in their relational 
characteristics from those IBs that have organized around the Main IB. The Tulbagh WUA and the 24 
River IB have collaborative relations with various kinds of organizations operative in the catchment. 
They are also more proactive on issues relating to alien invasive clearing activities in the catchment. 
The IBs belonging to the Main IB need to wait for the go ahead from Main IB before they can engage 
in any type of partnership or participate in specific activities relating to the management of the Berg 
River. One expectation is that the Lower IB is also engaged with WCDM on alien clearing issues. The 
reason for its greater freedom is related to the fact that until joining the Main IB, the Lower IB 
operated quite independently of all other IBs.  
5.3.3.2. Relations between the municipalities (sub-population) 
This section demonstrates that the patterns of interaction among the municipalities in the realm of 
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Table 5-10 Key characteristics of the municipalities  
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Table 5-10 highlights the fact that the municipalities differ in their dependency on the Berg River, 
their impact on the river as well as their demographic and economic constellations. These differences 
affect their relation to the river, their willingness to contribute to its management, and the 
willingness to collaborate with others. This becomes apparent when looking at the last column in 
Table 5-10. The degree centrality scores indicate the level of engagement of each municipality in the 
network. It shows that only the Drakenstein Municipality and the WCDM participate pro-actively in 
the network. Interestingly, the municipalities that are most dependent on the river for their water 
security (primarily the municipalities located in the lower catchment and the City of Cape Town) are 
not well embedded in the network. Despite the differences mentioned in Table 5-10, the local 
municipalities face similar challenges regarding the maintenance and upgrading of waste water 
treatment plants. Population growth, the pressure to provide basic services to poor communities, 
limited budgets, and corruption, are all factors that constrain the capacities of many South African 
municipalities to manage their water service infrastructure and operations sustainably. The 
qualitative data from the survey indicates that in addition to not having adequate financial resources, 
the municipal water service departments, which are primarily responsible for water management 
within the municipalities, lack the required human resources to fulfill their water services functions 
(Interviews S-8, S17, S-7, S-11). Expertise (e.g., environmental officers or department) for water 
management beyond water services is, in most of the local municipalities, non-existing (expectation 
Drakenstein Municipality).  
With many problems in common, close interaction and the sharing of information and knowledge 
could be of benefit to these resource-constrained organizations. The quantitative analysis of this 
group shows that there is surprisingly little interaction (information sharing and collaboration) 
between the municipalities. The left sub-graph in Figure 5-10 visualizes that no direct patterns of 
regular interactions exist among the local municipalities in the realm of water management. It is only 
the three local municipalities from the lower catchment that are indirectly connected to each other 
through the WCDM. However, the sub-graph on the right in Figure 5-10 reveals that when the DWA 
is added, then the highly fragmented group of organizations becomes one complete network in 
which all organizations are indirectly linked. This means that information sharing and communication 














Figure 5-10: Ties among the municipalities 
The left graph displays only the municipalities, in the right graph, the DWA is added to the group of actors.  
 
The qualitative information from the survey reveals that the few relations that exists are formal and 
obligatory (i.e. the minimum required by the mandates). The municipalities interact with the DWA on 
a regular basis because they are required to report their water quality data monthly. The regular 
information exchange among the WCDM and the three local municipalities can be explained by the 
WCDM functioning as a WSP delivering bulk water to the three local municipalities. The collaborative 
relations go beyond these formal communication structures only in the case of two local 
municipalities (see Table 5-11). The Berg River Municipality works jointly with the WCDM in the Berg 
Management Estuary Forum. Stellenbosch Municipality and the DWA have partnered in a project as 
part of the national ‘Adopt a River’ program. While the former has been a highly productive 
relationship, the latter had, at the time of the study, not resulted in any effective collective action. 
Both collective action initiatives are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
Table 5-11: Major information exchange and collaborative activities among the municipalities and the DWA 
 Information exchange Collaboration 
Without DWA  Only regular information 
exchange between WCDM and 
the three local municipalities 
based on contractual relation 
between WSAs and WSP 
 Berg Municipality and WCDM 
through the Estuary forum 
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exchange on water monitoring 
data  
 Several informal meetings 
between municipalities from 
upper catchment and DWA 
established partnership on 
Adopt a River program  
The marginalization of some of the municipalities in the network is exemplified by comparing the 
viewpoints that were articulated by the municipalities in the survey on the value of collaboration. 
The survey revealed two contrasting views among the municipalities. Municipalities from the lower 
catchment did not think that the collaboration in the Berg management network was of any benefit 
to them. They were of the opinion that their needs and interest were not taken into consideration in 
decision-making processes related to the Berg River. Concerns about bad taste in the drinking water 
or the water quality concerns of the local industry have not been directly acknowledged by the DWA 
or other decision makers in the catchment (Interview S-9). Feeling largely ignored and arguing that 
that their practices have little impact on the river (i.e. they do not contribute to the problem), these 
municipalities do not feel a strong need to collaborate. The representative from the WCDM, who is 
more involved in water management, had a slightly different view. He argued that better 
collaboration among municipalities from the upper and lower catchment was critical for ensuring the 
water security of the stakeholders in the lower catchment (Interview S-10). The municipalities from 
the upper catchment were of the opinion that collaboration (especially the informal engagement 
with the DWA and the Main IB) has been beneficial. One survey respondent argued that the 
engagement with the DWA has increased their access to governmental grants (Interview S-8). 
Furthermore, the pressure from the DWA (e.g., by issuing pre-directives) and the IBs (by threatening 
with legal actions) has enabled some of the municipal water service departments to put political 
pressure on higher level decision makers within their own organization (Interview S-8, S-7).  
The representatives from the municipalities mentioned several internal and external barriers that 
prevent the establishment of sustainable collaborative relations among the municipalities and to 
other organizations in the catchment. There is a general perception among all municipalities that it is 
the responsibility of the DWA to manage the river and not that of the municipalities. This seems to 
reduce the willingness to engage more proactively in river management. A clear distinction between 
water service provision and water management (i.e. river management) was made. An expectation 
are the Drakenstein Municipality and WCDM which, given their internal expertise within their 
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quantitative analysis that these two municipalities are highly engaged in the catchment.87 The SNA 
respondents from the municipalities also stated that, given the low support from senior municipal 
officers and the limited resources that are available to them, they barely can manage their day-to-
day activities. They argue that under such conditions it becomes almost impossible to engage 
collaboratively with others from the catchment. Yet, the municipalities in the upper catchment 
acknowledged that closer collaboration with others can lead to more political visibility of the 
problem as well as increases in funding possibilities. Several of the municipal representatives further 
pointed out that it is not the absence of intergovernmental meetings but the quality and ad hoc 
manner of those meetings that inhibits systematic communication and collaboration. Many of those 
meetings turn out to be just “talk shows” in which problems are tabled but not followed by concrete 
and systematic plans of action (Interview S-11,S-12.  
5.3.3.3. Conclusion on cohesion among key WMOs  
Effective catchment-wide water management necessitates that in particular the core WMOs, i.e. 
those organizations with a specific mandate for the management of the catchment’s water resources, 
are well connected. Unfortunately, the analysis shows that the interactions among the core WMOs 
operative in the Berg catchment is sparse. The limited interactions (in terms of quantity and content) 
are not enough to develop a functioning information exchange system and for aligning plans or 
actions. As a consequence, neither a common vision for the catchment nor a problem definition that 
indicates the interdependence of the organizations as well as their dependence on the river for their 
water security can be observed. Hence, important prerequisites for addressing the issue of degrading 
water quality jointly are missing. Furthermore, without close coordination and cooperation the core 
WMOs will continue fall short of carrying out key management activities effectively.  
Yet, the investigation also shows that the group of IBs is highly competent and effective. This appears 
to be the result of the strong cohesion within the group of IBs, which is facilitated through a star-like 
network structure and trust relations. This cohesion is expressed through the high level of collective 
action and self-organization among the IBs. The way they have organized does not only ensure 
effective information exchange and coordination of collective action among them, but also provides 
the group of IBs with access to important external resources (e.g., knowledge) and decision-making 
processes.  
The findings suggest that establishing collaboration relations within the group of municipalities (but 
also to other organizations) is significantly constrained by several factors. Among them are limited 
internal capacities (e.g., adequate staff and infrastructure for water service provision, expertise on 
                                                          
87 Measured by the number of links the organizations have to other organizations in the network (see degree 
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water resources management, inadequate monitoring systems), the differential dependency on the 
river (Table 5.9), and the lack of willingness to engage more actively in the management of the Berg 
River. Whereas the interaction among the IBs builds on strong trust relations, that of the 
municipalities are formal and obligatory relations (Table 5.10 and 5.11). Although the DWA has been 
identified as a central actor among the core WMOs, the findings suggests that the DWA has so far 
not been able to enhance the communication between the municipalities or the municipalities and 
the IBs.  
5.3.4. Identifying strong ties and cohesive sub-groups  
This section explores how organizations have organized themselves in the network to address the 
issue of degrading water quality. This is done through a cohesive sub-group analysis. Hence, 
instances of collective action are depicted by focusing on the relational data of the Berg management 
network without taking into consideration attribute data of the organizations. 
Chapter 3 highlighted that cohesive sub-groups are sub-sets of actors that distinguish themselves 
from the rest of the network through their shared strong, mutual, direct ties (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). Since this study only considers reciprocal ties among the organizations, the criterion of 
mutuality (i.e. ties that are reciprocal) is not helpful. However, the valued network N(v) is a 
multiplex88 network (i.e. two actors are connected through more than one type of relation) and 
allows the distinguishing of the tie strength among the actors (ranging from 0 to 2). The strongest 
ties can be found among those organizations that exchange information on a regular basis and 
collaborate with each other (i.e. all relations with a value of 2). To be able to only focus on the 
strongest ties, a new network was created in UCINET that only considers the ties with a value of two 
from the valued network N(v). In UCINET, the network N(v) was dichotomized at the cut of value of 2, 
meaning links with a strength less than two received a value of 0. The new network is called from 
here on the ‘collective action’ network.  
5.3.4.1. Comparing the information network with the ‘collective action’ network  
Before turning to the cohesive sub-group analysis, it is worthwhile to compare information exchange 
(information network) with the collaboration (‘collective action’ network) among the actors 
operative in the Berg catchment. Figure 5-11 shows that the two networks differ greatly in their 
shape. It appears that 11 organizations from the actor set do not collaborate with any other 
organization. They can be identified as isolated nodes on the upper left corner of the right graph. 
Among them are the metropolitan municipality of Cape Town and one local municipality from the 
                                                          
88
The idea behind multiplexity is that when actor share more than one kind of relational tie they are more likely 
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lower Berg catchment. In addition, small groupings, one containing two organizations (of which one 
is another local municipality) and the other three organizations, are separated from the main 
component of the ‘collective action’ network. Table 5-11 shows that the density in the ‘collective 
action’ network (when considering all 54 actors) is reduced by more than 50% and based on the 
diameter and average distance that the organizations require more time and effort to reach each 
other. The lower centralization scores suggest that catchment-wide collaboration is not coordinated 
by one specific actor. Hence, in comparison to information exchange, collaboration is decentralized 
and concentrated among fewer actors. 
Based on the qualitative understanding of the interaction in the Berg management network, it seems 
that the information exchange among most organizations is structured along formal relations. 
Collaboration, on the other hand, seems to capture so called ‘choice’ relations89 or informal relations. 
This suggests that the ‘collective action’ network provides a good indication of where in the network 
capacities effective incentive structures and (or) trusting relations exit. 
Another interesting observation can be made with regard to the two central actors that were 
previously identified in the Berg management network. The degree centrality measures (see 
Appendix 5.3) for the ‘collective action’ network show th t the Main IB continues to be one of the 
most active and influential organizations but that the DWA’s role is rather peripheral. This implies 
that the DWA is not highly engaged in collaborative activities. Given its rather peripheral position, it 
also seems to be unlikely that the DWA would be able to coordinate the collaborative efforts in the 




                                                          
89
 Choice relations are defined here as relations that are pursued by the organizations because the organizations 
have confidence in the other actors competencies (capacities and willingness to fulfill their obligations). These 
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Figure 5-11: Comparing information exchange (left graph) and collaboration (right graph) in the Berg management network   
Blue nodes= mandated actors, grey nodes =non-mandated actors 
Table 5-12: Comparing information exchange and collaboration in the Berg management network  
Network 







diameter Av. distance components 





4.3 24.96 23.74 2.26 9 3.36 14 
Information  
Exchange  
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5.3.4.2. Cohesive sub-group analysis: identifying collaborative clusters  
The Girvan-Newman algorithm (Girvan and Newman, 2002) function in UCINET and NETDRAW was 
used for the sub-group analysis of the ‘collective action’ network. The specific aim was to identify 
self-organized collaborative efforts among the diverse set of organizations that comprises the Berg 
management network90. The algorithm divided the network into six cohesive grouping. The partition 
choice was based on the highest score of the Q value 91  and confirmed by the qualitative 
understanding of the network.  
Figure 5-12 shows that the large main component of the ‘collective action’ network containing 38 
organizations was further divided into 4 distinguishable collaborative clusters visualized through 
different colors. In addition, two smaller components that are not connected to each other or to the 
main component were also identified as isolated clusters by the partition. The symbols representing 
the nodes indicate that the clusters are quite diverse in terms of the type of organizations.   
 
Figure: 5-12: The ‘collective action’ network partitioned into six cohesive sub-groups 
The sub-groups are distinguished by the different colors of the nodes. 
                                                          
90
 See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of the algorithm. 
91
The Q value is a score that describes how good each partition is in terms of dividing the network into specific 
groupings. It does so by comparing the number of internal links in the sub-groups with how many one would 
expect if these links were distributed randomly (Borgatti et al., 2013; Newman, 2006). 
IB initiative 
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A first examination of the activities of those groupings revealed that the four collaborative clusters 
represent the greatest efforts to address the issue of degrading water quality in the catchment. They 
include: 
 the self-organizing efforts of the IBs (The IB Initiative); 
 an assortment of organizations that are trying to tackle the issue of alien invasive vegetation (The 
alien invasive clearing cluster); 
 another group collaborating through an estuary forum which has been established to protect and 
manage the Berg River estuary (The Berg Estuary Management Forum); 
 the formal response of the DWA to the issue of water quality (i.e. the establishment of an 
intergovernmental platform to coordinate efforts related to issue of water quality among 
relevant government organizations) (The Water Quality task team ); and 
 2 smaller collaborative efforts. 92 
For the rest of the discussion, only the 4 clusters from the main component are considered and the 
two smaller clusters are ignored as their current contribution to the Berg management network 
remains minimal.  
The IB Initiative 
Based on the findings of the interactions among the core WMOs, it is not surprising that the group of 
IBs organized around the Main IB form a cohesive sub-group. It supports the argument from the 
previous section that this group is characterized by a high level of cohesion. The close and iterative 
cooperation of the IBs with different experts has become institutionalized in form of a pollution 
committee. The partition incorporated members of the pollution committee into the cohesive sub-
group of the IBs. The group of 16 organizations is visualized as the green cluster in the graph of 
Figure 5-12.  
The alien invasive clearing cluster 
The blue cluster is a heterogeneous group which includes NGOs, government departments, but also 
several IBs. While the cluster encompasses different initiatives, all organizations are engaged in the 
                                                          
92
In Figure 5-12, the purple cluster contains a group of consultancies that have been working closely together to 
generate ecological knowledge on the Berg River. The lime green cluster includes a local municipality and a 
Trust organized by the local industry (primary fishing sector): The trust coordinates a water quality monitoring 
program to monitor the discharge of representatives from local industry ((Interview S-13). The geographic focus 
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collaborative activities with the objective to reduce the problem of alien invasive vegetation. Alien 
vegetation is a serious issue in the catchment which directly and indirectly contributes to the 
degrading water quality of the Berg River. 
The Berg Estuary Management Forum (BEMF) 
The orange cluster is a forum that brings together government organizations, NGOs, as well as 
representatives from local stakeholder groups with the aim to manage the Berg River Estuary jointly.  
The Water Quality task team (WQ task team) 
The yellow cluster is made up of a group of government agencies that are involved in an 
intergovernmental platform coordinated by the DWA to officially address the water quality issues in 
the Berg. Important to note is that the WQ task team formally comprises several other organizations 
of which some are part of the Berg management network. However, these actors were of the opinion 
that the WQ task team is not an effective platform for information exchange and collaboration. 
Consequently, these organizations did not indicate in the SNA survey that they have regular 
interactions with the platform and its members. Hence, they do not feature as part of this cohesive 
sub-group. Among those organizations are several municipalities as well as the IBs.93 (For a further 
discussion on the WQ task team the reader is referred to chapter 6).  
The four identified collaborative clusters differ in several aspects. Whereas the IB initiative, the BEMF 
and the WQ task team are singular initiatives, the alien invasive clearing group contains several 
initiatives. Furthermore, the initiatives of the WQ task team and IB initiative are specific responses to 
degrading water quality. The BEMF and the alien clearing cluster have been established for broader 
purposes, i.e. they are not confined to the issue of water quality, but are concerned with the health 
of the river system in a broader sense. However, all of the groups address water quality as a specific 
issue. Sharing knowledge among the collaborative clusters and coordinating actions could be highly 
beneficial for catchment-wide management of the river. To further assess the cohesion among, and 
tie distribution within, the collaborative clusters, the ratio of intra -group ties and ties across the 
clusters (cross-boundary ties) was examined. Furthermore, centralization and average degree94 
within each sub-group was measured. All measures were done on a new matrix (38x38) which was 
created in UCINET and only included the main component. 
                                                          
93
The WQ task team rarely met in the period from 2010 to 2012. The organizations therefore argued that 
the interaction within the WQ task team has been too sporadic to foster the regular exchange of 
information and collaborative relations (Interview S-15, S-11, S-1).  
94
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Figure 5-13: Level of cross boundary interactions 
Table 5-13 shows the density and centralization scores within the groups. While the different group 
sizes made it impossible to make a comparison of the density scores, it is interesting to note the high 
centralization scores of IB initiative and theBEMF. These suggest the presents of a coordinating actor 
in both initiatives. For the IB initiative that means that despite the inclusion of the experts in the 
group, the central role of the Main IB remains intact. It has been previously mentioned that the alien 
clearing initiative is composed of several smaller initiatives. Nevertheless, most organizations appear 
to be well connected to each other (high density and average degree, moderate centralization) and 
no structural distinction could be observed between the initiatives. Comparing the ratio of intra-
group ties and the ties across the groupings (Figure 5.13), it appears that the interaction among the 4 
groups is quite limited. However, the SES literature has in particular emphasized the importance of 
cross-boundary interaction among sub-groups for creating a holistic understanding of SESs such as 
the catchment and for allowing effective management of such complex system (e.g., Berkes and 
Sub-group Size # of ties Avg. Degree Density Centralization 
Cluster green 
 (IB imitative) 
16 40 2.5 0.167 87.62 
Cluster black 
(alien clearing ) 
13 48 3.7 0.308 42.42% 
Cluster orange 
( BEMF ) 
5 8 1.6 0.4 58.33% 
Cluster yellow 
(WQ Task team) 
4 6 11.5 0.5 33.3% 
l = number of ties 
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Folke, 1998; Sandstöm, 2008). Figure 5.13 provides a simple visualization of the cross-boundary 
interactions four collaborative clusters. There it becomes evident that the existing linkages are too 
limited for coordinating catchment-wide collective action.  
5.3.4.3. Identifying organizations that link the collaborative clusters 
While the cross-boundary linkages that connect the four self-organized groupings are sparse, it might 
still be important to find out what organizations have facilitated these linkages. To identify 
organizations that bridge the collaborative clusters, the ‘weighted’ G-F brokerage method was used 
in UCINET. This method and the five possible brokerage roles that an actor can assume have been 
described in Chapter 3. 95 Of importance for the discussion below is to know that the cross-boundary 
brokerage score for each organization has been calculated by adding the scores for the Gatekeeper, 
Liaison and Consultant role (See Chapter 3 for a explanation of the terms). Organizations that have a 
high score for the Coordinator role are organizations that link many organizations within their own 
sub-group. Table 5-14 lists key bridging organizations identified with the G-F brokerage function. 
                                                          
95
Since the ‘collective action’ network is solely comprised of symmetric relations, the gatekeeper role and the 
representative role are the same. Gatekeeper/ representative = actor acts as contact between members of his 
group and another group. Liaison = actor links two organizations that are members of different groups. 
Coordinator= links actors of its own group. Consultant = links two actors that belong to the same group but to 
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Table 5-14:  Key bridging organizations connecting the four self-organized collective action initiatives For 
comparison purposes the intra-group brokerage roles are listed on the right. 











 IB initiative  Main IB 12  IB initiative Main IB 170,7 
 Alien(BEMF)   CapeNature 6,5  Alien (Estuary)  CapeNature 20,7 
 Alien (IB) Lower IB 6  Alien  DoA_wc 18,3 
 BEMF BEMF 4,5  Alien CWDM 13 
 Alien (BEMF) WCDM 4  Alien  WWF 8 
 IB Wright 4 BEMF BEMF 6 
 WQ task team IB pollution  3  IB initiative Upper IB 6 




 IB initiative Upper IB 2  Alien WfW 2,7 




 WQ task team DWA 0  WQ DWA 2 
The organization with the highest cross-boundary broker score is the Main IB followed by 
CapeNature, the Lower Berg IB, BEMF, the WCDM, and Wateright consultancy. The brokerage 
analysis revealed that cross-boundary linkages between the clusters were only realized in situations 
where the broker connects his/her group to another group (the gatekeeper/ representative role).96 
However, catchment-wide collective action would benefit from a network that does not just have 
brokers (gatekeeper) that do connect their group with other groups, but also includes brokers (liaison) 
that facilitate the collaboration between other groups.  
To sum up, the cohesive sub-group analysis was able to demonstrate that quite a large number of 
organizations exist that have organized into collaborative groupings with the aim to jointly address 
major management issues in the catchment. In comparison to information exchange, it appears that 
the organizations are more selective about whom they collaborate with. Collaborative relations are 
primarily choice relations that signal a certain level of trust in each other’s competencies. Most 
clusters are characterized by a diverse membership. That is, collaborative relation can be found 
among state and non-state actors as well as mandated and non-mandated actors. This suggests that 
the need for joint action and the pooling of resources is acknowledged by many of those 
organizations. However, the investigation into the cross-boundary linkages also revealed that the 
interactions across the clusters are not sufficient to achieve catchment-wide collective action. While 
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None of the 38 organizations connected two organizations from two other initiatives (the liaison role). Nor did 
any organization link two organizations that are part of the same initiative but to which the broker has no 
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the Main IB continues to be a highly influential actor, it does not use its influence to enhance the 
overall collaboration and self-organization of the Berg management network. The brokerage analysis 
identified several other actors that bridge the collaborative clusters. However, the qualitative data 
revealed that their influence on the functioning of the entire network remains limited, as they lack 
the necessary formal authority and access to catchment-wide information. Consequently, the cross-
boundary linkages do little to increase cohesion in the network. 
5.4. Heterogeneity: Level of cross-boundary interaction 
The participation of a diverse group of organizations that have different relations to the Berg River 
and which possess various resources can enhance the ability to recognize and deal with changes in 
the SES at the appropriate scale as well as to maintain important management functions (Folke et al., 
2005). The first part of the chapter showed that the Berg management network is composed of a 
diverse actor network rich in resources, skills, and expertise. In theory such a network creates many 
opportunities for adaptive water management in terms of the pooling of resources, compensating 
for limited capacities of individual actors, or for creating innovative solutions. Yet, if organizations 
with a wide range of interests, needs, and capacities are involved, this also means that it is often 
difficult to establish a common vision and to overcome conflicts of interest. A substantial amount of 
time and effort is required to establish trust or at least functioning relationships. In other words, in 
order to harness the heterogeneity of a group o  organizations, a certain degree of cooperation 
between the organizations must be established. The embeddedness of ecological knowledge, the 
integration of all relevant actors, and the existence of important cross-boundary linkages are all 
facilitative factors that can help to enhance the willingness to cooperate (Armitage et al., 2009).  
This section uses a variety of network measures to assess to what extent the heterogeneity of the 
Berg management network is utilized. First a core-periphery analysis is employed to examine the 
participation of major users and stakeholders highly dependent on the Berg River. Of interest here is 
to establish whether these actors are well embedded in the network or marginalized. It is assumed 
that the better an organization is connected in a network the more the organization can contribute 
knowledge, resources, and perspective (including interests and needs). This is followed by an 
assessment of the embeddedness of ecological knowledge in the network. Organizations that have 
an adequate access to credible ecological knowledge tend to form an informed understanding of the 
SES, find common interest, and establish a shared vision for the management of the SES (Biggs et al., 
2012). Finally, cross-boundary linkages in the network are examined with help of the E-I Index in 
UCINET. The Index enables the researcher to calculate the proportion of ties that connect 
organizations of different kinds. The focus is on linkages between sectors and interactions between 
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5.4.1. The integration of major water users and dependent stakeholders  
It is assumed in this study that a precondition for effective adaptive water management in the Berg 
catchment is that all major water users are part of the network and that those highly dependent on 
the water resources of the Berg River are either well embedded in the actor network or are well 
connected to central organizations in the network. Major water users are defined as stakeholders 
that have a significant impact on the river through their activities. These activities include, among 
other things, abstraction, discharge, or altering the watercourse. Equally important is the 
identification of those stakeholder groups that may not be the largest users but who have a high 
dependency on the Berg River with regard to their water security. Water may be used for productive 
purposes, for drinking water or for the maintenance of ecological services or functions.  
While major water users in the catchment were presented in the beginning of this chapter, a more 
detailed list of users (based on the SNA survey and reports) is provided in Table 5-15. In addition to 
listing major users, the table further specifies stakeholder groups who depend largely on the water 
resources of the Berg River for their water security (i.e. through water abstraction). The table shows 
that while stakeholder groups from the upper catchment (Drakenstein, Stellenbosch, and Witzenberg 
Municipality) have the highest impact on the river through their wastewater discharge, it is 
stakeholder groups in the lower catchment that have the highest dependency on the river system for 
their water security.97 
                                                          
97
 The three local municipalities (Swartland, Bergriver, and Saldanha Bay Municipality ) are fully dependent on 
the Berg for their drinking water supply (Interview S-11). The steel and metal industry, an important economic 
sector in the Saldanha Bay Municipality, requires good water quality for its operations (Interview S-9). The 
fishing sector in the Bergriver Municipality and the industry of the Saldanha Bay Municipality also need good 
water quality. The estuary and its bird areas are key contributors to the eco-friendly tourism sector of the 
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Table 5-15: List of major users their impacts on the River system and stakeholder groups highly dependent on 
water sources from the Berg River  
5.4.2. Core-periphery analysis 
For the purpose of this thesis, a core–periphery analysis (Section 3.1.4) was undertaken to identify 
those organizations in the Berg management network that, because of their peripheral positions in 
the network, are rather marginalized.98 The analysis was done on the valued Network N(v) to detect 
marginalized organizations in the Berg River catchment. The UCINET core-periphery continuous 
function placed 13 organizations into the core and 41 organizations into the periphery.  
 
                                                          
98
A similar approach for identifying marginal actors was used by Vance-Boreland and Holley (2011).  
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Figure 5-14: Core-Periphery structure of the valued network N (v)  
Pink nodes = Core actors (total 13), grey nodes= Peripheral nodes (total 41), Red circle=major user, blue circle= 
major user and dependent stakeholder, green circle =dependent stakeholder 
 
Figure 5-14 demonstrates that many of the IBs occupy peripheral positions in the network. However, 
the previous analyses demonstrated that their interests and needs are well represented through the 
Main IB and other supporting organizations such the IB pollution committee. The metropolitan 
municipality of Cape Town, a large user of the river, is on the other hand not well embedded in the 
network. This confirms the qualitative understanding that the City of Cape Town has so far taken a 
rather passive role in addressing the issue of degrading water quality in the Berg management 
network. Being a well-resourced and influential actor in the Western Cape Province, the City of Cape 
Town can use higher level decision-making platforms to ensure that its interests are protected (e.g., 
the Western Cape reconciliation strategy steering committee). Of the three local municipalities from 
the upper catchment that were identified as having a significant impact on the river in terms of 
discharge and related pollution problems, only one can be found among the core organizations. The 










P a g e  | 133 
 
management network has negative consequences in several ways. They currently lack a holistic 
understanding of the catchment system and are rather oblivious as to how their current and future 
actions affect the Berg River and other users. Furthermore, not being well connected to other 
organizations may indeed hamper their own problem-solving capacities as they can’t easily turn for 
advice or resources to other organizations involved in the management of the Berg River. Without 
being more integrated in the decision-making processes concerning the Berg River, their motivations 
for collaborating with others on issues of degrading water quality and their awareness of and 
compliance to established rules and shared responsibilities will remain low. 
Table 5-15 has pointed out that stakeholder groups from the lower Berg catchment, in particular, are 
highly depend on the Berg River for their water security. However, the core-periphery analysis shows 
that organizations representing these stakeholder groups are primarily located in the periphery of 
the network (e.g., local municipalities of the lower catchment as well as Estuary forum which 
represent the interests and needs of the estuary). While all of the organizations are directly 
connected to the DWA, this is currently not particularly beneficial since the DWA does not have the 
capacity to advocate their interests. Also of concern is that other stakeholder groups that are 
dependent on the river system are not part of the management network at all. Among them are farm 
workers, emerging farmers, and residents of informal settlements. One reason as to why they do not 
partake in the network is that they often lack organizational structures that represent needs and 
interests of individuals belonging to the stakeholder group. This is especially the case on questions 
that relate to their water security. Because of this it was difficult to predict the level of their 
dependency (or impact) on the Berg River within the scope of this study. Nonetheless, their lack of 
visibility in the Berg management in the network is worrisome.  
That the ‘dependent’ stakeholder groups mentioned above only have marginal positions in the 
network reduces the chances that their interests and needs are considered in current and future 
decision-making processes concerning the management of the Berg catchment. However, they are 
also some of the most vulnerable users. Unlike other users, they are less likely to have alternative 
options available for their water security.99 To illustrate the point, it might be useful to provide an 
example from the Saldanha Bay Municipality. The municipality receives most of its water from the 
Berg River. Some industries and residents frequently have complained about the quality of the water 
(Interview S-17). They are particular concerned about the taste (residents) and issues of salinity and 
conductivity (industries) (Interview S-9). Yet, so far their concerns have been ignored. The Saldanha 
Bay Municipality has ambitious development plans for the near future, e.g., the establishment of an 
                                                          
99
For example, while IBs from the upper catchment depend on the river system they also use dams or 
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Industrial Development Zone which is estimated to create up to 11,975 total jobs.100 While other 
water sources such as the construction of desalination systems are being considered, demands on 
water from the Berg River are likely to substantially increase. If the development plans and water 
needs of the region are not well integrated and synchronized with the current and future 
management strategies for the Berg River, then the water security of the region will be at even 
greater risk. 
To summarize the findings from the core-periphery analysis: the results show that some of the 
organizations that have the biggest impacts on the river and those that are highly dependent on the 
river for their water security are not well integrated into the Berg management network. This has 
reduced the possibility to develop a holistic understanding of the catchment certain needs, impacts, 
and interests remain ignored. If major users, and in particular major polluters, are not more involved 
in information sharing and collective action initiatives of the network then their compliance, 
motivation and capacities to contribute to the management of the Berg catchment will remain poor.  
5.4.3. Embeddedness of ecological knowledge 
This section explores the extent to which ecological knowledge is embedded in the network and 
contributes to its heterogeneity. This is done by examining which organizations have direct access to 
ecological knowledge sources. Ecological knowledge sources are referred to here as organizations 
from the network that either produce scientific reports or generate experiential ecological 
knowledge as a result of their specific water resource management functions. The focus on the 
generation and distribution of ecological knowledge among the organizations involved in the 
management of the Berg River is based on the assumption that a better understanding of the 
ecological functioning of the SES is vital for developing and applying sustainable management 
practices and strategies (e.g., Biggs et al., 2012). 
The Berg River is a highly modified and complex SES. It is especially altered through the technical 
infrastructure of the Western Cape water supply system of which the Berg River is an integral part. 
This has also led to complex relationships between the users (including managers) and the Berg River. 
Many users (including managers) do not directly interact with the river. Consequently, the awareness 
of how the river contributes to their water security or socio-economic well-being is rather limited. 
Others that directly interact with the river may not depend on its water sources. Under such 
circumstances, it can simply not be expected that many users possess adequate local ecological 
knowledge. In order to enable users and managers to make informed decisions leading to sustainable 
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practices, the distribution of scientific and experiential knowledge on the river, its ecological 
functioning as well as its importance to the overall prosperity of the region is critical. 
A significant amount of knowledge on the Berg River in form of scientific reports were generated in 
the period of 2005-2009 in the context of the Berg River Dam project. (e.g., the baseline studies of 
Anchor Environment). Simultaneously, ecological knowledge on the Berg catchment was 
communicated to many stakeholder groups in the preparation for the establishment of the Berg CMA 
(Interview S-14). However, the generation and in particular the distribution of ecological knowledge 
has since mostly stagnated (Interview S-14, S-15).101 
To assess the integration of ecological knowledge (scientific and experiential) in the network, first the 
knowledge sources in the network were identified. Scientific reports that provided ecological 
knowledge on the Berg River catchment were scanned in order to find out which organizations of the 
network function as scientific ecological knowledge sources and have made contributions to these 
reports. Additionally, based on the information that the respondents provided as part of the SNA 
survey, organizations were assessed as sources of experiential ecological knowledge based on their 
work in the catchment (monitoring of ecological processes, conservation and rehabilitation practices 
etc.).102 Then, the integration of the knowledge sources in the network was examined in UCINET. 
Table 5-16: Ecological knowledge sources in the Berg management network and their linkages to other 
organizations (non-ecological sources)  
Ties among sources refers to the information sharing among ecological knowledge sources. No distinction was 
made between experimental and scientific knowledge 
Scientific ecological knowledge Experiential ecological knowledge 
ID 
# of ties among 
sources 
# of ties to non-
ecol. sources ID 
# of ties 
among sources 
# of ties to non-
ecol. sources 
DWA  [G] 4 17 CSIR [R] 4 1 
WfW [G] 5 7 SANBI [R] 3 3 
DoA_wc [G] 3 9 J.B. [C ] 1 7 
CapeNature 
[G]/ [N] 4 9 
Anchor 
[C ] 1 2 
WWF [N] 3 3 SW[C ] 2 2 
[C ]= consultancy, [G] = government organization, [R]= research institute, [N] =NGO 
 
Of the 54 organizations that comprise the Berg management network, 10 organizations were 
identified as ecological knowledge sources. Of those 10 sources, five are scientific knowledge 
generators and five are experiential knowledge generators. Table 5-17 provides an overview of the 
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 While smaller research projects and reports continued to be produced, they were often too project oriented 
and did not necessary feed into management strategies.  
102
 While some of them are also producers of scientific knowledge, their role in this respect is rather limited in 
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identified knowledge sources and also lists how many ties they have to organizations that don’t 
generate ecological knowledge on their own (non-ecological sources). The table shows that the main 
scientific ecological knowledge sources are consultancies and the two research institutions. Based on 
the interview responses and reports that are available on the catchment, it appears that the 
consultancies play a greater role in providing input into the management of the river than the two 
research institutions. Yet, the knowledge production by consultancies is often too fragmented and 
project oriented to create a holistic understanding of the ecological status of the river. The DWA, 
which in the past has been an important scientific and ecological knowledge source has, like many 
other government agencies, lost a lot of its technical expertise and therefore tends to depend on the 
expertise of consultancies for the development of its scientific reports (Interview S-15). Sources of 
experiential ecological knowledge in the network are primarily WfW and related local alien clearing 
teams that are part of the public works programs, CapeNature, WWF, Department of Agriculture, 
Western Cape and the DWA.  
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The Figures 5-15, 5-16, and 5-17 indicate that the sources of scientific ecological knowledge are not 
well integrated in the actor network nor are they well connected to the core WMOs (especially not to 
local municipalities and IBs/WUAs). Based on the number of ties listed in Table 5-17 and the graph in 
Figure 5-17, it appears that organizations that generate a lot of experiential ecological knowledge are 
more engaged in the network then those generating scientific ecological knowledge. However, the 
interviews and the workshops suggest that the generated experiential knowledge is often not easily 
accessible to other organizations, nor is it proactively transmitted or shared by its producers. Yet, it is 
particularly this type of knowledge which is of great value for understanding interacting processes 
and trends in the catchment.  
Table 5-17: Core WMOs with access to two or more knowledge sources  
(other than the DWA) 
# of sources  
(w/o DWA) 
Core WMOs  
5 CWDM 
4 24 IB 
3 WCDM; Lower IB, DEA&DP_wc 
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Figure 5-16: Linkages between scientific ecological knowledge sources (dark green cirlce) and core 
WMOs (black), Red lines represent the ties between knowledge sources and WMOs 
  
Figure 5-17: Linkages between experimental ecological knowledge sources (light green) and core WMOs 
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With most municipalities as well as other stakeholder groups possessing limited internal expertise on 
riparian ecology and river management the limited linkages to ecological knowledge producers are 
problematic.103 Given that the DWA is currently not a reliable ecological knowledge source (because 
of inadequate number of technical staff and a poor communication system) the embeddedness of 
ecological knowledge is probably even poorer than depicted by the analysis. Of the 24 core WMOs 14 
organizations have no direct access to an ecological knowledge source other than the DWA. Many of 
the interviewed organizations stated that they do not know to which organization to turn for 
ecological advice concerning the Berg River. Even when they know which organizations (e.g., 
DEA&DP and CapeNature) have expertise on a specific topic, they tend to fail to locate the right 
contact person (Interview S-7). The overall impression was that little is done by government agencies 
and NGOs to proactively support municipalities and IBs/WUAs in their decision making. The DWA and 
CapeNature who, based on their mandates, should support other water management organizations 
in ecological matters, are limited in their internal capacity to provide the necessary support (e.g., 
CapeNature has only three aquatic scientists which have to cover the entire Western Cape province 
and the DWA staff responsible for resource protection also need to assist the Eastern Cape province).  
The only local WMOs that seem to currently benefit from access to scientific ecological knowledge 
are the IBs organized around the Main IB. Having interaction with one of the experts on ecological 
knowledge through the IB pollution committee, they are able to utilize this knowledge (primarily 
micro-biological) to advance their interests and to increase the legitimacy of their demands. The 
investigation into the generation and distribution of ecological knowledge in the network also 
revealed that those municipalities that have internal ecological expertise (Drakenstein Municipality 
and WCDM) have also access to multiple ecological knowledge sources (see Table 5-18). Hence, they 
reach out to other experts for support or find ways to highlight organizational mandates that are in 
line with sustainable resource management (Interviews S-3, S-10). Table 5-18 also reveals that it is 
actually the 24 River IBs and the WUA that are among those with access to multiple ecological 
knowledge sources. This stands in strong contrast to most other IBs who only have indirect access to 
ecological knowledge through the Main IB (the exception again is the Lower IB which, as mentioned 
previously, long acted independently of the Main IB and its other members.  
Another observation that was made during some of the workshops the researcher attended, and 
which was further supported by the SNA analysis (e.g., the low levels of interaction between 
scientific and ecological knowledge sources), is that besides the need to enhance the linkages 
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 Of the total 60 ties that the ecological knowledge sources (n=10) have to other organizations (n =44), 30% 










P a g e  | 140 
 
between WMOs and ecological knowledge sources, it is also critical to nurture the interactions 
among the ecological knowledge sources. Especially those working on similar issues, e.g., alien 
clearing or river rehabilitation tend to not benefit from each other’s knowledge and experiences. 
Furthermore, the SNA identified other potential ecological knowledge sources that are part of the 
network but which currently make little contribution to knowledge generation. Among them are 
WESSA, DEA&DP, AGC, CWBR and the BEMF. While some are marginalized in the network (BEMF, 
AGC), others currently do not generate a lot of knowledge relating to the Berg River (DEA&DP, 
WESSA).  
The observation that ecological knowledge is not well integrated in the network is further supported 
by findings of the fieldwork. The consequences of the inadequate generation and distribution of 
ecological knowledge became most visible in the ambiguity and presumptions articulated by many 
interviewees on the status of the river system. While almost all SNA respondents agreed that the 
degradation of the water quality in the Berg River is a serious problem (92%), there was no 
agreement about when the problem started (range was between two to 20 years ago), nor was there 
agreement about whether the problem has improved, stagnated or got worse in the past years. 
Furthermore, there was also disagreement on the impact from the Berg River dam on the river, as 
well as the extent of other issues related to the water quality of the river (e.g., the issues of aquatic 
weed or salinity).104 Hence, it points to the need to establish a common view regarding the status of 
the ecological system based on agreed and valid knowledge and systematic observation. Other 
studies (e.g., Crona and Bodin 2006; Sandström, 2011) have demonstrated that creating a common 
understanding about the SES is not a sufficient condition for AM. Sandström (2011: 294) for example 
emphasizes that “a common view regarding the status of the ecological system based on agreed and 
valid knowledge, systematic observation is a prerequisite for adaptability”.  
The analysis has shown that ecological knowledge is not well embedded and that in particular many 
of the core WMOs have limited access to ecological knowledge and which appears to negatively 
affect their commitment to the sustainable management of the river. The DWA, which is supposed to 
be an important knowledge source and transmitter, can currently not fill either of the two roles. 
While the work of consultancies, if systematically applied, could strengthen the DWA's knowledge 
generation capacities currently, their work is not applied with a larger holistic understanding of the 
catchment in mind. Furthermore, it needs to be noted that as long as a catchment-wide systematic 
monitoring program is not enforced and complemented by a functioning communication system, 
effective knowledge generation will remain a challenging task. In addition, the distribution of 
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 This may not just be resultant from the lack of valid ecological knowledge but also reflect the localized 
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ecological knowledge and the development of a catchment-wide vision for the Berg River is 
hampered by the problem that context-specific decision-making tools such as the State of the River 
Reports (intended to be updated every four years) or other strategies are either nonexistent or 
completely out of date. These tools, when equipped with the most recent ecological knowledge and 
trends, could guide the decision-making of many organizations or at least provide a point of 
reference until a catchment management strategy has been established. Unfortunately, the last State 
of the River Report for the Berg is from 2004, and the new one intended for 2008 still not finalized.  
5.4.4. Cross-boundary linkages: exploring the interaction across sectors and modes of 
governance  
Given the definition of horizontal cooperation that this thesis advances, the focus on sectors and 
modes of governance for assessing cross-boundary interaction in the Berg management network is 
considered to be important. It is for this reason that these two types of cross-boundary linkages were 
assessed with help of the External-Internal (E-I) index function in UCINET. The E-I index (Krackhardt 
and Stern, 1988) has been introduced in Chapter 3 as a method for examining intra-group and inter-
group (i.e. cross-boundary) ties. In the first analysis, organizations have been classified according to 
specified sectors, and in the second analysis, organizations have been assigned to one of the three 
ideal governance modes introduced in Chapter 2. In both cases, cross-boundary linkages were 
examined for information exchange (information network) as well as for collaboration (‘collective 
action’ network). 
Important for the discussion below is to know that an E-I index value can range from 1 to -1. A value 
of 1 means that all ties are external (i.e. only cross-boundary linkages exist). A value of -1 means that 
all ties are intra-group ties (i.e. no cross-boundary linkages exist). A network that has an equal share 
of intra-group and cross-boundary linkages would have an E-I index value of 0. Below, the results of 
the calculations for the E-I Index at network and group level are discussed. A 5000-iteration 
permutation test was performed (see Section 3.1.3 for an explanation of the test).  
Table 5-18 shows which organizations have been assigned to which sectors. In Table 5-19, 
organizations are affiliated with one of the three governance modes. It needs to be pointed out that 
these categories are rather fluid and that some organizations could easily be ascribed to more than 
one specific sector or mode. For highly difficult choices, the decision was based on the qualitative 











P a g e  | 142 
 





































































Table 5-19:Organizations organized according to governance modes 
Hierarchy (#19) Market (# 19) Network (#16) 
DWA 




























SB WQ Trust 
ST WQ Trust 
IB pollution  
Wateright 
5.4.4.1. Cross-boundary linkages: Sectors  
Table 5.20 shows that the information network with groups defined by sectors has an observed E-I 
index of 0.236, meaning that the proportion of ties among groups is higher than within groups. 
However, the observed E-I index is lower than the expected E-I Index (0.568). Indeed none of the 
permutation derived E-I values (see min. and max.) was as low as the observed (P <=0.000). Hence, 
while about 62% of the ties are external ties, the intra-group ties are greater than expected. This 
indicates a significant orientation towards intra-sectoral cohesion. The intra-sectoral cohesion is even 
stronger in the ‘collective action’ network. The observed E-I index of 0.082 is considerably lower than 
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external ties, none of the permutation derived E-I values (see min and max) were as low as the 
observed (P <=0.000).  
Table 5-20: External-Internal (E-I) results for information exchange and collaboration with groups defined by 
sectors  
*NW = network 
 Observed Permutation 























0.541 0.459 0.082 0.586 0.148 0.587 0.902 1.000 0.000 
Table 5.21 provides information on how collaborative ties (‘collective action’ network) are 
distributed for each sector. While the different group sizes make a comparison impossible, the table 
still shows that most sectors (except IND and OTHER) have collaborative ties to other sectors.  
Table 5-21: Intra-sectoral and cross-boundary collaboration rates for sectors.  
The diagonal cells (grey) show the proportion of collaborative ties that organizations have to other 
organizations from the same sector (intra-sectoral collaboration). All of the diagonal cells highlight the 
proportion of ties organizations have to sectors other than their own (inter-sectoral collaboration).  
  AGRI BASIC WATER CONSV R&C IND OTHER 
AGRI (n=19) 0.65 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.00 
BASIC (n=11) 0.26 0.22 0.10 0.32 0.05 0.05 0.00 
WATER (n=3) 0.2 0.02 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.10 
CONSV.(n=9) 0.21 0.25 0.08 0.42 0.04 0.00 0.00 
R & C (n=8) 0.40 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.40 0.00 0.00 
IND (n=3) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OTHER (n=1) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
* AGRI =agriculture, BASIC = Basic services, IND = industry, WATER = water sector, R&C= research and 
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Tables 5-22 and 5-23 display the number of external and internal ties for each sector as well as the E-
I index for each specified sector. It appears from Table 5.23 that the agricultural sector is the only 
one that has many intra-sectoral collaborative ties. (E-I index -0.308). However, the sector has also a 
considerable number of collaborative ties to other sectors. Hence, one could conclude that 
agriculture is a remarkably strong sector with strong internal collaboration (34 ties) while it is also 
well connected externally (18 ties). Similar relational patterns for the sector could be observed for 
information exchange (E-I index -0.360).  
Table 5-22: Sector level  E-I index: information exchange 
Information network 
  Internal External  Total  E-I 
AGRI 
(n=19) 
68 32 100 -0.360 
BASIC 
(n=11) 
10 43 53 0.623 
WATER 
(n=3) 
4 33 37 0.784 
CONSV. 
(n=9) 
14 33 47 0.404 
R&C 
(n=8) 
14 30 44 0.364 
IND 
(n=3) 
0 6 6 1.000 
OTHER 
(n=1) 
0 1 1 1.000 
 
Table 5-23:  Sector level  E-I index: collaboration 
‘collective action’ network 
  Internal External  Total  E-I 
AGRI 
(n=19) 
34 18 52 -0.308 
BASIC 
(n=11) 
4 15 19 0.579 
WATER 
(n=3) 
2 8 10 0.600 
CONSV 
(n=9) 
10 14 24 0.167 
R&C 
(n=8) 
6 9 15 0.200 
IND 
(n=3) 
0 1 1 1.000 
OTHER 
(n=1) 










P a g e  | 145 
 
Also notable in Table 5-22 is the prominent role of the research and consultancy (R&C) sector with 
regard to information exchange in the Berg management network (14 internal and 33 external ties). 
However, this role as information provider does not translate to the same extent to collaborative ties 
externally as it does internally (see Table 5-23). Hence, the research and consultancy sector is not 
highly involved in inter-sectoral collaborative efforts. Considering that this sector is, in the context of 
the management of the Berg catchment, primarily represented by consultancies, the rather low 
involvement in collaboration is not surprising. Hence, consultancies are less inclined to provide their 
services without being remunerated for it. 
5.4.4.2. Cross-boundary linkages: modes of governance  
The observed E-I Index of 0.097 in Table 5-24 for the information network with groups defined by 
governance modes is significantly lower than the expected Index of 0.354. The network has 
significantly more internal ties than expected (P <=0.000). Consequently, this suggests a preference 
for establishing internal ties (homophily or intra-mode cohesion). In the ‘collective action’ network 
with groups organized by governance modes, the percentage of internal ties (54%) is slightly larger 
than the external links. The value for the observed E-I Index is -0.082 which stands in stark contrast 
to the expected E-I Index of 0.354. The tendency toward internal ties is strongly pronounced 
(p<=0.001). 
Table 5-24: External-Internal (E-I) results for information exchange and collaboration with groups defined by 
governance modes 

















NW, 288 ties) 





0.459 0.541 -0.082 0.354 -0.180 0.354 0.852 1.000 0.001 
Table 5-25 highlights the low level of cross-boundary collaborative linkages for actors belonging to 
the hierarchical mode and organizations belonging to the market mode. Both of these modes have a 
strong internal orientation. Organizations that are part of the network mode have a more even 
distribution of their collaborative ties. The low collaboration observed between market actors and 
actors belonging to the hierarchical mode (i.e. government organizations) corresponds with the 
qualitative data from the interviews. In this case, it became apparent that market mode actors do 
not view government organizations as reliable partners due to the perceived bureaucratic red tape 
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Table 5-25: Intra-mode and cross-boundary collaboration rates for the modes of governance 
The diagonal cells (grey) show the values for the proportion of ties that organizations have to organizations 
belonging to the same mode. All off diagonal cells are the proportion of ties that organizations from a specific 
mode have to organizations that are part of a different mode.  
 Hierarchy Market Network 
Hierarchy (19) 0.60 0.06 0.34 
Market (19) 0.07 0.70 0.23 
Network (16) 0.46 0.26 0.28 
The two Tables (5-26 and 5-27) presenting the group level E-I index for the different governance 
modes show that market mode actors have a strong internal orientation with regard to collaboration 
(E-I index -0.400). However, they are externally oriented when it comes to information exchange (E-I 
index 0.211). Government organizations (hierarchical mode) have a strong internal orientation for 
information exchange (E-I index -0.203) as well as collaboration (E-I index -0.191). The high internal 
orientation could be a result of the vertical (i.e. hierarchical) relations among government 
organizations and their limited interaction with actors from other modes could be an indication that 
these actors find it more difficult to establish horizontal collaborative linkages. 
Table 5-26: Group level E-I index information exchange relations (288 ties) 
Information network 
 Internal External Total E-I 
Hierarchy 
(19) 
74 49 123 -0.203 
Market 
(19) 
28 44 72 0.211 
Network 
(16) 
30 63 93 0.416 
 
Table 5-27: Group level E-I index collaborative relations ( 122 ties)  
collective action’ network 
 Internal External Total E-I 
Hierarchy 
(19) 
28 19 47 -0.191 
Market 
(19) 
28 12 40 -0.400 
Network 
(16) 
10 25 35 0.429 
To summarize the two analyses on cross-boundary linkages: The collaborative relations in the Berg 
management network can be predominantly found within sectors. This tendency becomes even 
more visible when organizations have been grouped according to governance modes. Hence, a 
significant level of intra-sectoral cohesion and intra-mode cohesion can be observed. While the 
internal orientation with regard to sectors and modes is less pronounced for information exchange 
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the inter-sectoral integration appears to be low in the network and while all three modes of 
governance affect the patterns of interactions in the network, it appears that organizations belonging 
to the hierarchical mode find it particularly difficult to establish collaborative ties with organizations 
from the network and market mode. 
High levels of collaboration can be found within the agricultural sector. At the same time, the sector 
holds collaborative ties to other sectors. The observed significant collaboration within the sector is 
partially resultant from the collective action among the group of IBs but, as is shown with the help of 
the G-F brokerage method below, other actors such as the Department of Agriculture, Western Cape 
(DoA_wc) are also highly collaborative actors. Market actors have established many cross-boundary 
linkages for information exchange but they have primarily created collaborative linkages among 
themselves. Of the three modes, actors belonging to the hierarchical mode are the least 
collaborative and most of their collaborative ties are internal. 
5.4.5. Individual actors and their role for fostering cross-boundary linkages  
The previous section has provided a good understanding of cross-boundary linkages at the network 
and group level. This section is interested in identifying those actors that seem to bridge sectors or 
modes. Towards this end, the G-F brokerage role method that has been explained in Section 3.1.3.3 
was utilized.  
From the results of the G-F brokerage analysis below (Table 5-28) it appears that is in particular the 
Department of Agriculture, Western Cape, CapeNature, the Main IB but also the two district 
municipalities (WCDM, CWDM) which seem to fulfill important broker roles with regard to inter-
sectoral integration. The DWA do s not appear to contribute to intra- or inter-sectoral collaboration. 
Sectors that have the greatest number of brokers are agriculture and conversation.  
Table 5-28: Key brokers within and across sectors based on G-F Brokerage method 
Actors with the highest intra-sectoral brokerage scores signal an important role for intra-sectoral coordination 









Consultant, liaison ) 
AGRI 
DoA_wc 2 23 
Main IB 154 22 
Lower IB 4 6 
                                                          
105
Gatekeeper/ representative = actor acts as contact between members of his group and another group. 
Liaison = actor links two organizations that are members of different groups. Coordinator = links actors in its 
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Tulbagh WUA  0 3 
IB pollution  0 5 
BASIC 
WCDM 0 9 
CWDM 0 12 
DS_M 0 3 
WATER 
DWA 0 1 
WfW 0 6 
CONSV 
 CapeNature 6 31 
WWF 0 7 
BEMF 2 9 
C &R Wright 0 9 
Table 5-29 list the scores of the most important organizations that seem to bridge modes of 
governance. It appears that the Main IB, CapeNature and the Department of Agriculture, Western 
Cape (DoA_wc) who already played important broker roles for sectors, are again the most important 
organizations. In addition, the BEMF seem to fulfill important broker role between the three 
governance modes. This suggests that BEMF is an effective platform that is able to enhance sectoral 
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Table 5-29:Key broker across modes of governance 
G-F brokerage high scores for coordinator role signal an important role for intra-mode coordination whereas 







 (Gatekeeper /Repr., 
Consultant, liaison ) 
Hierarchy 
DWA 2 0 
DoA_wc 4 21 
WCDM 4 5 
CWDM 4 7 
 CapeNature 10 26 
Market 
Main IB 130 34 
Lower IB 0 8 
Network 
Tulbagh WUA  0 4 
IB pollution  0 4 
Wright 0 7 
BEMF 0 12 
WWF 0 8 
5.5. The role of influential actors  
In the first part of the chapter two organizations, the DWA (in this case the Regional Office of the 
Western Cape) and the Main IB, were identified as the most central actors in the Berg management 
network (e.g., through the centrality measures). A number of reasons exist as to why the two 
organizations possess these central positions. The DWA occupies this position because of its 
legal/political authority. The Main IB, on the other hand, emerged as an influential actor because of 
its capacities to establish collaborative relations with other organizations. Additional analyses in the 
section on network cohesion and heterogeneity provided evidence that both actors differ in how 
they use their central positions in the network. The findings from the analyses are discussed below. 
This is done in view of the organizational characteristics (e.g., mandate and capacities) of the two 
actors.  
The DWA has a specific mandate that enables proactive engagement in the Berg River catchment. 
The core functions of the regional office are to regulate water use and management activities and to 
ensure the protection of the Berg River. Furthermore, the National Water Act (1998) has assigned to 
the organization the role of a proto-CMA until the establishment of such an organization. That is, it 
has a specific obligation to coordinate actions among users of the Berg River and to provide a vision 
for the catchment. Yet, the investigation of the DWA`s role in the Berg catchment revealed that the 
organization struggles to fulfill its functions. This is, for example, supported by the SNA analysis 
which showed that the DWA’s contribution to the production and transmission of ecological 
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Despite the fact that the DWA has relations to many organizations that are operative in the 
catchment, the DWA is unable to utilize these linkages because it is highly restrained in its 
organizational capacities. This became evident when the SNA revealed that the DWA does not play a 
central role in the collaborative efforts to address the issue of degrading water quality (expressed 
through the ‘collective action’ network, section 5.3.4.1.). At the same time, the DWA falls short of the 
necessary leadership that would be required to address effectively the issue of degrading water 
quality. Efforts led by the DWA, such as the WQ task team, lack the commitment to develop it into a 
constructive platform for concrete actions. This in turn prevents others from investing time and 
energy into the DWA’s efforts. The cohesive sub-group analysis, for example, disclosed that several 
of the organizations that formally are members of the WQ task team do not acknowledge this 
platform as a collaborative practice (section 5.3.4.2.). From the evidence provided through the SNA 
and the qualitative understanding of the activities in the catchment, it can be concluded that the 
DWA is currently not able to contribute to the cohesion (e.g., through providing leadership or a vision) 
and heterogeneity (e.g., by transmitting new or important information and linking various 
organizations) that is required for enhancing opportunities for learning and collective action in the 
Berg catchment. It therefore seems reasonable to argue that at present the DWA operates as a 
gatekeeper rather than a broker in the network.  
In comparison to the DWA, the mandate of the Main IB is more restricted with regard to the 
coordination of activities in the catchment. Its main objective is to ensure that the interests of the IBs 
and its members are protected. Therefore, the coordination of activities is primarily limited to the IBs. 
Despite this, the Main IB, as a powerful organization in the Berg management network, has to a 
certain degree contributed to cohesion and heterogeneity in the network. It has for example 
enhanced the cohesion among the IBs and strengthened relation to other actors such as the DWA 
and some of the local municipalities. Furthermore, the IBs, under the coordination of the Main IB, 
actively contribute to the knowledge generation about the river (e.g., through the monitoring system) 
and are also willing to share this knowledge with other organizations. By engaging more 
collaboratively with some of the local municipalities, the Main IB, through its pollution committee, 
also assists in strengthening capacities of some of the municipalities (e.g., sharing of water quality 
data, working jointly when pollution incidents occur). 
This suggests that in comparison to the DWA, the Main IB is more able to utilize its central position. 
While the organization is willing to engage with the DWA and some of the municipalities on the issue 
of water quality, it is less willing to engage with other organizations on related issues (such as alien 
clearing) or to take up more management functions. Although the Main IB does not act as a 
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contribute to cohesion and heterogeneity in the network as long as this enhances the interests of the 
IBs.  
What neither of the central actors does is to deliberately coordinate actors to establish a common 
vision for the Berg catchment and its management. Yet, the need for coordinating actors who 
facilitate the establishment of a common vision and who can assist in coordinating specific actions 
became recurrently apparent in the investigation. This is particularly the case in the Berg River 
catchment where the issue of degrading water quality is multifaceted and many organizations with 
different interests and capacities are involved in the management of the catchment. The quantitative 
analysis of actor relations above demonstrated, in the example of the DWA, that political authority 
and legitimacy is a necessary but not sufficient condition to fulfill a coordinating role. If an 
organization does not have the required capacities (leadership and brokerage) to utilize its central 
position then this will lead to a dis-accreditation of its legitimacy and such actor can become a 
gatekeeper hindering other collective processes that might arise in the catchment.  
While the Main IB is a key actor in the Berg catchment, it cannot fulfill the role expected of the DWA, 
nor is it willing to do so. The Main IB is a highly resourceful organization with a lot of influence over 
its member organizations whose interests are closely linked to the status of the Berg River. The IBs 
are therefore inclined to make important contributions to the management of the Berg River and 
may in this way even reduce the management burden on the DWA (e.g., through their own WQ 
quality monitoring system). However, the incentive structures for the proactive engagement of the 
Main IB (and all other IBs) in the Berg management network are rooted in market structures, i.e. in 
the export market and the related global food standards. As long as this is not complemented by 
other effective incentive structures (e.g., by the state) the IBs are unlikely to go beyond their 
immediate self-interests.  
Despite the seemingly vital role of capacitated central actors, the analysis of the collaborative 
relations in the catchment also seems to suggest that the functioning of the Berg management 
network does not solely depend on the two most central actors. Other organizations also possess 
great potential to contribute to the required cohesion and heterogeneity. The cohesive sub-group 
analysis identified a significant number of organizations operative in the catchment that have 
organized themselves into collaborative initiatives through which they try to address issues relating 
to the water quality of the Berg River. It became further clear that several of those organizations (e.g., 
the WCDM, CapeNature, and the Lower IB) are actually important in fostering valuable linkages 
between the initiatives. They also play important roles in enhancing sectoral integration and the 
coherence of governance modes. By occupying these bridging positions in the network, they have a 
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willingness to collaborate with others and to successfully navigate sectoral interests and 
discrepancies among the governance modes. Consequently, they have the potential to contribute to 
the cohesion as well as heterogeneity of the network, i.e. their knowledge of, and engagement in, 
the different activities could assist in coordinating existing efforts. With access to different 
knowledge sources, they could also assist in enhancing the information on the status of the river 
system. Yet, so far, their bridging functions have not been acknowledged by the DWA, the Main IB, 
and other higher level decision makers. As a result, their actual influence on the dominant decision-
making processes in the catchment/network is rather restricted. Furthermore, all of these 
organizations are quite constrained in their own capacities. They have to attend to other obligations 
and commitments inside and outside the catchment. This constrains their abilities to upscale their 
efforts.  
5.6. Conclusion: Revisiting the chapter objectives 
In this chapter, a SNA was used to examine the operational level of South Africa’s water governance 
system. The aim was to achieve a better understanding of horizontal cooperation in complex 
governance arrangements and its effect on water management in the Berg catchment. Through the 
employment of various complementary quantitative analyses at the network, sub-group and 
individual levels, the four objectives that were stated in the beginning of the chapter were addressed. 
Objective 1: The identification and description of the actor network at the operational level (i.e. the 
Berg management network) 
The analysis showed that in the case of the Berg catchment the operational level is composed of a 
diverse group of organizations (including inter-organizational platforms that vary in their levels of 
formality). The high number of non-mandated organizations that are part of the actor network 
suggests that various incentive structures seem to exist that encourage different actors to contribute 
to the management of the catchment (section 5.2.). The information exchange and collaboration 
among the organizations provide clear evidence that water management is by no means simply a 
matter of a few government organizations (and their technical staff).  
The 54 organizations that comprise the Berg management network possess complementary 
resources, skills, and types of knowledge that potentially could assist greatly in the effective 
management of the Berg catchment. The rather sparse interaction that the SNA measures revealed 
among the organizations is not surprising given the large number and the different stakeholder 
groups these organizations represent. Within the Berg management network, two organizations (the 
DWA and the Main IB) appear to occupy central positions in the network. Hence, these two actors, 
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the communication and collaboration among the organizations. However, while the potential 
capacity for AM appears to be high (with many learning opportunities and possibilities to work jointly) 
in the Berg catchment, the investigation into the patterns of interaction among the organizations 
showed that the realized capacity is extremely low which is evidenced by the poor management 
performance of the network. This is best exemplified by the issue of degrading water quality, the 
absence of an adequate water quality monitoring system, and the low level of rule compliance106. 
Further investigations into the information exchange and collaboration among the organizations 
found that the cohesion and heterogeneity in the Berg management network provide insightful 
explanations.  
Objective 2: Assessing horizontal cooperation based on the two network characteristics cohesion 
and heterogeneity 
Cohesion in the Berg management network was assessed by investigating quantitatively the 
interactions between specified core WMOs as well as by examining the extent to which the 
organizations comprising the Berg management network have self-organized to jointly address issues 
of degrading water quality, i.e. the presence of cohesive sub-groups, in other words, collaborative 
clusters. 
Group density and centralization were important measures to better understand the patterns of 
interactions among and within the core WMOs. These measures showed that the interactions among 
the core WMOs are not sufficient for the effective sharing of water management responsibilities and 
coordinating actions in the catchment. For example, information exchange as well as collaboration 
among the core WMOs is extrem ly low (section 5.3.3.). Formal obligatory interactions exist, but for 
the most part these do not seem to contribute in their current form to meaningful information 
sharing and to effective management of the Berg River. The low level of interaction among the local 
municipalities was particularly alarming (section 5.3.3.2.).  
The examination of the core WMOs also revealed that the IBs, as a stakeholder group, have a high 
self-organizing capacity which has enabled them to effectively engage in collective action and to 
build strategic linkages to other organizations from the network. The group of IBs organized around 
the Main IB has well established patterns of interaction which have been in existence for a long time. 
While formal relations among the IBs exists, strong trust relations are the basis of the cohesion 
within the group. This cohesion is strengthened and maintained through the coordinating activities of 
the Main IB. Yet, the cohesion and collective action within the group of IBs cannot compensate for 
                                                          
106
Rule compliance is especially an issue with regard to water discharge and encroachment on the river banks 
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the sparse and inadequate interactions among all core WMOs. The consequences of the insufficient 
cohesion become visible in the absence of:  
1. a common vision for the management of the catchment;  
2. the lack of a common understanding of the Berg River and its ecological status;  
3. a systematic plan of action to address the issue of degrading water quality (e.g., the inability to 
prioritize activities). 
Three factors seem to hinder interaction among the core WMOs. Firstly, while the two identified 
central actors are among the core WMOs, they do not provide the leadership required for the 
coordination of actions and creating a common vision. The DWA shows almost no leadership 
characteristics. Its engagement in the network does not enhance communication among 
municipalities, nor is the DWA a central actor in the identified collective action initiatives (see e.g., 
Figure 5-11). The organization also does not appear to actively support any of the self-organizing 
efforts of other actors. The Main IB, on the other hand, shows strong leadership capacities. However, 
the organization uses its central position in the whole network and among the core WMOs to 
advance primarily the self-interest of the stakeholder group it represents (i.e. the IBs and commercial 
agriculture). Secondly, another hindrance to interaction is the complicated role of the local core 
WMOs (IBs and municipalities). They are not only managers but are also users and, at least some of 
them, polluters. In such circumstances, it is not easy to establish trusting relations or to increase the 
willingness to collaborate. Thirdly, the strong distinction between water resource management and 
water service management among the municipalities also negatively affects their willingness to 
engage more actively in the management of the Berg River.  
The cohesive sub-group analysis detected several collaborative clusters through which some of the 
organizations from the management network attempt to jointly address the issue of degrading water 
quality. These collaborative clusters show that the need and willingness for joint action is high in the 
network. Potentially, these joint efforts could become the basis for nurturing trust and strengthening 
relations within the network. Yet, the qualitative understanding of the clusters also suggests that 
they differ in their performance. Overall it appears that the collective action efforts seem to be 
constrained by the lack of catchment-wide cohesion and the insufficient interactions among core 
WMOs. Both factors are critical for establishing a clear vision for the catchment and for linking and or 
up-scaling the collective action efforts. 
The assessment of the heterogeneity revealed that high actor diversity, resources, and types of 
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integration of key water users and of stakeholders with a high dependency on the Berg River (section 
5.4.1.). Also of concern is the fact that neither the production nor the distribution of ecological 
knowledge plays a critical role in the decision-making of the Berg management network. Hence, 
ecological knowledge is not well embedded in the actor network which negatively affects the 
problem-solving capacities and sectoral integration (agricultural water quality demands vs. urban 
water service provision) of core WMOs (Section 5.4.2.). While linkages across different sectors and 
between organizations that belong to different governance modes exist, these linkages are too 
limited to speak of inter-sectoral integration or of coherence of governance modes. This leads to the 
conclusion that the observed horizontal cooperation in the Berg management network does not 
currently allow for the required learning and collaboration to establish and maintain an adaptive 
water management system in the Berg catchment. Yet, the analysis also highlighted several 
opportunities how the situation could be improved. For example, the role of the identified bridging 
organizations (in terms of fostering collaboration across collective action initiatives, sectors, and 
modes of governance) should be acknowledged and supported by the central actors in the network 
or other higher level decision makers (section 5.4.4.). Although the DWA is currently a capacity 
constrained organization, if the organization focused its efforts on strengthening its leadership 
responsibilities and investing in its learning capacities, this would be beneficial for the network and 
would reduce the management burden of the DWA.  
Objective 3: The influence of the cohesion and heterogeneity in the Berg management network on 
the learning and collective action capacities of the organizations 
The SNA provided a clear picture that the learning and collective action opportunities in the Berg 
management network are currently constrained by the patterns of interactions among the 
organizations. 
The learning of the core WMOs is restricted by their inadequate access to scientific and experiential 
ecological knowledge. The low cohesion among the core WMOs also has hindered them in learning 
about each other’s needs and constraints. This in turn makes it difficult to establish more trusting 
relations and to find common interests. Valuable learning platforms seem to have been established 
within some of the identified collaborative clusters (e.g., the Estuary Forum or initiatives within the 
alien clearing cluster). Yet, the generated knowledge remains largely contained in the platforms and 
does currently not contribute to catchment-wide learning processes. This is partially the case 
because the two identified central actors are not inclined to facilitate learning processes at 
catchment scale. For example, the few public meetings organized by the DWA have been limited to 
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The existing cohesion is not conducive for catchment-wide collective action nor is it sufficient for 
concerted action among core WMOs. Localized collective action, that manifests itself in the 
collaborative clusters, has a lot of potential but needs to be embedded in larger processes as existing 
management issues are too complex to be dealt with at one level or scale. 
Yet, it also needs to be highlighted that the management network is not completely dysfunctional. It 
signifies rather that influence has shifted from conventional decision makers such as the DWA to 
other resourceful organizations that have been able to utilize their relational capacities. To illustrate: 
the problem of degrading water quality has been a concern in the Berg River catchment for many 
years. Yet, it was primarily through the joint actions taken by the IBs that the problem became 
openly acknowledged by political decision makers in the three spheres of government (i.e. the 
municipalities, provincial government, and national government (the DWA)107). 
The investigation into the management of the Berg catchment also revealed that the pressure and 
influence of the IBs have not been enough to create a catchment-wide strategic plan of action to 
systematically address the problem of degrading water quality. While a common problem definition 
within the Berg management network is evident (i.e. water quality is viewed a serious problem in the 
catchment), this problem definition is largely shaped by the knowledge and interests of the IBs. 
Consequently, the multifaceted issue of degrading water quality might be too narrowly defined. 
What seems to hamper a holistic problem definition is a lack of integration of the ecological 
knowledge (including systematic monitoring and evaluation), the weak engagement of other critical 
water users, as well as a lack of joint iterative learning processes upon which localized as well as 
catchment-wide collective actions can be build.  
Objective 4: New insights into sectoral integration and the coherence of governance modes 
through a relational approach  
Although the quantitative analyses were not able to assess coherence of the modes of governance or 
sectoral integration in great detail, they were able to demonstrate that a considerable level of 
interplay between sectors exists. Overall, the tendency to form intra-sectoral ties is currently pre-
dominant in the Berg management network. The agricultural sector seems to be well organized and 
embedded in the network. To what extent cross-sectoral integration could be strengthened once the 
network has been able to establish a common vision and management strategy for the catchment 
needs to be seen.  
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The quantitative analyses also showed that all three governance modes affect the interactions in the 
Berg management network. Surprisingly it was market mode actors that have been identified as the 
most collaborative organizations (section 5.3.4.). At the outset of this research many interviewees 
indicated that it appeared that the only effective drivers to push for higher water quality in the 
catchment came from market structures (e.g., global food standards). However the SNA 
demonstrated in the example of the IBs that the market incentives (loss of export market) were only 
able to become effective drivers when they were complemented with strong relations among the 
affected actors (i.e. IBs which coordinate their internal affairs through a network-like governance 
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6. Chapter: Collective action and self-organization  
in the Berg River catchment 
Chapter 5 identified with the help of a formal SNA the organizations that are involved in the 
management of the Berg catchment, and described how the regular pattern of interactions among 
them has affected the management of the Berg River. Gaining a more detailed understanding of the 
structure and composition of the Berg management network provided insights into how the cohesion 
and heterogeneity within the actor network has affected learning processes and collaboration among 
the organizations involved in the management of the catchment. In other words, the formal SNA 
made it possible to demonstrate how the network structure has shaped the performance of the actor 
network in terms of AM.  
This chapter assesses horizontal cooperation from a qualitative perspective through a focus on 
collective action. The primary objective of Chapter 6 is to identify constraints affecting collective 
action and the capacity to self-organize for organizations involved in the management of the Berg 
catchment. As part of the SNA analysis several collaborative clusters (i.e. cohesive sub-groups) were 
identified in Chapter 5. These clusters comprise specific collective action initiatives which are the 
focus of this chapter. Ostrom’s eight design principles are applied to examine the constraints that 
affect collective action within the initiatives as well as catchment-wide collective action. It is further 
argued that through the design principles, the extent of AM in the Berg catchment and the existence 
of a functioning (polycentric) water governance system can be probed.  
The chapter is organized in the following way: First, the two management issues of pollution and 
alien-invasive vegetation that threaten the Berg catchment are described from the perspective of 
collective action problems. The subsequent section reports on six selected collective action initiatives. 
To allow for a comparison of the initiatives, the motivation for, internal dynamics within, larger 
context and potential contributions to management functions are highlighted for each initiative. To 
estimate the level of catchment-wide collective action, findings from two workshops that had been 
organized by the researcher are incorporated into the analysis. This is followed by a discussion on the 
individual design principles. The purpose is to reveal key constraints to collective action and to 
demonstrate how the individual design principles assist in determining the robustness of the existing 
governance arrangements of the Berg catchment. The chapter ends by highlighting the role of agency 
in creating robust governance arrangements. 
6.1. The two management issues  
To illustrate the need for collective action in the Berg catchment, but also to point to the challenges 
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described as so-called collective action problems (sometimes also referred to in the literature as 
commons dilemmas). These two management issues are degrading water quality (see Chapter 4) and 
the invasion of alien vegetation in the riparian zone. They are threatening the sustainability of the 
Berg catchment and illustrate that the existing governance arrangements are not able to effectively 
manage the catchment . 
Degrading water quality is a multifaceted problem in the Berg catchment. Chapter 4 highlighted that 
one of the major factors that has contributed to the pollution of the Berg River is the inadequate 
municipal water service infrastructure and the poor management of the infrastructure. Confronted 
with the in-migration of job seekers from other parts of the country, and struggling with the 
maintenance and upgrading of waste water treatment as well as sanitation infrastructure, some of 
the local municipalities have become major polluters in the catchment. In addition, due to the slow 
and patchy implementation of water reform, characterized by insufficient law enforcement and the 
lack of monitoring activities, other users have also, intentionally and unintentionally, contributed to 
the pollution problem (e.g., through agricultural runoff and industrial discharge) (Interview I-5, I-12).  
The other major issue in the Berg catchment, alien-invasive vegetation, is a significant environmental 
problem for many of South Africa’s riparian ecosystems (Richardson et al., 1997).108 Invasive trees 
and shrubs (such as eucalyptus and black waddle) but also aquatic weeds (e.g., water hyacinth, water 
lettuce, parrots feather) impede the functioning of the Berg River and its ecosystem services. Studies 
have shown that the invasion of alien vegetation in riparian systems leads to decreased surface 
water runoff and groundwater recharge as well as decreased river flows, increased biomass and 
more intense fires and consequent erosion (Chamier et al., 2012).109 Chamier et al. (2012) state that 
invasive alien plants do not only affect water quantity but also water quality. The reduction in river 
flow, for example, contributes to increases in the concentrations of nutrients and pollutants, which in 
turn “contribute[s] to eutrophication processes resulting in potentially toxic algal bloom” (Chamier et 
al., 2012: 346). 
Both pollution and alien-invasive vegetation are complex, interrelated problems involving different 
actors and different property rights systems (private and public land ownership). Addressing these 
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It has been estimated that the reduction in surface water runoff amounts to about 7% ( ca 3,300 Mm3) of the 
national total (Le Maitre et al., 2000, cited in Chamier et al., 2012). 
109
Many species of invasive alien plants, especially trees and shrubs, have higher evaporation rates than 
indigenous species do and, therefore, use more water than the vegetation they replace. “The increased 
biomass and evapotranspiration rates associated with invasive alien plants arise because of their greater height, 
root depth and senescence, compared to the native species that they replace.”(Chamier et al., 2012: 345, citing 
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issues effectively necessitates the contribution and commitment of many actors that agree to work 
jointly. Alien-invasive vegetation, for example, can only be managed successfully through a 
systematic strategy in which private land owners, relevant government departments (e.g., DoA, DEA, 
municipalities) and conservation organizations are engaged. Without coordination, collective action, 
and follow-up, alien vegetation re-grows, and land users re-infest each other’s property, thereby 
wasting the scarce funding that is available for alien clearing (Interview I-3, I-5). Furthermore, the 
clearing of alien vegetation requires a lot of technical expertise with regard to the restoration of the 
riparian zone, follow up clearing, and the management of biomass (Interview I-4, I-6 I-4, I-25). 
Therefore, close cooperation between research institutions, government agencies (operative as 
implementing agents) and landowners, and an adaptive ‘learning by doing’ approach are critical 
building blocks for the successful management of the issue. Similarly, the pollution problem also 
requires the contribution and close cooperation of many actors from various administrative levels 
and sectors. It is imperative that the main causes of pollution (especially challenges related to waste 
water treatment plants and informal settlements) be addressed jointly, and that innovative solutions 
be found for strengthening law enforcement and monitoring in light of existing resource constraints.  
Despite the need for collective action in the Berg catchment, the limited possibility of excluding 
actors from the use of the water resources (abstraction, discharge and land management practices) 
or from the benefits gained through the joint efforts of others, motivates behavior such as free-riding 
(expressed in the Berg catchment by the non-participation in the maintenance or conservation of the 
water resources). Chapter 5 mentioned several factors that seem to reduce the willingness for 
collective action in the Berg catchment. Among them are the varying dependencies on the water 
resources and the perceptions of stakeholders of their impact on the water resources, especially with 
regard to land management practices. Chapter 5 furthermore highlighted that the perceptions that 
others will not commit to their responsibilities, as well as uncertainty regarding the long term 
assurance of benefits of certain stakeholder groups (e.g., insecurity of IBs with regard to the property 
rights), are also factors impeding joint action. Together, these factors forcefully undermine the 
willingness and commitment to collective action in the Berg catchment. Despite this rather bleak 
picture, collective action efforts do exit in the Berg catchment. These efforts are the focus of this 
chapter because they have the potential to make significant contributions to AM in the Berg 
catchment and for addressing the two management issues more effectively.  
Chapter 3 introduced Elinor Ostrom’s comprehensive work on collective action in common pool 
resource systems. There it was mentioned that Ostrom, based on a large number of empirical case 
studies, has developed a theory of how actors can successfully engage in collective action and 
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which express conditions under which trust and reciprocity for societal cooperation can be 
established. The design principles were described in great detail in Chapter 3. However, since they 
serve as guiding reference points for investigating the collective action initiatives in this chapter, they 
are summarized as a reminder in Table 6.1.  
Table 0-1: The eight design principles as important conditions for societal cooperation 
 (adapted from Ostrom, 1990; Cox et al., 2010) 
Principle 1:  Well-defined boundaries:  
a. community boundaries  
b. resource boundaries  
Principle 2:  Congruence between appropriation and provision 
rules and local conditions  
a. cost must be perceived as at least equal to 
benefits  
b. rules must match local conditions  
Principle 3:  Collective-choice arrangements  
   
Principle 4:  Monitoring  
a. Monitoring of environmental condition  
b. Monitoring of the human environment 
interaction  
Principle 5:  Graduated sanctions  
   
Principle 6:  Conflict-resolution mechanisms  
   
Principle 7:  Minimum recognition of rights  
   
Principle 8:  Nested enterprises  
   
 
6.2. Identification and description of collective action in the Berg catchment  
As part of the SNA analysis, four collaborative clusters were identified which can be understood as 
indications of higher levels of collaborative activities. These clusters serve as a starting point for the 
investigation of collective action and self-organization in the Berg catchment. From those four 
clusters, six collective action initiatives were selected. While three clusters equate to singular 
collective action initiatives (the Berg Estuary Management Forum, the Water Quality task team and 
the Irrigation Board initiative) the cluster containing organizations that partake in alien-invasive 
clearing comprise several collective action initiatives. Three collective action initiatives were selected 
from this cluster to explore in more detail. They are the 24 River initiative, the Lower Berg initiative 
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The six initiatives were selected because they represent the scope of collaborative efforts that exist 
in the catchment. They furthermore could potentially become important platforms that foster cross-
boundary linkages and AM in the Berg catchment. However, as it will become clear in the subsequent 
sections, the performance of the initiatives differs greatly. Some could even be described as non-
functioning.  
The collective action initiatives are not easily comparable as they differ in their formality, 
composition, number of actors, and stage of development. Therefore, different methods were 
considered to gather information on the evolution and performance of the initiatives. Empirical data 
on the initiatives was generated through follow-up interviews with organizations participating in the 
initiatives, qualitative data from the SNA survey, participant observations in meetings of some of 
initiatives as well as through the analysis of minutes from previous meetings.110 In addition, 
government reports and strategies were consulted to understand the formal reasons for establishing 
some of those initiatives. 
What follows is a detailed description of the six selected initiatives. To assist with the assessment of 
the initiatives and their individual and joint contributions to AM of the Berg catchment, they have 
been organized according to the following themes: motivations, internal dynamics, the larger context, 
as well as realized and potential outcomes with regard to AM. The reader is referred to Chapter 3 for 
more information on the themes. The occurrence of Ostrom’s design principles are highlighted for 
each initiative through brackets [Principle x (+/-)] with a (+) indicating a positive expression and (-) a 
negative expression. The design principles are then further discussed in section 6.4. 
6.2.1. The irrigation boards (IB) initiative  
The IBs have been introduced in Chapter 5 as core WMOs. The SNA also identified them as a cohesive 
sub-group with a strong group identity [Principle 1a (+)]. The SNA showed further that the IBs, 
primarily through their internal organization and the linkages to experts and decision-makers, have 
asserted influence on other organizations and decision-making processes. This has enabled the IBs to 
frame the issue of degrading water quality as an economic issue and to put degrading water quality 
high on the political agenda. However, it took several years and different strategies, ranging from 
threats of legal actions to the establishment of scientific reports, to finally get the necessary political 
attention (Interview I-22). The main strategy pursued by the IBs was to show how the loss of the 
agriculture export market would affect the economy of the Western Cape (in terms of loss in GDP 
and potential jobs in the agricultural sector and in the related manufacturing and service industries) 
(Interview I-13). This strategy was quite successful as it did raise concern among various government 
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departments who otherwise would have discarded the issue as an environmental or agricultural 
problem.  
The Berg River Main IB (Main IB) was established in the early 1970s as an overarching body to 
coordinate the activities of all IBs receiving water from the Berg River  (Interview I-13). There are 
twelve Irrigation Boards/Associations represented on the Main IB. These are all entitled to draw 
water from the Berg River [Principle 8 (+)] (Interview I-26).111 
6.2.1.1. Motivation 
When the IBs realized that the problem of degrading water quality in the catchment could become a 
serious threat to their economic existence and that actions taken by individual IBs or farmers were 
not enough to exert pressure on political decision-makers, the IBs decided to engage in strategic 
collective action (Interview I-22). One of the activities was the formation of a pollution committee to 
which they also invited regional scientific and water sector experts. The aim was to gain legitimacy 
and credibility and to provide evidence for their claims that degrading water quality is a threat to the 
region’s economy and that the municipalities are among the major polluters (Interview I-22). 
The interviews with the chairmen of the IBs revealed that the widespread perception that their 
current property rights and related benefits are under threat was for many IBs another motivating 
factor to engage in a joint group effort (Interviews I-19, I-21, I-15, I-3). Many white commercial 
farmers believe that national land and water reforms could significantly curtail existing rights and 
benefits. It therefore seemed important to speak with one voice to ensure that the interests of the 
IBs would not be ignored in the government-led transformation process. Several IB chairmen stated 
further that water is one of the most constraining factors for increasing their agricultural productivity 
(Interviews I-19, I-17, I-15). Hence, current and future access to adequate water quantity and quality 
is vital for the sustainability and growth of the farms. The chairmen believe that being well organized 
as a group and being very proactive on the issue of degrading water quality increases their lobbying 
potential and makes it more challenging for the government to just impose new regulations upon 
them (Interviews I-27, I-22). The fact that the IBs have over generations developed strong informal 
and formal relations has kept the transaction costs for engaging in collective action on the issue of 
degrading water quality very low. Hence, existing trust relations as well as formal organizational 
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 The Main IB  manages water releases from the Government Water Schemes from Theewaterskloof Dam, 
Berg River Dam and Voëlvlei Dam. Water use by individual water users and irrigation boards are controlled on 
behalf of the DWA. The Main IB acts as billing agent to recover water resource charges from water users and 
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structures (e.g., the annual joint IB meetings and regular meetings of the chairmen) prompted this 
stakeholder group to invest additional resources into collective efforts concerning water quality of 
the Berg River. 
While several interdependent factors motivated the IBs to self-organize, the most significant driver 
for the IBs to move their collective action beyond their water use management function (i.e., water 
distribution and financial management) was the threat that the farmers would lose access to the 
export markets, a core market segment for their products (Interview I-21, I-22, I-13 I-26,). Associated 
with this was the fear that should the water quality issue prevail or even worsen, they no longer 
could afford the rising costs associated with treating the polluted water prior to irrigating their crops 
(Interview I-15, I-14). 
6.2.1.2. Internal dynamics 
The IBs have a long history in the catchment area. Many of the irrigators belonging to the IBs have 
possessed and cultivated agricultural land in the catchment for several generations (Interview I-17). 
Over time and within the legislative framework of the Water Act of 1956, they have developed a self-
regulating governance system through which they coordinate the distribution of water from the Berg 
River and related management activities [Principles 3 (+), 2b (+)] (Interview I-15). Chapter 5 
highlighted the fact that the group of IBs is very homogeneous in terms of their interests, values, 
needs and ethnicity. It seems that because of the perceived threat to their current rights and benefits, 
the group identity may even have  grown stronger in the past years.  
The analysis in Chapter 5 showed that most activities are coordinated through a central actor (the 
Main IB). This enables the group to be very effective and efficient in terms of information exchange 
and the prioritization of activities. While the Main IB is the key decision maker and has much 
freedom to act, major decisions always require the consent of the chairmen of all IBs [Principle 3 (+)]. 
The pooling of resources allowed the organizations to distribute the cost for undertaking specific 
measures such as water quality monitoring or the attendance of public meetings[Principle 2a (+)] 
(Interviews I-13). The group of IBs have established their operation rules in accordance with the 
functions assigned and delegated to it in terms of the Water Act of 1956 and the National Water Act 
of 1998 through which they coordinate their activities [Principle 3(+)]. 
The interviews as well as the SNA survey revealed a common problem definition among the IBs with 
regard to the issue of degrading water quality. According to them, the root causes of the problem lie 
with the municipalities and other key provincial and national government departments that are 
currently not able to enforce existing regulations or do not adequately fulfill their management 
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committed to the initiative. Yet, the cohesion within the group is not always perceived as beneficial. 
Fear of negative media coverage has sometimes prevented farmers and IBs from publishing results of 
pollution incidents and water quality of the Berg River [Principle 5 (-)]. However, many pollution 
incidents have been regularly reported to the DWA. (Interview I-26).  
6.2.1.3. Larger context 
Having established strategic linkages to other organizations, the IBs are well positioned to influence 
decision making in the Berg catchment [Principle 8(+)]. Chapter 5 showed how they have access to 
ecological knowledge and policy information at the catchment level which in turn allows them to use 
their collective action strategically to advance their interests. Nevertheless, the IBs have also come to 
the realization that no matter how well organized they are as a group, as long as the larger 
management system remains inadequate, their efforts to improve the water quality in the catchment 
and the management of the Berg River will remain constrained. It also needs to be noted that while 
the IBs are influential stakeholders in the catchment, their acceptability has been questioned 
because they are not transformed into WUAs with the participation of all sectors with an interest in 
the Berg River. The transformation to WUAs has been delayed because of the institutional 
realignment process within the DWA. They are however still legal statutory bodies with regard to 
water legislation [Principle 7(+)].  
6.2.1.4. Uptake of management functions 
Realizing that that the DWA as well as other government organizations are currently not able to 
effectively manage the catchment area, the IBs have started to take on a more active role. Hence, 
they no longer just regulate the activities among IBs and their members (e.g., water distribution, cost 
for water infrastructure maintenance etc.). They have engaged in the systematic monitoring of water 
quality in the Berg catchment (e.g., through the pollution task team committee) [Principle 4a and b 
(+)]. At the same time, the IBs remain reluctant to take on even more functions because of the 
uncertainty with regard to their long term benefits from the catchment (Interview I-13). Hence, the 
institutional uncertainty regarding the land and water reform processes (including the pending 
transformation of IBs to WUAs) reduces the willingness of the IBs to make costly long-term 
investments. Furthermore, the IBs continue to have little trust in the DWA (national and regional) 
and its capacities to provide the required guidance for the water sector (Interview I-22). In the past 
years, the DWA has been unable to provide a clear vision for the management of South Africa’s water 
resources. Indeed, the DWA has on several occasion changed its discourse and often not acted on its 
promises articulated in the public stakeholder meetings. This has unsettled the IBs as well as many 
other actors. There is also the suspicion among the farming community that government 
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providing the necessary support and without the government departments fulfilling their 
responsibilities (Interviews I-15, I-13). These factors have reduced the willingness of the group of IBs 
associated with the Main IB to contribute more actively to other management activities such as alien 
clearing. 
6.2.2. The Berg Estuary Management Forum (BEMF) 
The Berg Estuary Management Forum was established in 2009 as part of the GEF and South African 
government co-funded Cape estuaries program (Interview I-23). The para-state conservation agency 
CapeNature, host of the Cape estuaries program, leads the estuary management process. The aim 
was to develop systems and processes to improve the management of the estuary and in so doing 
ensure the protection of the estuary that is in the lower reaches at the coast.112 The forum consists of 
representatives from DEA, DAFF, DWA, DEA&DP, CapeNature, Bergriver Municipality, West Coast 
District Municipality (WCDM), local tourism, Bird Life SA, WESSA, Anchor Environmental, Cape 
Westcoast Biosphere Reserve (CWBR). Participation is governed by points set in the agenda but 
members that participate on a regular basis are CapeNature, representatives from conservation 
groups (such as Bird life SA and CWBR) and a representative from local tourism. 
6.2.2.1. Motivation for establishment 
In addition to the formal advisory role mentioned above, the intent was to create through the BEMF 
a platform which enables better coordination between various government departments and  which 
allows for a more participatory and inclusive management approach involving local users and other 
relevant stakeholders (Interviews I-23, I-7). Members of the BEMF stated that the ability to receive 
and exchange information about relevant legislation and trends concerning the estuary, the pooling 
of resources, the ability to impact local decision-making processes, and the establishment of a joint 
vision and rules for the estuary were factors motivating them to participate in the forum (Interviews 
I-28, I-29, I-30). Most of the actors participating in the BEMF were of the opinion that the fragmented 
management approach previously practiced had led to the deterioration of important ecosystems in 
the estuary and that a joint and coordinated effort was needed to secure the long term sustainability 
of the estuary. 
6.2.2.2. Internal dynamics 
The running of the BEMF is financed by the WCDM as well as CapeNature. The role of the chairman is 
currently carried out by the CapeNature representative. He is also the driving force behind the BEMF. 
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While estuary management forums are not legally required with regard to specific legislative processes in 
South Africa, the Integrated Coastal Management Act (2008) does provide for advisory bodies that can be set 
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The members meet on a bi-monthly basis to discuss issues relating to the estuary. One of the larger 
tasks of the forum, and which is currently underway, has been the development of an estuary 
management plan and its implementation. The BEMF, through its members, monitors development 
trends and practices in the estuary. It also tracks the fulfillment by various government agencies of 
their roles and duties related to the estuary [Principle 4a and b (+)]. More recently, the forum has 
started to be involved in water quality monitoring activities.113 
The BEMF is a highly democratic platform in which decisions are based on consensus [Principle 3 (+)]. 
If larger disputes cannot be resolved within the BEMF, then experts or relevant policy makers are 
invited to the BEMF meetings to provide more detailed information on a specific issue (Interview I-
23). The findings from participant observation and the interviews suggest that the BEMF has 
developed into a joint learning platform. Many of the participants stated that they have learned a lot 
about the estuary, either through the information exchange with other forum members or through 
the contributions of invited scientific experts (Interview I-29, I-30). In addition to using the meetings 
for deliberation, the BEMF has developed a good communication system through which all members 
(even those that rarely participate) are informed about the meetings and the recent developments 
relating to the forum or the estuary. The common problem solving approach and joint vision for the 
estuary among the members is reflected in the estuary management plan.  
The BEMF has benefited a lot from the leadership of the chairman and the dedication of the 
representative of the WCDM. However, the high commitment of the other members becomes 
apparent through the ways in which tasks and responsibilities are shared in the forum. Almost all 
activities are done on a voluntary and honorary basis. Several members, however, have pointed out 
that some of the local government organizations could be more proactive and show more 
commitment. Although state and non-state actors are treated as equal partners in the meetings, 
non-state actors have complained that they are investing a lot of time and effort without any formal 
acknowledgment or compensation. Representatives from government organizations, on the other 
hand, get paid for their time (i.e., the meetings are part of their job description and they get also 
reimbursed for their travel time). Consequently, non-state actors feel that the costs and benefits of 
participating in the forum are not equally distributed [Principle 2a (-)] (Interviews I-29, I-30). 
Another potential weakness of the BEMF observed by the author is that the meetings take place 
during working hours. This makes it difficult for some stakeholders to attend. They simply cannot 
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afford to take time off from work. It is for this reason that it is mainly retired citizen that make up the 
majority of non-state actors in the forum. Of concern also was that no representatives of poorer, 
more marginalized communities are part of the forum [Principle 1a(-)]. One reason mentioned is that 
they are not well organized and that some of those communities are only represented through local 
municipal councilors. Currently, the forum is highly dependent on the chairman and his leadership. A 
more formal institutionalization of the forum (e.g., through the hiring of staff) would significantly 
reduce this dependency. The two identified champions in the forum, the chairman and the 
representative from the WCDM, are constrained in their current capacities (Interviews I-7, I-23). They, 
like most forum members, have many parallel commitments that require their time and resources. 
6.2.2.3. Larger Context 
Although the BEMF brings together a very diverse group of organizations which have developed, 
through the platform, a shared understanding of the estuary and who can successfully negotiate the 
differing interests and needs of the various stakeholders, the forum is not well linked to other 
initiatives in the catchment [Principle 8(-)]. It simply lacks the resources and capacities to do so. A 
related obstacle is that estuary management forums are not yet formally recognized by legislation 
(ICMA or NEMP) and government in general [Principle 7(-)] (Interview I-7).114  
The lack of embeddedness in larger decision-making processes of the Berg management network has 
already been captured through the SNA analysis in Chapter 5. Interviews with organizations outside 
the estuary also affirmed the impression that many organizations do not view the estuary as part of 
the Berg River system (Interviews with representatives of the DWA, DEA&DP, upstream 
municipalities). As a consequence, the forum remains ignored by most of the decision makers and 
initiatives in the Berg catchment [Principle 8(-)]. This is problematic for the BEMF and the 
sustainability of the estuary. The forum depends on information about the Berg River for its own 
decision making and prioritization of activities. Furthermore, many of the activities that happen 
upstream ultimately affect the estuary. If the forum is not well connected, it cannot report issues 
that are caused by upstream activities.  
Perhaps the greatest concern is the long-term sustainability of the BEMF. The forum has grown in its 
tasks and responsibilities. But as shown above, many activities rely on the voluntary commitments of 
its members. This is neither sustainable nor does it allow for the forum to effectively fulfill all its 
management activities or to assist other key management organizations such as the local 
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municipality in the management of the estuary. Several members stated that while lead 
organizations (DWA and DEA&DP) have a legislative obligation to provide financial support to the 
forum and the municipality, so far they have failed to do so [Principle 7(-)]( interviews I-7, I-23).  
Another potential point of conflict could be the fact that the forum has only an advisory function in 
the management of the estuary [Principle 3(-)]. Specific responsibility for the management of the 
estuaries has been delegated to local municipalities (Celliers, 2009), or in cases where the 
municipality struggles to fulfill its responsibility, it is the district municipality that takes over some of 
the functions (Interview I-7). Although the forum has established a good working relationship with 
the local municipality, commitment especially from senior officials, is still missing (Interviews I-7, I-
23). This becomes apparent through the rather passive participation of the municipal representatives 
in the forum. It was pointed out by the municipal officials that without a dedicated budget on the 
Municipal IDP for estuary and coastal management, the incentives remain very low for most 
municipalities to become responsible estuary managers (Interview I-7). 
6.2.2.4. Uptake of management functions 
The forum is a vital platform for the management of the estuary. It has brought together a diverse 
group of people that through the forum can work together and share their resources and generate 
new knowledge that allows them to effectively address emerging issues or conflicts relating to the 
estuary or the forum. Through the monitoring of the activities of different players and socio-
economic trends as well as ecological changes in the estuary, the forum is vital for knowledge 
production, information dissemination and transparency. As such, the forum could make important 
contributions to a catchment-wide monitoring system [Principle 4a and b (+)]. The forum has also 
been able to engage the local municipality, creating a sense of ownership and shared responsibility. 
The municipality has realized that the forum can become an important support structure and assist 
the resource-constrained municipality in the management of the estuary. Finally, the forum plays an 
important role in advocating that the ecological reserve flow requirements are met [Principle 2b(+)] 
(Interview I-23). The forum’s engagement with the DWA has resulted in improved flows, especially 
with regard to base flows reaching the estuary.  
6.2.3. The Water Quality task team  
The task team is a forum coordinated by the DWA (regional office Western Cape). The primary 
objective of the task team is to coordinate the actions of all government departments that have 
some level of responsibility relating to the Berg River. The forum is also intended to engage major 
users from the catchment area. Participants in the forum are representatives from local and district 
municipalities, the DWA, several provincial government departments, and major users such as the IBs 
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6.2.3.1. Motivation 
The initial driver behind the establishment of the forum was the Office of the Premier of the Western 
Cape. The former premier became aware of the issue of degrading water quality partially through the 
lobbying of the IBs (Interview I-31). He then commissioned a study in 2009 to assess the problem. 
The output was a formal report (BRTR, 2009) which lists key impacts and causes of the degrading 
water quality as well as provides several recommendations.115 In the process of establishing who was 
responsible for the pollution problem and who should take the leadership in addressing the problem 
and coordinating the actions of the various departments, a dispute between the provincial and 
national government became apparent(Interview I-31, I-32). In the end, it was the DWA that took 
over the coordination of the forum.  
6.2.3.2. Internal dynamics 
The largely unresolved dispute resulted in low political will by the lead agencies (DWA RO WC and 
Provincial Government) to commit to the forum. The consequence was that the task team rarely met 
in the period between 2009 and 2012.116 Not surprisingly, the lack of interaction hindered the 
possibility of constructively negotiating perceived conflict of interests [Principle 6(-)]. It also made it 
impossible to develop a common problem definition and to establish a systematic plan of action to 
address the problem of degrading water quality [Principle 3(-)]. Some of the local organizations 
(municipalities and IBs) voiced their frustrations about the lack of leadership by the DWA and 
provincial government (Interview I-22, I-33). Some interviewees went even so far to say that they felt 
this was just a pretense that something is done about the issue at a higher level political level. The 
observed lack of political will to transform this forum into a working platform was also echoed by 
representatives from several provincial government departments (Interview I-31, I-34).  
The quantitative analyses in Chapter 5 provide evidence for the lack of interaction within the task 
team (See section 5.2.2). The findings showed that the patterns of interactions in the task team are 
weak. Some of the task team members (IBs and some municipalities) did not even indicate that they 
have collaborative relations with the task team [Principle 1a(-)]. 
6.2.3.3. Larger context 
Being unable to establish a clear vision and a plan of action, this inter-governmental forum is also not 
in the position to take on a catchment-wide coordinating role or to link to other collaborative efforts 
in the catchment area [Principle 8(-)]. The lack of involvement of the Task Team in the Berg 
management network also became apparent in the SNA. 
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As mentioned previously, the issue of degrading water quality is a highly complex problem. In the 
South African context it is closely related to housing and sanitation issues. Many factors that are 
contributing to the issue of degrading water quality are therefore outside the jurisdiction and sphere 
of influence of those responsible for the management of the Berg River. Finding the optimal level and 
scale for addressing the issue adequately remains elusive. Such a problem necessitates engaging with 
different levels and scales simultaneously. However, without leadership and vision at the catchment 
scale, the issue will continue to be addressed in a fragmented manner. 
6.2.3.4. Uptake of management functions 
As indicated above, the task team in its current form does not add any value to the management of 
the Berg catchment area. Indeed, it may actually obstruct the emergence of alternative collaborative 
efforts that involve decision makers from different administrative and political levels (local, provincial 
and national). Nevertheless, many governmental organizations and stakeholders are of the opinion 
that this type of forum is vital for the management of the Berg catchment and that it is essential to 
transform the Water Quality task team into a functioning platform. The need for coordinating actions, 
especially among the various government departments, is tremendous and many organizations are 
of the opinion that the water quality issue can only be effectively addressed if the political level at 
which the task team is located takes a leadership role (Interviews I-32, I-26, I-33, I-1). While it might 
be possible to develop a clear vision and strategy for the catchment at a lower level, only through the 
committed involvement of higher levels of decision-making can such vision and strategy be 
implemented.  
6.2.4. The 24 River initiative  
The 24 River initiative is a collaborative effort between an IB (the 24 River IB, which is not member of 
the IB initiative discussed above), the conservation organization WWF SA, the government program 
Working for Water (WfW), the para-statal NGO CapeNature and the Department of Agriculture 
Western Cape. The purpose of the initiative is to pool resources to clean a section of the river of alien 
vegetation. More specifically, the initiative has set out to clean 250 ha at an estimated cost of R6 mill.  
6.2.4.1. Motivation 
Like degrading water quality, alien clearing is a problem that is very costly and requires a systematic 
approach. Even though the overall intent of the unique partnership was the pooling of resources, 
each of the organizations has engaged in the partnership for slightly different reasons. WWF saw in 
the initiative a good opportunity for conserving natural vegetation in a region characterized by 
intense agriculture. For WfW and Department of Agriculture, Western Cape, it was important to 
create some notion of ownership and responsibility on the part of the landowners so that they are 
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partnership an opportunity to get financial support with the clearing, to work jointly with experts, 
and to safeguard future water rights (Interview I-18). Furthermore, being proactive in alien clearing 
enables the farmers to have more influence on how, where and by whom the clearing is done. 
6.2.4.2. Internal dynamics 
The 24 River IB has been the champion behind the initiative. It is represented by the chairman and 
has 42 members (who each have an average farm size of 100 ha). In the initiative, WfW functions as 
the lead agent and WWF SA provides additional financial resources and expert advice on river 
rehabilitation. CapeNature is involved in the training of personnel in the removal of alien vegetation. 
The Department of Agriculture, Western Cape has been providing more indirect support in the form 
of advice based on previous initiatives (Interview I-6). After three years the initiative is still in its 
planning stage. The delay is mainly due to the long bureaucratic procedures within government 
organizations such as WfW. Despite these constraints, regular communications and meetings among 
the organizations have led to trusting relations (Interview I-25). Everyone involved has learned a lot 
about the others, the specific constraints in which each organization has to operate, and what it 
means to engage in a collaborative project involving such a diverse group (Interview I-3, I-25). 
Transparency and open communication has helped to better illuminate why the implementation of 
the project has been delayed for such a long time. Constraints not only exist within the government 
organizations. It was, for example, quite challenging for WWF to secure the necessary funding 
required for the clearing project. The representatives also needed to convince their headquarter that 
the project will meet the conservation requirements of WWF (Interview I-25). This highlights the fact 
that the different objectives and mandates of the organizations (such as public works programs vs. 
river rehabilitation vs. more wat r for agricultural production) need to be carefully negotiated and 
deliberated. Crucial for navigating through sometimes conflicting objectives has been the 
establishment of interpersonal relations as well as access to ecological information on the extent of 
the problem (Interviews I-18, I-25). This in turn enabled the establishment of a common problem 
definition. Furthermore, it made it possible to find ways to best match and utilize resources and 
organizational mandates [Principle 3 (+)]. Through the division of tasks and the engagement of the 
land-owners, ecological and social monitoring can be achieved at low transaction costs [Principle 4a 
and 4b (+)]. WWF will be responsible for the ecological monitoring, and the irrigators will ensure that 
all landowners fulfill their commitments (Interviews I-18, I-25).  
6.2.4.3. Larger context 
Long delays and bureaucratic red tape within the government agencies have significantly hampered 
the initiative (Interviews I-18, I-3). It was, for example, only with difficulty that the IB could be 
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IB chairman to keep other farmers committed to the initiative (Interview I-18). Another challenge is 
that the representatives involved in the initiative have sometimes limited influence over higher level 
decision-making processes within their own organizations. A key constraint in the case of WfW is, for 
example, that the program as a whole does not have a clear vision and strategic plan of action 
(Interview I-3). The leadership and vision absent at the national and provincial level in turn hampers 
the development of strategic action plans at catchment and sub-catchment level [Principle 8 (-)].  
6.2.4.4. Uptake of management functions 
While the initiative is a small project, still in its early stages and only focusing on a tributary of the 
Berg River, it has much potential to contribute to a more systematic and adaptive management of 
the catchment. The project creates important linkages between different sectors (e.g., conservation, 
agriculture and government departments) and also allows for a more equal distribution of costs for 
alien clearing [Principle 2a (+)]. This enhances the willingness of farmers to take some ownership and 
responsibility in alien clearing, which in turn increases the likelihood that the farmers will continue 
with the follow-up maintenance. It therefore could be argued that the initiative has great potential in 
fostering the self-governance capacities at the sub-catchment level while at the same time ensuring 
that the self-organization is in line with sustainable management objectives. 
Alien clearing necessitates long term partnerships. Only a systematic learning by doing approach that 
takes into consideration the particular ecological and social context upon which management 
practices and rules of engagement are adjusted will ensure that the issue is effectively addressed . 
Many lessons can be learned from the project and the lessons should be taken back to the 
participating organizations so that future initiatives are less constrained by the obstacles that led to 
the delays in the 24 River initiative.  
6.2.5. The Lower Berg initiative 
Similar to the 24 River initiative, the Lower Berg initiative is a unique partnership composed of the 
Lower Berg IB (also part of the IB initiative), the West Coast District Municipality (WCDM), WfW and 
Department of Agriculture, Western Cape. 
6.2.5.1. Motivation 
The partnership started very informally after a water hyacinth outbreak in the Misverstand Dam in 
2009 (Interviews I-27, I-35). To coordinate action and speedily address the outbreak, an action 
committee was created between the Lower Berg IB, individual farmers, the WCDM and Department 
of Agriculture, Western Cape. These collaborative efforts have developed into a working partnership 
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6.2.5.2. Internal dynamics 
The initiative has been championed by the Lower Berg IB but the leadership is split between the 
Lower Berg IB and the Department of Agriculture, Western Cape (Interview I-27). The committee 
meets on a regular basis to discuss and address issues relating to alien vegetation that may occur in 
the Lower Berg [Principle 3 (+)]. The activities are no longer confined to the monitoring and control of 
aquatic weeds but also include the clearing of alien trees in some parts of the lower Berg River 
(Interview I-35). Motivated by the success of the initiative, some farmers have even started to clear 
on their own sections of the river beneath the Misverstand Dam. While the initiative has remained 
largely informal, regular information exchange in form of periodic meetings ensures that good 
working relationships are maintained (Interview I-7). The initiative is greatly valued by all 
organizations because it provides a mechanism by which individual resource constraints can be 
overcome through the pooling of resources (Interview I-4). This in turn has led to a more balanced 
distribution of costs [Principle 2a (+)].  
6.2.5.3. Larger context 
The initiative has experienced obstacles similar to those encountered by the 24 River initiative. The 
long bureaucratic procedures within government organizations are the biggest obstacle for 
responding promptly to emerging issues and for taking on management functions such as monitoring 
the river or systematically clearing alien species (Interview I-4). The initiative has accrued substantial 
knowledge on handling aquatic weeds; however, this knowledge has not been communicated to 
other initiatives or organizations even though the problem of aquatic weeds is also an issue in several 
other parts in the catchment.  
6.2.5.4. Uptake of management functions 
Through the initiative, the organizations have been able to develop a good monitoring system and 
early response strategy in the lower Berg catchment [Principle 4a (+)]. Unfortunately, the initiative is 
not well linked to other efforts to establish a monitoring system for the whole catchment [Principle 8 
(-)]. The initiative further demonstrates that small projects that include private landowners are very 
important and that there is a need to build upon them. A representative from the Department of 
Agriculture, Western Cape expresses the impact of the project in the following way: 
“These projects are generally more sustainable because the landowner has invested time and 
money and will therefore take care of his “investment” by doing the required follow-up clearing 
and applying of herbicide. If landowners regard alien clearing as a government function and 
liability they will neglect the area that was cleared and the problem will be exacerbated by the 
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6.2.6. Adopt a River Stellenbosch 
The final initiative that will be discussed is the Adopt a River Stellenbosch initiative. The initiative is 
part of a larger national program which has been started by the Minister of the DWA with the aim of 
cleaning up polluted rivers by employing unemployed community members (Interview I-2, I-36).117 
The Stellenbosch initiative is based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the Stellenbosch 
Municipality and the Minister of Water Affairs. The platform includes various departments from the 
Stellenbosch Municipality, representatives from local business and community groups, as well as 
officials from the provincial departments and DWA.  
6.2.6.1. Motivation 
With this partnership, the DWA, RO, and WC intended to get the communities more involved in 
addressing the pollution problem as well creating more accountability and leadership within the 
municipality.  
According to the interviewed representatives from Stellenbosch Municipality, the municipality 
envisioned that it could, through the initiative, address the pollution problem more systematically 
and access additional financial resources (Interview I-36). Some of the municipal departments further 
hoped that the initiative could help to overcome internal political infighting as well as to obtain the 
necessary support from senior officials within the municipality (Interview I-8, I-9). Because of the 
perceived crisis situation concerning the rivers in the Stellenbosch Municipality, local stakeholder 
groups showed great interest in engaging the initiative. Prior to the initiative, the municipality had 
not taken any leadership in addressing the pollution problem or establishing platforms to coordinate 
actions and form partnerships with other stakeholders.  
6.2.6.2. Internal dynamics 
The Stellenbosch Municipality took over the leadership of the initiative and in the beginning the 
platform showed a lot of potential for initiating a plan of action through which the pollution problem 
could be systematically addressed. An institutional structure (including regular meetings and specific 
task teams) was established, and commitments to collectively address the issue of pollution were 
high on all sides [Principle 3 (+)]. But after the chairman, who was well positioned in the municipality 
and who led the process, left the municipality the platform started to fall apart. The position of the 
chairman was given to another representative who lacked the required leadership capacities and 
vision. Many meetings in the second half of 2012 and 2013 were canceled at short notice. Without 
                                                          
117
 The Stellenbosch Municipality has some of the most polluted rivers in the region. Although most of the 
rivers fall outside the Berg catchment, some upper areas of the catchment are within the municipal boundaries 
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continuity in leadership the platform was neither able to establish a holistic problem definition nor 
deliberate on how the problem could be addressed [Principle 3 (-)]. 
It became apparent that the short-term interest of the municipality in accessing funding for public 
works job creation measures and using the initiative as a political platform to show that the 
municipality is addressing the pollution problem started to be predominant. This destroyed the 
opportunity for the initiative to become a constructive platform for deliberation and strategic action. 
At the start of the initiative many stakeholder groups and different municipal departments believed 
that through the Adopt a River program the various players and stakeholders could create a joint 
understanding of the extent of the pollution problem and work collaboratively on a feasible plan of 
action that could be realized through the pooling of resources. Another disappointing experience was 
that municipal officials that had an interest in moving the initiative forward did not get the necessary 
formal support from senior officials [Principle 7 (-)](interview I-8). The lack of political will by the 
municipality has alienated many stakeholders as well as officials within the municipality that 
genuinely were trying to make the platform work through a collective effort. 
6.2.6.3. Larger context 
For several years political infighting within the municipality has inhibited its functioning. This has 
negatively impacted the day-to-day activities and planning of the various municipal departments and 
also created a very non-collaborative culture between different departments [Principle 6 (-)] 
(Interview I-8, I-10). The initiative was created in a context  of many urgent problems that needed to 
be addressed. Without careful guidance (DWA and the municipality) and clear leadership the 
initiative could not develop a vision and prioritize activities [Principle 8 (-)]. Indeed, the platform was 
used to advance the self-interests of a few dominant players (the municipalityshould you list the 
other players?) without giving enough space for other actors and alternative ideas. 
6.2.6.4. Uptake of management functions 
The platform has failed to improve the coordination of river management within the municipality. 
However, in the first phase of its establishment, the platform has helped to create a better 
understanding of the pollution problem and on the constraints within the municipality. More trusting 
relationships started to emerge but all of this came to an abrupt halt after the chairman left. This 
highlights the need for visionary leadership which is not biased in the interest of one particular actor 
but which can bring together different stakeholders and help create a common problem-solving 
approach for the issue at hand. Another important lesson for this collaborative effort is that 
platforms need time to develop problem-solving capacities. It is therefore crucial to only focus on a 
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6.2.7. Catchment-wide collective action: insights from workshop findings 
As part of the research the author organized two workshops with the intent of getting a better sense 
of the cooperation between the initiatives and the constraints specific to catchment-wide collective 
action. The first workshop (‘champions’ workshop) brought together organizations that, based on the 
SNA analysis, play a critical part in the overall management of the catchment.118 This workshop had 
the intent of discussing current and future environmental threats in the catchment and of identifying 
current barriers to a more sustainable management of the Berg catchment. A second workshop 
(‘alien’ workshop) was held with key organizations involved in alien-clearing activities in the 
catchment. Although alien-clearing projects at sub-catchment level have been quite successful, the 
findings from the SNA survey and the investigations into the 24 River and Lower Berg initiatives 
suggested that clearing activities continue to be poorly coordinated at catchment scale. The overall 
aim of the ‘alien’ workshop was to elicit key constraints to the development of an integrated strategy 
for alien clearing in the catchment, to learn jointly about the different clearing projects and 
partnerships, as well as to share experiences and challenges relating to the collaborative efforts.119  
While each workshop had specific objectives and targeted a slightly different audience, the 
workshops provided similar results on the topic of constraints to catchment-wide collective action. 
The discussions in the two workshops showed clearly that the organizations involved in the 
management of the Berg catchment did not share a common understanding of the Berg 
catchment.120 The lack of shared understanding is a serious impediment to prioritizing activities and 
for establishing catchment-wide collective action. Access to information on the management issues 
(scientific data, existing strategies and lessons learned) and an inclusive monitoring system were 
highlighted as key obstacles. The absence of a guiding vision for the Berg catchment, inadequate 
strategic leadership by the DWA and other higher level organizations such as WfW as well as the 
missing of an interactive decision-making tool (e.g., a joint website) are factors that were identified 
                                                          
118 
Those targeted were so-called catchment champions (i.e., those attempting to contribute to AM in the 
catchment and key players based on their mandates). 
119
 Detailed summary reports for each workshop are provided in Appendix 6.2. 
120
The participatory group modeling exercise in the ‘champions’ workshop, for example, revealed that while 
each organization has specific expertise on the Berg catchment, many workshop participants had differing, and 
sometimes limited, understanding of the Berg River system and its functioning. The difference in understanding 
was not as pronounced in the alien-clearing workshop. In particular the implementing agencies (WfW, 
CapeNature, Department of Agriculture, Western Cape and the district municipality) have a lot of ecological 
knowledge expertise on alien clearing. However, the discussion showed that most of the organizations raised 
questions regarding the magnitude of the alien invasion in the catchment. Hence, a lot of ambiguity about the 
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as additional stumbling blocks for creating the necessary cross-boundary linkages and for establishing 
nested governance structures. As a consequence, many initiatives, but also individual organizations, 
continue to work in silos with little knowledge of the activities of other initiatives. This fragmented 
approach limits the success of the specific initiatives and reduces the problem-solving capacities with 
regard to the two management issues, pollution and alien vegetation. 
The joint discussions and the sharing of experiences in the workshops also demonstrated how 
difficult it is to collaborate because of the diffuse responsibilities and mandates of the various 
organizations. These challenges, it became clear, can only be overcome through close interaction, 
processes of deliberation and a supportive institutional structure (support and guidance by higher 
level decision-making levels) and learning-oriented organizational cultures (which allow for a certain 
flexibility on interpreting mandates and moving beyond pre-defined self-interests). Both workshops 
turned out to be a highly valuable joint learning experience for the researcher and the participants 
and also demonstrated the enthusiasm and willingness among the participants to cooperate. 
However, because none of the key players (e.g., DWA and WfW) saw themselves in the position of 
taking on a leadership role, the ideas and planned activities articulated in the workshops quickly 
dissolved.  
6.2.8. The presence of the design principles in the collective action initiatives  
Table 6-2 provides an overview of how the design principles feature for each initiative. Not 
surprisingly those initiatives that provide positive evidence on most of the design principles are also 
the better performing initiatives in terms of improving the relations among the organizations and in 
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Table 0-2: Results from the presence of the Ostrom’s design principles for the collective action 
initiatives. 
A cell with a (+) means the design principle is achieved, a (- -) the 
design principle is no longer being achieved. Where (-) / (+)  are present in a cell, findings could be interpreted 
in both directions. Note that while statements could be made for almost all principles listed in the table 
(exception n/a) only the most important design principles are found in the body text of section 6.2. 
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+ - - - - - 
Leadership + + - + + +  - 
Learning processes -/+ + - + + +  - 
Self-organized + n/a n/a + + n/a 
Externally initiated n/a + + n/a n/a + 
trust + + - + + - 
Going beyond organizational 
self-interest -/+ + - + + - 
Uptake of management 
functions + + - n/a + - 
It is interesting to note is that despite South Africa’s progressive water legislation that provides 
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2010< Colvin etal.,2014), the self-organizing efforts observed in the Berg catchment are not the 
result of enabling conditions. They have emerged in response to a perceived governance crisis 
situation at the catchment scale. Hence, the lack of effective governance at the catchment scale has 
motivated the desire for self-organization and self-governance at sub-catchment level. This has led to 
the more proactive engagement of some organizations which previously saw management of the 
Berg River as the sole responsibility of the DWA. However, by revealing key constraints that inhibit 
social cooperation and that affect the success and the sustainability of the initiatives, the next 
section will demonstrate that the capacity to transform the self-organizing efforts into effective 
governance arrangements remains limited. 
6.3. Identifying key constraints to collective action and reflecting on the robustness of 
the governance arrangements  
In this section, key constraints to collective action are assessed through the lens of Ostrom’s eight 
design principles. Discussing each principle individually, the section furthermore inspects the extent 
of AM and polycentric governance in the Berg catchment. Doing so reveals important insights about 
the robustness of the existing governance arrangements that have emerged from horizontal 
cooperation.  
Principle 1a & b: Well-defined actor and resource boundaries 
Multiple demands on the catchment’s water res urces and the ways in which various practices affect 
the water resources make it difficult to define who is affecting the water resources to what extent 
and who should be participating in addressing management functions or issues.  
Initiative based 
The most clearly defined actor and resource boundaries, i.e., who is eligible for membership, could 
be observed within the IB initiative. In other words, the initiative has a closed membership with only 
regional IBs being able to become full members. While the pollution committee (including the 
participating experts) is part of the initiative, its role is restricted to that of an advising body. Not 
surprisingly, the IB initiative has also the strongest group identity, which was made evident in the 
strong cohesion detected in Chapter 5. This cohesion has led to a similar problem definition, and the 
possession of the same values and interests. All other initiatives have a more open membership. That 
is, actor boundaries are more inexplicit. Furthermore, the collaborative relations are still fragile. 
Hence, unlike in the IB initiative, trust and social capital must still be fostered.  
Both situations are not without shortcomings in the Berg catchment. The closed membership 
observed in the IB initiative and the tendency to only engage in very strategic partnerships that 
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relations with organizations of different kinds. The ego network analyses in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1 
demonstrated that the 24 River IB, which is not a member of the IB initiative, has collaborative 
relations to several organizations of various kinds. The relations of most of the IBs that belong to the 
IB initiative tend to be restricted to the Main IB and the IB pollution committee.121 Hence, the IBs 
that are part of the Main IB may be less adaptable to local changes as they have limited opportunities 
to learn and collaborate with other organizations operating in their localities. The open membership 
that characterizes all other initiatives results in the challenge of deciding whether or not an actor 
should take part in collective action. Furthermore, important players that are crucial for addressing 
the issue at hand cannot be easily forced to participate. Others may simply lack the authority or the 
ability to exert the needed social pressures on these actors to participate.  
Catchment wide  
The analysis of the initiatives shows that boundaries in complex regional SESs are not easily identified. 
Group boundaries as well as resource boundaries (including the boundaries concerning the two 
management issues which are resultant from several interlinked factors) will for the most part 
remain fluid. However, boundary specification is important for developing strategic action and 
assessing cost-benefit distribution as well as for clarifying roles and responsibilities (e.g., Armitage et 
al., 2008b). Based on the experiences of the initiatives it seems that deliberation processes within the 
initiative which, if complemented by open membership, could assist in the task of identifying, 
transcending and where necessary renegotiating relevant boundaries. However, as Ostrom (2009a) 
cautions, a clear distinction must be made between carefully defined boundaries that may change 
because of changing circumstances or new findings and ridged boundaries. Furthermore, the 
literature on complex SESs sugg sts that fluid boundaries are not as big a problem when nested 
enterprises (vertical and horizontal nestedness) exist (Termeer et al., 2013). That is, initiatives may 
be location specific even though the problem needs to be addressed at a larger scale. As long as the 
smaller unit is part of larger efforts, the initiative can still be effective. In other words, difficulty with 
fluid boundaries can be partially addresses through nestedness (design principle 8) and deliberation. 
Principle 2: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
The initiatives showed clearly that collaboration and AM come at a significant cost. This cost must be 
openly acknowledged and made transparent. Where organizations perceive the cost of engaging in 
the management of the catchment and in collaborative efforts as too high, incentive structures 
                                                          
121
 The only exception in this group is the Lower Berg IB. While it is part of the IB initiative, it only joined the 
initiative more recently. Prior to joining the other IBs it was operating more independently and established 
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provided by external (often higher-level) actors must be provided (e.g., tax subsidies, additional 
financial support, technical and ecological advice). In all initiatives it became clear that cost refers not 
only to the resources a specific organization contributes to the collective action. It also entails the 
time and effort needed for the deliberation and negotiation process itself and costs for gaining 
access to important information for decision making.  
Initiative based 
In the case of the IB initiative, the cost-benefit ratio is perceived as fair and transparent. All IBs make 
financial contributions to the Main IB which then uses the money to finance specific activities which 
benefit all IBs. The cost-benefit distribution in the other initiatives is less straight-forward and often 
needs to be negotiated among members. In policy and scholarly circles, participatory governance 
platforms have been promoted as new effective governance mechanisms (Reed, 2008; Mostert, 
2003). However, the experiences of the BEMF and even the Adopt a River Stellenbosch show that the 
institutionalization and long-term sustainability of those platforms is often not well thought through 
in the planning processes. Several initiatives rely currently to a large extent on honorary and 
voluntary commitments, especially where they involve non-state actors. For example, members of 
the BEMF serve as secretary or take on other logistical tasks (such as minute-writing, etc.). Given the 
extent of the issues they are attempting to address, many initiatives will need to develop more 
institutionalized structures (e.g., hiring of staff, development of a business plan). Only such measure 
can ensure that they are able to balance cost and benefits in the future. Interestingly, the 24 River IB 
initiatives and the Lower Berg initiative also demonstrate that deliberative and open learning 
processes can assist in distributing the management cost more evenly. 
In most of the initiatives, local organizations struggle with the task of taking on more management 
responsibilities without receiving the necessary support from higher level organizations. Just because 
organizations are competent or contribute to key management functions (e.g., the IB initiative or the 
BEMF) does not mean that they should be burdened with additional tasks without the required 
support. This is particularly the case when organizations are burdened with issues that need to be 
dealt with at a larger scale or higher level. In the long run, such an approach will erode the 
willingness and capacities of competent organizations to contribute to the provision of services for 
public benefit. Hence, the need for financial and non-financial incentive structures becomes apparent. 
Catchment-wide  
The institutional uncertainty concerning the Berg catchment (in particular the unfinished 
establishment of the CMA, the slow transformation process for WUAs and the incomplete water 
allocation reform) have significantly increased the perception of various stakeholders that risks, and 
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assurance from the DWA (national) and other spheres of national and provincial government, 
organizations are not sure as to whether their projects and joint activities will be supported and 
legitimized by higher level decision-making processes. Consequently, the commitments to increasing 
investments in the management of the Berg catchment and for up-scaling collective action remain 
low. 
Because of the lack of a holistic understanding of the Berg catchment and its functions, many 
stakeholders continue to maintain a flawed perception of their level of dependency on the water 
resources from the Berg River. Dependency is primarily framed in terms of dependency for drinking 
water, industrial water use and irrigation. Too often the costs it would take to have to use alternative 
water sources are not incorporated, nor are the consequences considered if vital ecosystem services 
can no longer be maintained. Because of this contorted perception many organizations assume that 
the benefits of contributing to the joint management are not worth the effort. 
Principle 3: Collective choice arrangements 
Many studies have shown that those that are affected by the rules should be able to participate in 
rulemaking and their modification (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). This is also the case for the Berg 
catchment. Participation in rulemaking not only increases the legitimacy of the specific activities (e.g., 
an alien-species clearing initiative that includes farmers). It also provides an avenue for defining and 
dealing with specific constraints as well as adjusting rules for changing ecological or socio-economic 
conditions. Hence, through collective choice arrangements rules become more enforceable and 
effective. 
Internal rulemaking: 
The better performing initiatives have been those where everyone participating in the initiatives 
could also contribute to the rulemaking. However, the initiatives may sometimes not include all 
relevant actors (e.g., in the BEMF, small scale and subsistence fishermen are missing, and in the 
Adopt a River Stellenbosch the informal settlements as well as local IBs are not adequately 
represented). Any rules that are established within the initiatives may therefore not be adhered to by 
those stakeholder groups.  
Another observation that the author made during the meetings of some of those initiatives (e.g., 
Adopt a River Stellenbosch) is that some participants (e.g., municipal councilors) are not familiar with 
the science and policy terminology used in these meetings. They voiced concerns that they did not 
feel knowledgeable enough on the subject of water management and therefore preferred to keep 
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interests. This is a situation that has been highlighted by other studies too (e.g. Goldin, 2010; Colvin 
et al., 2008). 
Rulemaking within the larger governance context. 
The self-governance that some of the initiatives aspire has to take place within the constraints of 
existing legislation and policy frameworks. In other words, the rules of the initiatives, which 
determine their interactions with other organizations (e.g., rules of engagement, conflict resolution, 
distribution of roles) as well as interaction with the catchment area (specific management activities), 
have to be established within the constraints of institutional arrangements in which the various 
organizations are embedded. While it is critical for the initiatives that rules are adjusted to existing 
constraints and that certain room for experimentation and flexibility is provided, this is not easily 
achieved. The flexibility of many organizations is too often cumbered by their specific organizational 
mandates. This makes it difficult to make adequate adjustments to the local context and capacities. 
Furthermore, initiatives that are trying to apply a learning-by-doing approach (based on the 
monitoring and evaluation of previous actions) frequently realize that existing rules cannot be easily 
adjusted because of the institutional rigidity within their own organizations. Institutional rigidity has 
especially been an obstacle in the alien-clearing projects. It appeared furthermore that in the Berg 
catchment it is particular government organizations who continue to struggle to adopt a learning-by-
doing approach and more flexible rules. A final point that needs to be made is that without access to 
information about ecological conditions and trends, the initiatives may not adequately adjust their 
management rules in accordance with the ecological changes in the catchment. 
Catchment wide 
As long as there are no functioning catchment-wide platforms in which relevant stakeholders are 
represented, creating collective-choice arrangements at this level is not feasible. The water quality 
task team which is supposed to focus on the entire catchment could potentially represent such a 
platform. But the current lack of deliberation within this initiative and the top-down approach 
pursued by the DWA do not allow for joint rule-making. 
If a workable catchment strategy or at least a river management plan existed, then this would 
provide at least some prospect for balancing continuity and flexibility in the catchment area. Self-
organizing efforts and flexible rulemaking at sub-catchment level could then take place within the 
parameters set by the strategy. Hence, mechanisms (such as a guiding strategy) can ensure that the 
rules and collective action activities at the sub-catchment level are consistent with larger public 
policy goals and the intended objectives (e.g., to secure the sustainability of its water resources and 
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Principle 4: Monitoring  
In the case of the Berg catchment, monitoring seems to be one of the most critical principles that 
could assist in the realization of collective action and the fostering of trust and reciprocity. The 
monitoring of actors and their practices as well as the monitoring of the ecological changes and 
trends is vital in several ways. A monitoring system can provide a holistic understanding of the 
current status of the catchment or the issue in question (e.g., extent of pollution or invasive 
vegetation). Such an understanding is a prerequisite for designing effective plans for and prioritizing 
specific activities. Furthermore, the monitoring of the practices of the organizations engaged in the 
management of the Berg catchment enhances trust levels among the collaborators. 
Initiative based 
The BEMF, the IB initiative, and the Lower Berg initiative have established effective monitoring 
systems that enable them to monitor environmental changes as well as social activities. Through the 
monitoring systems, participants in these initiatives have also gained valuable ecological knowledge. 
Joint evaluation of the monitoring activities within the initiatives has also provided valuable learning 
opportunities. Yet, these learning opportunities have been inhibited by the limited access to data on 
socio-economic and ecological changes at catchment scale.  
Catchment wide 
The absence of a comprehensive monitoring system was pointed out by many stakeholders as 
perhaps the biggest obstacle to creating an adaptive and functioning management system in the 
Berg catchment. Currently, neither environmental changes (e.g., adequate and continuous 
monitoring of water quality changes in the riparian zone) nor management and user practices (land 
use changes in the riparian zone) are adequately monitored. Furthermore, data from existing 
monitoring activities are often not user-friendly or easily accessible to most organizations. As a 
consequence, a lot of redundant and incomplete information that is based on speculation rather 
than systematic scientific studies122 and monitoring activities circulates among the organizations in 
the Berg catchment. Therefore, the pervasiveness of existing issues and their causes cannot be 
effectively determined.  
A catchment-wide monitoring system would be of great assistance to the various collective action 
initiatives with regard to knowledge generation and diffusion. It allows the evaluation of how existing 
measures not only affect a specific locality but also the larger system. At the same time each 
                                                          
122
 The issue in the Berg catchment is not so much the lack of scientific studies but rather the accessibility and 
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initiative, through its own monitoring activities, can make valuable contributions to the catchment-
wide monitoring system. In this way an open and transparent communication system is established 
which can also help in the distribution of monitoring costs. Furthermore, overlapping and 
complementary monitoring activities can present checks and balances which in turn could enhance 
the legitimacy of the generated knowledge. For such a system to function, an adequate 
communication system must be established among the monitoring organizations. A communication 
system is not only important for the distribution of generated data but also for deciding which 
ecological and social indicators need to be measured, how and by whom. Given the large number of 
demands on the catchment’s water resources and the many ecological processes that comprise the 
catchment, agreeing on the purpose and content of the monitoring system is not a straightforward 
matter. It necessitates deliberation and a systematic engagement of all involved in the management 
of the Berg catchment. Investing in an inclusive monitoring system that benefits from the plurality of 
contributions and which is utilized for joint learning and knowledge generation can become an 
important bridging tool that helps to establish collaborative linkages across levels and scales. It could 
also be used to increase the linkages between the scientific knowledge producers and core WMOs 
(see Chapter 5). 
Principle 5: Graduate sanctioning 
In the context of the Berg catchment, graduated sanctions need to be considered in relation to 
overall rule enforcement as well as in terms of the compliance with rules agreed upon within the 
initiatives. 
Initiative based 
The reasons for breaking rules (whether the inability to fulfill agreed upon commitments or engage in 
unsustainable management practices) are often multifaceted in the Berg catchment. Resource 
constraints, lack of education regarding the potential consequences of certain practices on the water 
resources, but also sheer disregard of existing rules because of weak rule enforcement mechanisms, 
have started to shape decisions regarding rule conformity in the catchment. It is therefore critical to 
openly discuss within the initiatives the reason for non-compliance and how the problems could be 
best resolved. This again requires transparency regarding one’s own actions and constraints, open 
communication as well as regular interactions. Another challenge for those participating in the 
initiatives is that they have little influence over other organizations that contribute to the problem at 
hand but that are not part of the initiative. Hence, the need for access to a higher level conflict 
resolution mechanism becomes apparent.  
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Currently, many organizations are of the opinion that the lack of enforcement of environmental 
legislation in the Berg catchment negatively affects their efforts to address the two management 
problems. Insufficient monitoring and the fact that enforcement agencies rarely prosecute wrong-
doing (e.g., discharge of pollutants or solid waste into the river) has encouraged some stakeholders 
not to adhere to existing legislation. As long as law enforcement is not improved at higher level 
decisionmaking (provincial and national government), and rule-breaking organizations (including 
government organizations such as some of the municipalities) are not held accountable, attempted 
sanctioning through the initiatives will have limited effect. If initiatives are unable to create particular 
pressure on rule breaking actors to change their practices then it is vital that higher level authorities 
step in.  
Principle 6: Conflict resolution mechanisms 
The organizations that participate in the initiatives bring varying perspectives, interests and values 
into the interactions. For example, organizations that have partnered to pool resources for alien 
clearing may still be motivated by differing interests such as creating jobs through public work 
programs (WfW), protecting natural habitat and biodiversity (WWF) or increasing the water supply 
for agricultural production (IBs). Finding ways to deal constructively with emerging conflicts of 
interests and disputes is vital to the success of the collaborative efforts (Dietz et al., 2003). 
Participatory and democratic processes within the initiatives can create low-cost conflict resolution 
mechanisms. Yet, leadership and the possibility to turn to higher level conflict resolution mechanisms 
are also required.  
Initiative based 
The initiatives show that it is critical that all actors are viewed as equal partners and that leadership 
must be unbiased. Both conditions were missing in the in the WQ task team and, at a later stage, in 
the Adopt-a-River Stellenbosch initiative. The initiatives that reveal high levels of collaboration (e.g., 
BEMF and Lower Berg initiative) have well-functioning conflict resolution mechanisms which are 
primarily based on deliberation.  
Catchment wide 
Easily-accessible conflict resolution mechanisms at catchment scale do not really exist. One problem 
is that the DWA does not act as a facilitator. This became clear when discussing the disputes that 
arose between the government departments in relation to the water quality task team. The DWA 
currently takes the position of an affected party that needs to defend its interests and rights. 
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related to the cost of carrying out management functions. These disputes must be addressed at the 
catchment scale or even at higher levels of decision making. 
Principle 7: Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
The findings in this study support the argument that Principle 7 has particular importance in heavily 
regulated policy fields, i.e., in situations where traditional governance structures with established 
specific patterns of interactions and decision-making procedures prevail (Termeer et al., 2013). The 
Berg catchment certainly reflects such a situation. The recognition of rights, especially from higher 
level authorities, renders possible the required ‘external’ legitimacy which enables the collective 
action initiatives to develop and implement specific management actions to influence higher-level 
policy making and to claim financial and technical support. In this way, the recognition of rights also 
positively affects the capacity to self-organize. Hence, the development of enforceable joint rules is 
not only dependent on ‘internal’ legitimacy but also on ‘external’ legitimacy (Provan and Kenis, 2007; 
Jentoft, 2000).123 Other studies have come to similar conclusions (see for example Sandström et al., 
2013; Suskevics, 2012) 
Initiative based 
The relationship between the recognition of rights and the capacity for successful collective action is 
well illustrated by the example of the BEMF initiative. While the BEMF has developed into a very 
effective collective action initiative based on trust and reciprocity, its sustainability as well as 
effectiveness remains fragile. The BEMF has not been acknowledged as a legitimate player by several 
higher level decision makers in the catchment. This is exemplified by the lack of financial support and 
the marginalization of the forum from decision-making processes relating to the management of the 
Berg River. As a consequence, knowledge generation and institutionalization of the initiative are 
encumbered.  
Similarly, observations could be made of the 24 River initiative and the Lower Berg initiative. Both 
initiatives represent hybrid governance mechanisms whose role has until now not been sufficiently 
recognized by more traditional government structures. Without the required acknowledgment they 
will struggle to access important information and are unlikely to become well integrated into the 
larger Berg River management system. Interestingly, the WQ task team and the Adopt a River 
                                                          
123
Internal legitimacy relates to the acceptance and credibility that that those involved in the initiatives give to 
the decision-making processes. “External” legitimacy refers here to the acceptance by actors outside the 
management system (Jentoft, 2000). That is, goals of the particular management system need to be consistent 
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Stellenbosch have the necessary authority and ‘external’ legitimacy but these initiatives lack ‘internal’ 
legitimacy (i.e. organizations that are participating in the initiative or are affected by their rules do 
not view the decision making within these platforms as fair or credible.)  
Catchment wide  
Ostrom et al. (1999) point that higher level government can either facilitate or hinder self-
organization at the local level. The authors (1999:281) continue to say that “[n]ational governments 
can […] hinder local self-organization by […] maintaining that the state has ultimate control over 
resources without actually monitoring and enforcing existing regulations.” To a large extent this 
seems to be still the case in the Berg catchment where the DWA still insists on its ultimate control 
over the water resources without respecting and legitimizing ongoing effort of self-organization and 
local management and without actually addressing the issue adequately. 
Principle 8: Nested enterprises 
The findings from the investigation of the collective action initiatives suggest that nested enterprises 
seem to be of great significance for the performance of the specific initiatives. To obtain legitimacy 
and support the collective action, initiatives are required to cooperate and link to other existing 
formal decision-making processes within and beyond the operational level of the catchment. Only 
then is the necessary space for self-governance and for establishing robust long term collective 
action provided (Termeer et al., 2013; Wynborn and Bixler 2013).  
Initiative based 
The quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the IB initiative is the only initiative which is 
well embedded in the Berg management network. The SNA in Chapter 5 illustrated how the initiative, 
through its strategic linkages, can influence others operative in the Berg catchment as well as higher 
level decision-making processes. Furthermore, the IB initiative itself represents  a system of nested 
enterprises. Hence, the individual IBs are embedded in the Main IB but they also have some 
autonomy to develop their own rules and activities within their specific jurisdiction. The 
organizational structure of the initiative and its strategic linkages ensure that the IB initiative is well-
informed about new developments, opportunities and issues concerning the management of the 
Berg catchment. This has strengthened the capacity of the group of IBs to self-organize and to 
prioritize its collective action activities. All other initiatives lack this embeddedness. Consequently, 
the costs of acquiring important information and for accessing support structures as well as decision-
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An interesting observation could be made for the BEMF. As mentioned earlier, the BEMF is well 
embedded in the Berg management network. However, the BEMF is also nested in the coastal 
governance system. Representatives from the BEMF are, for example, participating in the Municipal 
Coastal Committee (MCC) and the Provincial Coastal Committee (PCC). This makes it possible to 
escalate estuarine/coastal issues from the estuary forum to the MCC, the PCC or to the National 
Coastal Committee. Hence, the BEMF has been able to learn from the lessons of other estuary 
forums and has also access to some resources and conflict resolution mechanisms from higher level 
coastal management platforms.  
Catchment wide  
While the potential that the individual initiatives hold for enhancing horizontal cooperation among 
the organizations should be recognized, it is also important to realize that individually the initiatives 
will not be able to effectively address the two management issues . Both issues are of such a complex 
nature that they require actions at several levels and the involvement of various modes of 
governance. Hence, nested enterprises are a necessary condition for enabling AM in the Berg 
catchment. Most of the initiatives are not well embedded in higher level decision-making processes 
concerning the catchment and the two management issues (see Table 6-1). However, nesting does 
not only refer to vertical embeddedness but also horizontal nestedness. The findings from the 
workshops as well as the SNA show that the individual initiatives are not well connected to each 
other. The horizontal nestedness that is currently missing from the Berg management network is 
critical for complementary monitoring activities, for understanding upstream-downstream relations 
and the spatial effects of management changes at one locality.  
6.3.1. Summarizing key constraints to collective action 
The employment of Ostrom’s eight design principles provided knowledge about the nature and 
extent of horizontal cooperation in the Berg catchment that could not have alone been gained 
through the SNA as presented in Chapter 5. The analysis brought to the fore key constraints that 
inhibit social cooperation and brought into view larger governance arrangements (beyond the Berg 
management network) that significantly affect the success and sustainability of the initiatives and the 
self-organizing efforts in the catchment.  
The identified constraints can be broadly summarized as follows:  
 The negative impact of the national water governance system which is currently 
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 The lack of access to adequate and relevant, catchment-wide information on the ecological 
status and socio-economic trends in the Berg catchment, which is to a large extent the result 
of a missing monitoring system and communication strategy; 
 The missing support and legitimacy from higher level governmental authorities, in particular 
in terms of law enforcement, conflict resolution mechanisms and incentive structures; 
 The limited ability to affect rules and decision-making processes that go beyond the internal 
affairs of the initiatives;  
 The inadequate resources provided to the organizations to fulfill management functions and 
to afford the transaction costs necessary for iterative learning and collaboration;  
 The limited space and time provided for learning and deliberation and therefore knowledge 
generation within and across the initiatives; and  
 The persistence of rigid boundaries rather than carefully defined actor and resource 
boundaries (alien clearing vs water quality managem nt, water service management vs. 
water resource management).  
6.3.2. Reflecting on the robustness of governance: the extent of AM and polycentric 
governance in the Berg catchment 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that Ostrom’s  design principles create a critical linkage between AM and 
polycentric governance. That is, jointly, the design principles allow for the assessment of the extent 
of AM and of polycentric governance in the governance arrangements through which the Berg 
catchment is managed, which in turn speaks to the robustness of the existing governance. Robust 
governance has been defined in this thesis as arrangements that can sustain key management 
functions and address management challenges in light of socio-economic and ecological changes. It 
was argued that governance arrangements that contain features of AM and polycentric governance 
are more robust because they create the conditions under which effective governance can be 
sustained.  
Section 3.2.3 and Figure 3-7 highlighted that design principles 1, 2 and 3 are critical for establishing 
important conditions for collaboration. Principles 4, 5, and 6, on the other hand, provide 
opportunities for learning and knowledge generation about the SES. Finally, Principles 7 and 8 
facilitate cross-boundary linkages which allow for the development of effective multi-level 
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The detailed discussion of design principles 1 to 6 provides testimony that the existing arrangements 
through which the Berg catchment is governed afford few possibilities for learning and collaboration. 
It is therefore not surprising that AM remains an abstract concept rather than a well-integrated 
practice in the catchment. At first glance this may provide a bleak picture for realizing the sustainable 
management of the Berg catchment through joint action. However, the analysis also demonstrated 
that some of the examined initiatives have considerable potential to become effective governance 
arrangements at the sub-catchment level (see Table 6-2). Some of them already fulfill two important 
governance functions: the strengthening of collaborative relations among some organizations and 
the partial uptake of some of the management functions. The investigation showed that, in particular, 
those initiatives with engaged leadership and that have developed a culture of deliberation, actively 
integrating the knowledge that the various organizations bring into the initiatives, have been able to 
create a common and more holistic understanding of the catchment or specific issue areas (examples 
are the BEMF, the 24 River initiative and the Lower Berg initiative and to a lesser extent the IB 
initiative). For some initiatives, learning processes and knowledge production were enhanced 
through specific monitoring activities (e.g., the BEMF, the Lower Berg Initiative and the IB initiative).  
In the case of the Berg catchment, it appears that the greatest obstacle to robust governance relates 
to the conditions created by the arrangements that go beyond the individual initiatives and the 
catchment. Hence, the weak performance related to design principles 7 and 8 suggest that a 
functioning polycentric governance system does not exist and that vital cross-boundary linkages that 
foster vertical integration have not been established. Therefore, it does not come as much of a 
surprise that the current arrangement  that govern the Berg catchment do not score highly when it 
comes to the maintenance of k y water management functions, the efficient response to water 
management problems and the equitable and accountable distribution of cost and benefits. 
6.4. Additional factors shaping collective action 
Organizing the initiatives according to the themes proposed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.4) turned out 
to be not particularly helpful for highlighting the additional factors that inhibit or foster collective 
action in the Berg catchment. However, they were helpful in capturing and understanding the role of 
agency. It became evident that agency in the form of champions and leadership had a significant 
influence on the quality and sustainability of the collaborative efforts. In reflecting further on the 
interpretations of the analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
6.4.1. Agency: the role of champions and leadership  
All of the initiatives did in some way experience significant organizational and resource specific 
constraints. Yet, several representatives from different organizations found ways of interpreting their 
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and issues could be addressed collectively (e.g., accessing funding for alien clearing in the BEMF, the 
WCDM and the Department of Agriculture, Western Cape). For example, the representative from the 
Department of Agriculture, Western Cape framed the issue of invasive vegetation as a disaster 
management issue. This enabled him to access more funding for his organization and to engage 
other provincial government departments responsible for disaster management.  
Individuals such as the representative from the Department of Agriculture, Western Cape display 
high levels of commitment and the will to contribute to the sustainable management of the 
catchment. Champions like him are important for getting the buy-in of the organization they 
represent and for convincing other organizations that joint actions are a good strategy for achieving 
organizational objectives. To develop this type of agency, it is essential that the participants of the 
initiatives are knowledgeable, i.e., have access to relevant information, and can influence decision-
making processes that affect their activities. During the fieldwork, it became evident on several 
occasions that champions are critical for overcoming legislative and bureaucratic obstacles and for 
moving the initiatives forward. Organizations that had internal expertise relating to environmental 
governance or water resources management were often those from which champions emerged. Yet, 
it also became clear during the fieldwork that the agency of such champions can remain highly 
restricted. Returning to the example of the Department of Agriculture, Western Cape representative, 
while he was able to create more awareness, his limited formal influence within larger decision-
making processes and formal authority on the subject prevented him from taking a catchment-wide 
leadership position.  
Leaders, as understood in this thesis, may be distinct from champions in that they have the 
legitimacy and means to transform innovative ideas into action. Reflecting on the level of 
cooperation within the collective action initiatives, it appears that leadership is important for 
coordinating internal affairs and in negotiating trade-offs that may arise from a conflict of interests. 
The findings further highlight that it is not enough to have a central actor who may have the 
authority to coordinate action but that the leadership must be unbiased. In other words, leaders 
must have an interest in advancing the objectives of the initiative and not act solely in the interest of 
the organization that they represent. This type of leadership is particularly critical for externally 
initiated collective action (WQ task team, Adopt-a-River Stellenbosch, BEMF). Externally initiated 
collective action represents situations where trust relations are still fragile and organizations may be 
constrained by a lack of resources or rigid mandates. Leadership can provide for the necessary vision 
and ensure that the initiative does not get overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem. An 
impediment to the Adopt-a-River Stellenbosch initiative was, for example, the loss of leadership 
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turned into ad hoc efforts without seeking the necessary integration. From the findings it also 
appears that catchment-wide collective action requires leadership at the scale of the catchment. This 
should not just be exercised through a top-down intervention. Rather, it should be accommodated 
by nested leadership as has been described by Termeer et al. (2013). Hence, leaders at different 
levels need to form a collaborative network through which they can form institutional arrangements 
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7. Chapter: Discussion & Conclusion      
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of the key findings of this research. First, the findings 
and conclusions of the two empirical chapters (Chapter 5 and 6) are summarized. They are 
interpreted in relation to water governance in South Africa and the management of regional SESs. 
Reflecting on the insights that were generated, the research question When does horizontal 
cooperation contribute to adaptive management in complex governance arrangements? is answered. 
Following that, key contributions that the thesis has made to knowledge are summarized. The 
subsequent section discusses the applicability and relevance of a relational approach for providing 
new insights on the intersection of horizontal cooperation and complex governance arrangements. 
Here, the usefulness of the conceptual design and the proposed analytical framework are discussed. 
In light of the understanding gained during the research process, the specific limitations of the 
framework and the methods employed are pointed out. The chapter closes by providing an outlook 
on future research directions. 
7.1. Key findings in the context of water governance in South Africa 
Water management in the Berg catchment has changed significantly over the past decade. The role 
of local organizations has gained prominence in addressing existing issues related to the Berg River 
and in contributing to day-to-day management activities. In addition, several inter-organizational 
platforms have become potent actors in water management at the catchment scale. The 
participation of the large number of non-mandated organizations (43%) is indicative of the changed 
composition at the operational level (see Chapter 5, section 5.2). It appears though, that the 
willingness to take action is not so much induced by South Africa’s progressive water legislation, 
which strongly promotes greater stakeholder participation. For many organizations, their 
involvement in water management is mainly motivated by the perception that the state (in this 
instance the DWA) is not able to maintain a functioning management system and to effectively 
address the issue of water quality. While this driver is a potent catalyst for changing the stakeholders 
perceptions that water management is not solely the responsibility of the DWA, stronger incentives 
(e.g. secure property rights, local benefits and access to higher level decision-making) and support 
structures are necessary, so that stakeholders contribute to management activities on a regular basis 
and in ways that go beyond their immediate interests.  
Involving more actors at the operational level, even when they are from different administrative 
levels and are representing different stakeholder groups, does not automatically lead to effective and 
sustainable management. The examination of water management in the Berg catchment clearly 
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catchment can partially be explained by the lack of cooperation among the core WMOs, i.e., those 
that have a formal mandate. Evidence of the limited information exchange and prioritization of 
activities among the core WMOs was provided through the quantitative assessment of horizontal 
cooperation in Chapter 5. These limitations have negative implications for the execution of 
management functions, as well as for creating and promoting a vision for the catchment. Although 
various collaborative efforts to address the two management issues, degrading water quality and 
alien-invasive vegetation, among the stakeholders in the Berg catchment exist, the lack of horizontal 
cooperation among core WMOs has significantly impeded the self-organizing efforts of other 
organizations in terms of informed decision-making, prioritization and up-scaling. 
In the case of the Berg catchment it appears that it is not simply the lack of interactions among the 
organizations involved that explains the poor management of the Berg River. The findings from the 
examination of stakeholder relations revealed that the quality of interactions also hampers the 
utilization of the expertise and the substantial efforts that exist in the Berg catchment. Lots of 
recycled and outdated information gets circulated even among those organizations that are well 
connected in the network. Chapter 5 highlighted that this is partially a result of the limited access to 
catchment-wide scientific ecological knowledge and limited integration of knowledge generated at 
sub-catchment level (e.g., within the collective action initiatives). Without better knowledge on the 
status of the catchment, including trends and developments, a better integration of major water 
users, and an inclusive vision for the catchment, developing collaborative relations through which 
management issues and functions can join ly be addressed remains limited.  
While more financial resources could assist in capacitating the core WMOs in carrying out key 
management functions, this is not sufficient for achieving AM in the catchment. The study shows that 
key deficiencies are of a relational nature: narrowly defined boundaries (such as the distinction 
between water services and water resources management or water quality and alien-invasive 
vegetation), limited trust, and a restrictive organizational mandate. The institutionalization of 
horizontal linkages (e.g., through the establishment platforms for joint learning and planned 
coordination) could greatly assist in building trust and a shared vision of and feeling for joint 
responsibility for the catchment.124  
                                                          
124
 A potential candidate for such a platform is a program called the Berg River Improvement Plan which was 
established in 2013 under the leadership of the provincial government. The WQ task team,  discussed at great 
length in this study, was also revitalized after the completion of the fieldwork for this study. The core WMOs 
are members of both initiatives. In order to strengthen effective water management, these initiatives should 
make it their mandate to assist in creating functional linkages between the core WMOs and in fostering  
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One of the major impediments to the development of trust and reciprocity among stakeholders in 
the catchment seems to be the institutional uncertainty that has dominated the national water 
governance system for several years (i.e., issues regarding the establishment of CMAs, role and 
composition of WUAs, and water and land reform). In Chapter 6 it became evident that because of 
this uncertainty, roles, responsibilities and boundaries of the various organizations, involved in the 
management of the catchment, remain vague, and organizations find it difficult to agree on how 
costs and responsibilities should be shared.  
The observed institutional uncertainty needs to be discussed in the context of the transformation 
processes taking place in South Africa’s water governance system, i.e., the fact that the 
establishment of new institutional arrangements and reconfiguring actor relations are not only taking 
place in the Berg catchment. The transformation of the water governance system has been primarily 
the responsibility of the DWA and the difficulty of the task should not be underestimated. Making 
governance more inclusive and adaptive is particularly challenging in a country where access to 
decision-making processes and participation in water management has been extremely unequal 
(Goldin, 2010; King and Piennar, 2011). The DWA neither has the capacities nor the means to lead 
the transformation processes and the management of South Africa’s catchment areas through a 
mere top-down approach. The fact that water is a cross-sectoral domain implies, furthermore, that 
there will always be other powerful actors (e.g., other national government departments and private 
sector actors) that will contest the authority of the DWA in specific decision-making processes. 
Notwithstanding that the examination of the Berg catchment only provides a glimpse into the 
working of South Africa’s water governance system, the findings illustrate that the current steering of 
activities by the DWA has been rather counterproductive. This has been also echoed by other studies 
such as (Colvin et al., 2014). The DWA has been interacting in the catchment either through non-
involvement, which could be observed particularly at sub-catchment level, or through non-inclusive 
top-down approaches at catchment and national level. The findings further suggest that the DWA 
finds it challenging to move from the more familiar top-down engagement to collaborative, non-
hierarchical interactions. Mindful that the organization has been significantly constrained in its ability 
to coordinate activities because of insufficient human resources with respect to particular technical 
skills (King and Piennar, 2011; Schreiner and Hassan, 2010), it appears the DWA has completely 
overlooked the need for and importance of transforming itself into a learning organization. That is, 
without the DWA adopting a learning approach that entails reflection within its own organizational 
structures, the organization will fall short of its intention to transform South Africa’s water 
governance system. To fulfill its leadership role, the DWA needs to acquire skills for coordinating 
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and systematic engagement with learning and management processes at different levels. In order to 
make use of the learning processes and incorporate them into its decision-making processes and its 
organizational strategies, it is also critical that the DWA foster and encourage learning processes and 
information within itself. Although the interactions between the DWA regional and the DWA national 
offices were not the focus of this study, the lack of communication and learning within the DWA and 
its negative effects on the interactions within the Berg catchment became obvious.  
The findings from this study highlight strongly the need for catchment-wide coordination. While 
some management functions can be carried out at sub-catchment level, many require that they are 
coordinated at catchment scale or even higher. CMAs could make valuable contributions in this 
regard as they provide the organizational space for cross-sector integration and cooperation (Dent, 
2010 and 2008). The role of such organizations is less about taking over all management functions 
concerning the water resources of a catchment and more about assisting in creating a common 
vision, aligning collaborative efforts, and strengthening self-organization at the sub-catchment level. 
In light of a recent decision by the DWA that two to three adjacent catchment areas will be 
coordinated by one CMA125, it is unlikely that a CMA can employ the same strategy for coordinating 
management in the different areas under its jurisdiction. CMAs will be most successful if they 
facilitate management through a better understanding of the collaborative efforts that already exist, 
strengthening them and where necessary trying to link them. 
 That said, it needs to be highlighted that CMAs can not be seen as the panacea for South Africa’s 
water governance challenges. The observations made in this and other studies (e.g., Ernstson et al., 
2008) clearly show that creating and maintaining relations comes at a significant cost. Furthermore, 
given that water is a cross-sectoral issue, many management challenges have their origin outside the 
catchment and the water governance system. Hence, the coordinating role that CMAs can fulfill will 
have its limits. It is therefore important that CMAs are supported by other actors and initiatives that 
are in a position to take up such a bridging role, especially with regard to higher level decision making.  
For example, the Strategic Water Partners Network – South Africa (SWPN) is a public-private expert 
leadership group, formed in 2011 and chaired by the Director-General of the DWA. It is intended to 
strengthen South Africa’s water security through collaborative private-public projects that can 
strategically address South Africa’s persistent water management challenges (e.g., the 
                                                          
125 Instead of having 19 CMAs for 19 catchment areas, it was recently decided by the DWA to establish 9 CMAs 
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malfunctioning of municipal sewage treatment plants) (NEPAD, 2012). 126 Hence, SWPN builds 
horizontal cooperation at the highest level of decision making in South Africa. To contribute 
effectively to water management, it will be vital that this high level partnership becomes well 
connected to the catchment areas so that it can provide tailored incentives and supports structures 
that enhance the management capacities and collective efforts at catchment and sub-catchment 
scale.  Hence the better the SWPN is able to strengthen local scale governance arrangements the 
more likely it will be able to accomplish the governance objectives it has set out to accomplish. Other 
studies, such as Bixler (2014), are in strong support of this argument.  
Key messages-South Africa’s water governance system 
 More stakeholders can participate in water management, yet options generation as well as the 
meaningful engagement of marginalized and not well organized groups remain low. 
 Opportunities created through self-organization and collective action at sub-catchment level are 
not well utilized. 
 Institutional uncertainty is a major reason that horizontal cooperation in the Berg catchment is 
not conducive to AM and for the effective co-production of public benefits. 
 To a large extent this institutional uncertainty has been created by the DWA which until now has 
failed to transform itself into a learning organization. 
 Learning, through the integration of technical and ecological knowledge, appears to be most 
important for changing actor relations and perceptions on water security. 
 Capacitated core WMOS are critical for the fulfillment of key management function and for the 
utilization of the self organization of other actors. 
 Core WMOs will only be able to fulfill management functions if they cooperate with each other 
and take advantage of the contributions of other actors.  
 CMAs and other coordinating forums (above and below the catchment scale) are critical for 
establishing vital vertical and horizontal linkages and for creating effective incentive structures. 
7.2. Key findings in the context of management of regional SESs 
The expansion of the operational level is a development that the Berg catchment shares with many 
other regional SESs (e.g., e.g. Bixler, 2014, Marshal, 2009; Berkes 2007; Armitage et al., 2008b). At 
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best, the participation of more actors leads to an effective execution of management functions, 
because necessary resources and actions can speedily be deployed at the most appropriate levels or 
scales. The findings from the Berg catchment also suggest increased fluctuation at the operational 
level. That is, it may change in size depending on the management issue or function to be addressed. 
Yet, if a joint vision for and common knowledge base of the SES is not actively built and shared 
among a diverse set of actors, the expansion of the operational level will simply lead to 
fragmentation and may even result in more unresolved conflicts of interests and management gaps. 
Hence, actors will continue to advance narrowly-defined self-interests which make it extremely 
difficult to create functioning governance arrangements among semi-autonomous actors . 
This study clearly supports the argument that collective action and self-organization are important 
for the effective management of regional SESs (e.g., Bixler 2014; Wynborn 2014; Pollard, and du Toit, 
2011; Cundill and Fabricus, 2010; Knüppe and Pahl-Wostl,2014). Yet, the findings from this case study 
also suggest that self-organization within actor networks that manage regional SESs on their own will 
rarely lead to AM and robust governance arrangements. This is particularly true in regional SESs that 
are characterized by great power discrepancies and competing user interests. The observations made 
in this study show that it is primarily well-resourced and well-connected organizations that are able 
to advance their interests and viewpoints.  
An important point that until now has not received adequate attention from the SES literature is the 
relationship between modes of governance and AM in regional SESs. Using a relational approach, this 
thesis demonstrates that the behavior of actors towards each other and the SES is influenced by 
incentives provided by informal network structures, market mechanisms and bureaucratic 
hierarchies. Hence, modes of governance intersect at the operational level and consequently 
influence the nature of horizontal cooperation. Chapters 5 and 6 jointly demonstrated that, while the 
quality of the management of the SES is largely determined by the patterns of interactions among 
the actors that manage the SES, these interactions are also influenced by other institutional and 
organizational structures in which the actors are embedded. Unexpectedly, market mode incentives 
have stimulated collective action in the Berg catchment and accentuated the need for addressing 
degrading water quality. Informal relations and emerging processes such as the creation of inter-
organizational platforms (such as the BEMF) matter for learning and for providing opportunities for 
collective action. Yet, the incentives (or lack thereof) created through the hierarchical steering of the 
South African water governance system by the DWA have been rather counterproductive. That is, so 
far the self-organizing efforts at sub-catchment level could not be transformed into functioning 
governance arrangements because of the constraints that are imposed by the hierarchical mode (i.e., 
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the nature of the effect of each mode of governance on the overall performance of the actor 
network and how processes related to a specific mode affect the incentives for horizontal 
cooperation in other modes. Only then can informed decisions be made on where and how to 
intervene in order to establish robust governance arrangements and to utilize existing opportunities 
that promote sustainable management practices.  
The importance of iterative social learning processes for arriving at a common understanding and for 
fostering mutual interests and needs has been frequently emphasized in the SES literature (e.g., 
Berkes, 2009). However, the investigation in the Berg catchment demonstrated that collective 
learning processes in regional SESs necessitate the integration of legitimate technical and ecological 
knowledge. Such knowledge is not only a critical requirement for making informed decisions that 
lead to sustainable management practices, but it can also become a common point of reference 
upon which trusting relations can be built among actors whose previous forms of engagement were 
marked by adversary and distrust.  
It has been argued in Chapter 1 that the limited transition toward AM practices can only be 
understood if the rising complexity of governance arrangements is taken into consideration. In 
particular, the findings derived from investigating the collective action initiatives in Chapter 6 
highlight that it is not so much the complexity of arrangements that is the problem. Complex 
governance arrangements are often desirable as they lead to the institutional diversity necessary for 
the effective management of SESs and for motivating a diverse set of actors to contribute to the 
fulfillment of management functions. This finding is consistent with those of scholars such as Elinor 
Ostrom who have argued that to be effective, governance systems must match the complexity of the 
SES (Ostrom, 1990, 2005, 2009b; Crona et al., 2011; Andersson et al., 2014). It is critical to 
understand the distribution of power and influence, the interplay of modes of governance, and the 
prevalence of collaborative structures, and how these in turn affects learning and collaboration at 
the operational level. The examination of the Berg catchment also highlighted that the cost-benefit 
distribution for the management of the SES needs to be assessed in a holistic manner. What are the 
costs for carrying out management functions and how does this relate to the capacities and benefits 
of the specific actors? How does this cost-benefit distribution relate to organizational mandates and 
the water governance system as envisioned by legislation? Gaining such understanding necessitates 
knowledge on the actors that form part of the operational level and the ways in which they 
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Key messages-management of regional SES 
 In regional SESs the operational level has increased and become more fluctuating making day 
to day management functions more challenging to fulfill as the necessary cohesion among 
the actors is not easily achieved.  
 Self-organization and collective action that arise from horizontal cooperation are important 
for AM in regional SESs. 
 Self-organization in regional SESs requires institutional stability and nestedness.  
 Collective learning processes in regional SESs necessitate access to technical and ecological 
knowledge.  
 Complex governance arrangements are not a hindrance to robust governance. 
 Modes of governance intersect at the operational level and consequently influence the 
nature of horizontal cooperation.   
7.3. Horizontal cooperation as means for achieving adaptive management  
This research set out to provide clarity on the concept of horizontal cooperation. This was done by 
proposing a workable definition which emphasized collaborative, non-hierarchical interactions of 
actors across sectors, modes of governance and spatial scales, and by investigating these 
characteristics through a relational approach. The empirical investigation into the Berg catchment 
confirmed that these characteristics do indeed capture horizontal cooperation in complex 
governance arrangements. 
The key message to take from this study is that horizontal cooperation does not by default become a 
means for adaptive management. In regional SESs characterized by complex governance 
arrangements, horizontal cooperation is not easily achieved. Certain conditions are needed so that 
social and ecological outcomes are achieved and the cost of horizontal cooperation remains 
acceptable. A nested governance structure, in which horizontal cooperation is complemented by 
vertical integration, is necessary for learning and collaboration within and beyond the operational 
level. The study confirms that self-organization and collective action that arise from horizontal 
cooperation are important for the AM of regional SESs. However, without being supported by larger 
structures and decision-making processes, they are insufficient for creating and sustaining robust 
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cooperation at the operational level can only be effective when supported by the hierarchical 
governance mode. 
This thesis has made valuable contributions to a growing field of interdisciplinary research on SESs. In 
recent years, the interest in the concept of SES has been rising (see e.g., Halliday and Glasser, 2011). 
However, it has become evident that more studies are required to unpack relational patterns, 
governance and environmental outcomes in such systems (Young et al., 2006; Janssen et al., 2007; 
Bodin et al., 2011). By provided more clarity on the concept of horizontal cooperation as well as by 
developing a systematic framework through which horizontal cooperation can be assessed, this 
thesis provides valuable insights into the research question When does horizontal cooperation 
contribute to adaptive management in complex governance arrangements? Hence, while this thesis 
is only able to answer the question for a specific SES (i.e., for the Berg catchment), the proposed 
framework makes it possible to test and validate the findings in other regional SESs.  
 
7.4. Critical reflections 
7.4.1. The contribution of a relational approach for providing new insights into horizontal 
cooperation  
The relational approach advanced in this thesis focused on actor networks and collective action. 
More specifically, actor relations among a group of organizations that jointly manage a particular 
regional SES served as a starting point for the investigation into horizontal cooperation. The 
quantitative assessment of the patterns of interactions, achieved through a formal SNA, gave 
valuable insights into how these interactions have shaped learning processes and collaboration 
among the organizations. These quantitative investigations were supplemented by a qualitative 
analysis of collective action. This in turn provided a comprehensive understanding of how the nature 
of, and constraints to, horizontal cooperation in regional SESs can be assessed. 
A key advantage of the relational approach has been its ability to delineate complex governance 
arrangements, i.e., the methodological tools that have been employed in this study allow the 
identification and description of actor constellations and institutional processes that characterize 
specific arrangements. That is, while the unit of analysis has been an actor network, the focus on the 
patterns of interaction brought revealed how designed and self-organizing components and 
processes are organized in specific governance arrangements. This in turn helped in the 
understanding of how they individually, but also jointly, built upon, facilitate or obstruct horizontal 
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constellations and institutions) matter the most in a particular governance setting, the relationship 
among those components, and the governance outcomes of their interactions.  
While the approach was clearly able to detect and describe in great detail the operational level and 
the complexity of governance arrangements therein, it fell short in revealing the entire multi-level 
governance system that shapes water governance in South Africa. For example, it became quite clear 
during the research that vertical linkages (in particular vertical nestedness) plays an important role in 
horizontal cooperation. Furthermore, observations on the effect of existing institutions (in this case 
formal rules) on horizontal cooperation through an investigation of actor relations only has limited 
explanatory power. Another shortcoming of the approach has been its limited ability to capture 
those organizations holistically that have a national, regional but also local presence. More 
specifically, while the study provided a thorough examination of inter-organizational relations, it 
could not do so for intra-organizational relations.  
The advantage of using a polycentric governance lens for examining complex governance 
arrangements is that it enables the creation of a more holistic understanding of the components and 
processes that characterize these arrangements. By taking into consideration the nature of existing 
institutional and actor diversity, a polycentric governance lens assists in the evaluation of the 
functioning of these processes and components, and the constraints upon them. Furthermore, this 
increases the researchers’ ability to understand how the interplay of the different governance modes 
affects collaboration among semi-autonomous actors. This understanding is especially important for 
maximizing institutional diversity to foster an effective governance system that builds upon learning 
and collaboration. The case of the Berg catchment illustrated that the decentralization that has taken 
place in South Africa’s water governance system has not been faithful to the polycentric idea. 
Whereas lower level decision-making centers like municipalities and IBs have been given greater 
responsibilities in the management of the catchment, this has been done without nesting them into 
higher level structures. This lack of vertical integration overwhelms the operational level making it 
difficult to co-produce services for public benefit. 
7.4.2. Reflection on the analytical framework 
The formal SNA employed in this study revealed how the composition and structure of the Berg 
management network has shaped learning processes and collective action and given rise to specific 
management practices. A key advantage of the SNA has been that issues concerning the 
management of SES could be re-framed in network terms, demonstrating how the nature of 
interactions affects management. More specifically, the SNA helped to operationalize and empirically 
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representation of complex relational structures affecting learning and collaboration in the Berg 
catchment turned out to be an analytically valuable descriptive tool.  
The examination of the two network characteristics, heterogeneity and cohesion, created a better 
understanding of why management performance is poor despite the diversity of actors, resources 
and knowledge. It became apparent that the mobilization of resources and the coordination of 
collective action are constrained by the catchment-wide lack of cohesion in the network. The 
quantitative analyses also provide plausible explanations of why specific actors like the IBs have been 
able to advance their interests in the network and why others, such as municipalities in the lower 
catchment, failed to do so. Furthermore, the SNA helped to better understand how formal authority 
relates to influence in the catchment and in the management practices. For example, the DWA, 
because of its formal authority, continues to have significant influence in the decision-making 
processes of the network even though the organization is currently not able to fulfill its leadership 
role. Other actors that have engaged more pro-actively in collaborative efforts at the sub-catchment 
scale are limited in their bridging role because they lack the formal authority.  
Cohesion and heterogeneity were useful indicators in the assessment of horizontal cooperation. The 
complementary measurements for each characteristic allowed for meaningful interpretations. For 
example, looking at the overall connectedness among the organizations participating in the 
management of the catchment was not very informative on its own. A better understanding was 
available after investigating the cohesion among the core WMOs and after having identified the 
collaborative clusters that have formed within the Berg management network. Concentrating the 
interpretation of heterogeneity on access to ecological knowledge and network integration of major 
users and highly dependent stakeholders demonstrated that the high actor diversity that is present 
in the network is not well utilized. The investigation of the two network characteristics also 
illustrated why learning about the catchment is very restricted and why some actors continue to 
remain under the false impression that their water security is not dependent on the catchment. 
Together, that leads to the conclusion that the existing horizontal cooperation is not conducive to 
AM and that consequently the realized adaptive capacity is low in the Berg catchment. The analyses 
also highlighted the integrated relationship between the two network characteristics and that in 
order to serve as indicators for horizontal cooperation they need to be discussed jointly. 
Notwithstanding that the simplification of complex processes through the SNA helped in their 
understanding, rich qualitative information was lost in the quantitative analyses. The use of 
qualitative information generated through semi-structured interviews, participant observations and 
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The investigation into the collective action initiatives in Chapter 6 made use of and built upon this 
rich qualitative information.  
Reflecting on the SNA design and execution, it needs to be said that while the whole network 
approach was helpful for describing the relations and behaviour among the actors operative in the 
Berg catchment, an ego network analysis would have been more appropriate for gaining a better 
understanding of the extent to which these actors are linked to other levels of decision making. Time 
and resource constraints did not allow for the undertaking of this complementary measure. 
Furthermore, in this thesis relations were captured only at one point in time. A longitudinal study 
may have better captured changes in the network and allowed for plausible explanations as to which 
factors or actors triggered theses changes. As well, it needs to be mentioned that the SNA, because it 
captures stable and regular interactions, has not been very sensitive in detecting newly established 
initiatives and processes. For example, the Berg River Improvement Plan and the larger SWPN had 
little maturity at the time when the field work was conducted. Hence, both could not be detected in 
the Berg management network even though they already had started their efforts to strengthen 
water management. 
Perhaps the most valuable insight for the assessment of horizontal cooperation to take from the 
employment of Ostrom’s eight design principles is that they were able to demonstrate how critical 
vertical integration in the form of nestedness is for collective action and the capacity to self-organize 
in regional SESs. The study confirms the conclusion of others (e.g., Termeer et al., 2013; Ariras et al., 
2013; Huntjens et al., 2012) that the design principles are of great relevance for the investigation into 
regional SESs and their management. Chapter 6 provided clear evidence that in regional SESs, 
horizontal cooperation builds on trust and reciprocity. As demonstrated in this study, the design 
principles were valuable in understanding the robustness and effectiveness of individual collective 
action initiatives as well as the larger arrangements arising from horizontal cooperation. However, 
they were less useful in capturing and examining the linkages between the collective action initiatives. 
This may relate to a specific weakness which needs further exploration. That is, it appears that 
Principle 8 (nestedness) is the least developed and empirically investigated principle in Ostrom’s 
work. However, in relation to regional SESs and their complex governance arrangements, design 
principle 8 seems to be most critical. Furthermore, while accounting for vertical nestedness, 
Ostrom’s framework does not explicitly account for and point to the role of horizontal nestedness. 
Hence, more research is needed to advance the understanding of the processes and conditions that 
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7.4.3. Outlook with respect to future research 
Through both the findings and the reflection on the conceptual and analytical framework, new and 
interesting questions have emerged.  The ones that seem critical in advancing the understanding of 
horizontal cooperation are summarized below:   
There is a clear need to investigate further the relationship between horizontal cooperation and 
vertical integration. As mentioned above, one option could be to undertake an ego network analysis 
to explore the extent to which members of different collaborative actor networks that operate at 
different levels, but who have similar governance objectives (e.g., water security), are linked. To what 
extent do these linkages indeed foster learning and collaboration across and within those networks? 
Which organizations can function as bridging organizations and span the different levels of decision 
making? What would be a meaningful definition for vertical integration that can capture integration 
within and across the three ideal governance modes? These and similar questions can be explored 
using a relational approach.   
The investigations into the Berg catchment show that the intersection of the governance modes do 
affect self-organization and collective action in regional SESs. Case studies that use the same or a 
similar methodological approach could provide greater insight into the role of governance modes on 
horizontal cooperation and AM. An interesting proposition to test would be whether coherence 
among governance modes (i.e., the alignment of incentives) does indeed lead to a greater willingness 
of organizations to take on management functions and address specific management issues. 
Like other studies before (e.g., Sandström, 2011), this thesis supports the argument that an intrinsic 
relationship between network cohesion and heterogeneity exist. Jointly they shape collaboration and 
learning among interacting actors. However, the extent to which higher levels of cohesion or a higher 
level of heterogeneity is required in order to accomplish a specific governance outcome depends 
largely on the specific contextual setting and the issue at stake. When reflecting on the findings from 
the Berg catchment, an interesting question emerges: What is the relationship between the maturity 
of the governance system and the two network characteristics and how does the maturity of the 
governance system relate to the conditions for horizontal cooperation? South Africa’s water 
governance system went through rapid change triggered by large scale political changes. Many 
relations among the various actors need to be either reconfigured or newly established. The findings 
from the Berg catchment further suggest that strengthening the cohesion among the core WMOs 
seems to be a prerequisite for the utilization of the heterogeneity that currently exists within the 
Berg management network. Undertaking a similar study in a country where the political systems has 
not seen such drastic changes and where the water governance system has changed gradually could 
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An additional research need that became apparent during the research process and that should be 
pursued in future studies is the following: To what extent do intra-organizational interactions affect 
horizontal cooperation in inter-organizational platforms and to what extent is learning generated in 
these platforms utilized for intra-organizational decision making? Here the literature on social 
learning (e.g., Sol et al., 2013) and organizational theory can provide great assistance in exploring 
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Appendix 4.1: Social Network Analysis Survey-Berg River catchment 
 
 
Purpose of the study: 
To create a better understanding of how issues of degrading water quality are currently addressed 
by the various actors in the Berg River catchment. Of particular interest to the study are the 
interactions and collaboration between the various actors operative in the catchment. In other 
words, the focus of the study is to investigate who is collaborating with whom on the issue of 
degrading water quality. Identifying these collaborative groups will allow for a more detailed 
discussion of their characteristics and for possibilities to built upon the identified groups. In this 
context the study will explore why and how these collaborative groups have formed; what brings 
these actors together and motivates them to invest resources in meetings and joint action? 
 
Please answer the following questions as a representative of your organization. I am not looking for 




Please note that unless otherwise indicate all information provided by you and other respondents 
will be treated as confidential and presented anonymously. However, if applicable, I will refer to the 
name of the organizations that you are representing and a rough indication from which position the 
information was given. When presenting the data all organizations and actors will be presented as a 
node in the network without any reference to their names. Respondent names may be shared with 















I RESPONDENT / ORGANISATION INFORMATION  
 
Respondent  






Name of organization:   
Address:  
Your position in  the 
organization: 
 
















2.1. What type of activities do you carry out in these areas (for example irrigated agriculture, 










2.2. If your activities impact the Berg River but take place outside the areas displayed on the 
map then please write down those activities and locations below.(e.g. City of Cape Town as 
Berg River water consumer ) 
 



















II DIRECTION OF RELATIONAL QUESTIONS 
 
1. When looking at the recall list who do you recognize on the list as being active in the 
management of the Berg River. Please mark them in the blue column under the category ACTIVE 
IN WATER MANAGEMENT (R1). Please add any organizations that you consider as important but 









It is clear that we can’t solve the problem of degrading WQ alone but need to collaborate with 
others on the issue. I am therefore interested in your regular interactions with other organizations in 
response to the issue of degrading water quality. Please answer the following questions relating to 
information exchange and collaboration. But before you answer these questions let’s just see what 
we both understand as information exchange and collaboration and in what ways the two differ  
 
Information exchange: 
 requires less resources and time, includes sharing the of information on problems or data,  as well 







 comes at higher cost, requires trust the development of common objectives and the pooling of 
resources , A legal mandate to cooperate does not equate in collaboration. Collaboration has often 
a voluntary element to it. It is often reproduced along the same relationships as this is less costly 
i.e. same actors will chose collaborate on different issues rather than creating new relations,  







Exchange of information on the status of the River (specifically its water quality) 
2. From the recall list select those organizations with whom you regularly exchange information 
and advice on the issue of degrading water quality (e.g. sharing of water quality monitoring 
results, meteorological information, information on the environmental status of the River, 
capacity building, training,). Please mark the relevant organizations by selecting either the sub 
category PROVIDES WQ INFO (R3a) or RECEIVES WQ INFO (R3b) [the green columns]. Please 



















3. You selected the following organizations with which you regularly exchange information could 
you please explain to me what type of information you are exchanging? Please limit your 















Regular collaboration with others in the networks to address the issue 
4. From the recall list select those organizations with whom you regularly collaborate on the issue 
of degrading water quality (joint projects e.g. monitoring activities, sharing of expertise, 
partnerships). Please mark them in the orange column under the category COLLABORATIVE 
PARTNER (R4). Please add any organizations that you consider as important but are not 






5. For the selected organizations can you please describe in greater detail the type of 
collaboration? Please specify purpose and frequency of engagement as well as types of 










































8. Would you say that by having your organization collaborating with others, that this has changed 
your organization’s understanding of water quality issues and how water quality needs to be 
addressed? Do you for instance think that your organization has changed any priorities, or ways 
of working to address water quality, as a consequence of collaborations you have had with 
others? Can you please give me some concrete examples of this? Please remember that I am 








9. Would you say that your organization has learned anything new about the River and its 
management because of your collaborations with other organizations? Can you please give me 









10. Which among the collaborative partners that you selected in the recall list do you think you have 
trustworthy relationship with? That is, which of these organizations would you trust to fulfill 
their obligations? Please identify them by putting a circle around the cross you used to select 





III ATTRIBUTES/ DESCRIPTION OF YOUR ORGANISATION 
 
1. Please specify the type of organization: 
□ Government National 
□ Government Provincial 
□ Government Local 
□ IB/WUA 
□ NGO / Association 
□ Private Sector - Consultancy 
□ Academic Research - Consultancy 
□ Forum /Program/ Reference Group 
















2. If applicable, mark your economic activities in the catchment area. 
□ Irrigated agriculture 
Please specify 
□ Fishing  
Please specify 
□ Industry  
Please specify 
□ Tourism  
Please specify 





2.1. How would you rate your dependency on water from the Berg River (including 
tributaries)for your economic activities mentioned above? Please check one of the boxes 
below:  
 
□  □  □  
High partial none 
 
 
3. Through what activities are you influencing the water flow (quality and quantity) in the Berg 
River system? 
□ Agricultural discharge 
□ Agricultural abstraction 
□ Municipal discharge 
□ Municipal abstraction 
□ Industrial use discharge 
□ Industrial use abstraction  
□ Policy  
□ Water flow regulation 
□ Land use change/ developments along the River bed 






















4.1. If yes, which aspects does your mandate cover: 
□ Discharge 
□ Abstraction 
□ Protection of wetlands 
□ Physical flow management 
□ Water quality monitoring 
□ Estuary management 
□ Alien clearing  
 
 
5. Is your understanding of water quality and its impact on the River based on: 
□ observations 
□ anecdotal evidence,  
□ scientific evidence (peer reviewed) 
□ scientific evidence (not peer reviewed) 





6. How frequently are you able to observe changes in the River flow (including changes in the 
water quality)? 
□ Daily  
□ Weekly 
□ Once a month 




7. What type of changes can you observe? 




8. As I mentioned to you in the beginning water quality issues can be broadly divided into two 
categories, namely pollution cause by discharge (e.g. municipal and/or agricultural) and alien 
invasive vegetation (aquatic and terrestrial). For each of the two categories please tell me if you 
play an role in the management of water quality for the Berg River.  
□ Pollution 














PART IV WATER RESOURCES MAMAGEMENT  
































3. What impact has degrading water quality in the River had on the River, adjacent communities 





















































7. What do you think needs to change to improve the situation? 




































7.2. What more could your organization do within its mandate but is unable to do because of 









8. Please name three organizations that you regard as most influential with regard to water quality 
management at the two scales. I am not interested in formal hierarchies but the relative capacity of 
organizations to do something to improve the situation or use their veto power to make things worse.  
 






1. For all the organizations that you have added to the recall list could you please provide me with 


















































Appendix 4.2: Berg River catchment Recall List 
 
 
Name of organization 
Typical 
































































1a  Department of Water Affairs        
1b Department of Water Affairs         
2a  Working for Water       
2b  Working for Water       
3 Department of Agriculture       
4 Department of Local Government      
5 Department of Land Affairs      











7 Department of Agriculture       
8a DEA&DP       
8b DEA&DP       
9  Office of the Premier Western Cape      
10 Department of Housing       






12a West Coast District Municipality      
12b West Coast District Municipality      
13 Cape Winelands District Municipality      
14 Bergriver Municipality      
15 Stellenbosch Municipality      
16a Drakenstein Municipality      
16b Drakenstein Municipality      
17 Witzenberg Municipality       
18 City of Cape Town      
19 Swartland Municipality       
20 Saldana Bay Municipality       
 
21 Berg River Main IB      
22 Benede Berg River IB      
























24 Simonsberg IB      
25 Perdeberg IB      
26 Tulbagh WUA       
27 Vier en Twintigrivier IB      
28 Noord Agter Paarl IB      
29 Suid Agter Paarl IB      
30 Riebeek- Kasteel IB       
31 Riebeek West IB Nr.1      
32 Riebeek West IB Nr2      













34 Groenberg IB Nr1      
35 Groenberg IB Nr2       
36 Berg Pollution Action Committee      









38 NAFU      
39 Women on Farms      
40 AGRI WC      
41 WESSA      
42  Cape Nature      
43 CSIR      
44 Stellenbosch University      
45 University of the Western Cape      
46 UCT      
47 SANBI      
48a WWF (Water balance)      
48b WWF (BWI)      
49 Prof Jo Barnes       
50 Anchor Environmental      
51 TCTA       
52a Aurecon       
52b Aurecon       
53 Blue Science      
54 Waterright consulting       
55 St Helena WQ Trust      
 
56 Berg River Estaury Forum       





       
       
       
       
       
       
       
















Appendix 4.3:   The creation of the final reciprocated network N 
 
In order to be able to capture the direction of information flow in the network, the relation 
‘information exchange’ was split into two sub questions:  From whom do you receive information on 
the Berg River? To whom do you provide information on the Berg River? By asking the respondents to 
detail the direction of information flow, a better understanding was obtained of who was more a 
provider of information (and therefore a potential knowledge producer and transmitter) and who 
was a recipient of information.   
 
Considering that each relation (info provide, info receive and collaboration) defines a different 
network, the three sets of network data were combined to create a multiplex network comprised of 
reciprocal relations. 
 
For analyzing the communication flow in the network, the two relations ‘Info providing’ (r3p) and 
‘Info receiving (r3r)’ were combined into one matrix. A new relation R3 = max(r3r,r3p)1 was created 
using the Matrix Algebra function in UCINET. 2 The relation ‘information exchange’ (R3) was then 
transformed into a reciprocated relation using the minimum value as criterion for symmetrizing the 
relation.3. The new relation was labeled INFO. The relation ‘collaboration’ (R4) was symmetrized in 
the same manner and the new reciprocated relation was labeled COLL. 
 
Chapter 2 has already pointed out that collaboration entails a large continuum of activities ranging 
from formal reporting as mandated by law, information exchange and advice, joint projects, and all 
the way to mutual trust relations. To be able to capture the collaborative network as accurately as 
possible and to account for this variation in the Berg River management network, the two relational 
networks (INFO and COLL) were combined into a single multiplex network (N) through the linear 
combination of the adjacency matrices. Thus, to create this final reciprocal network composed of the 
two relations, the matrix addition N = add(INFO, COLL) was performed in UCINET.  This produced a 
54 X 54 data matrix with values ranking from 0 to 2. 
0 = no relation 
1 = info exchange or collaboration 








                                                          
1 The formula means that the exiting value in the matrix is replaced by the maximum value for either 
of the two sub relations.  If an organisation receives or provides information or if a organisation 
receives and provides information it will score a value of 1.  If an organisation neither receives nor 
provides information it will score a 0. 
2 The reason for first combining Info receive and Info provide and only then looking for reciprocal ties 
is based on the assumption that not everyone who provides info to another organisation will 
necessarily receive information from this organisation.  
3 Through this command the values in two corresponding cells are compared and only the lowest 
value is kept. This means that scoring a one for the new relation, the values in the two cells must 
have been one, meaning both actors acknowledged the relationship. This was done in UCINET 
through the command Transform –symmetrize-minimum. 
Equations used for creating the different network matrices using Matrix Algebra:  
 R3= max(R3p,R3r) (of the two values the higher value will be used)  
 N = add(INFO,COLL) 
 
Performed symmetrize function:  
 INFO  R3 symmetrised _minimum value  













Appendix 4.4:  Overview of water management organizations (core WMOS) 
 
The Department of Water Affairs (DWA ) 
The National office of the DWA is the operational arm of the Minister of DWA.  Key responsibilities 
include, among others, the formulation of policies and strategies, regulation, and resource 
protection. Currently, DWA National fulfils the following functions: issuing of water licences, 
information management, IWRM planning, overseeing of water services and infrastructure 
development. 
 
The regional offices, located in the nine Provinces, are primarily responsible for the implementation 
of management plans and strategies in specific regions which, for the most part, match the 
boundaries of the nine South African Provinces. On-going functions are concerned to a large extent 
the management of the water resources; they include institutional cooperation, stakeholder 
participation, investigation and advice, and development of Internal Strategic Perspectives (ISPs). 
The regional offices are also responsible for the management of water related infrastructure such as 
dams and intra-basin transfer schemes in their respective regions. The regional offices functions also 
as proto-CMAs in catchment management areas where CMAs have not been created. Hence, they 
are responsible for coordinating water management activities in the specific catchments. 
 
The catchment management agencies (CMAs) 
Originally, it was intended that the country should be divided into 19 water management areas 
(WMAs)4 with each area being managed by one coordinating body i.e. a CMA. Due to the slow 
establishment of CMAs and concerns regarding the financial viability of CMAs in poorer WMAs, the 
original number of WMAs has been reduced to nine. While the boundaries still correspond to a large 
extent with hydrological boundaries, the newly created WMAs combine two or three catchments. At 
present, only two CMAs are operational. However, given the restructuring of the water management 
areas, they will also need to merge with other catchments in the near future.  
 
CMAs are statuary bodies whose functions are directly assigned or delegated by the Minister.5 One 
of their key functions is to coordinate water related activities of the different stakeholders and water 
management organizations (i.e. WUAs, municipalities and various provincial departments concerned 
with water management). Some other functions include the development of a catchment 




Water User Associations (WUAs)/ Irrigation Boards (IBs) 
Similar to CMAs, WUAs are statutory bodies established by the Minister of DWA. WUAs are 
described under the Act as “cooperative associations of individual water users who wish to 
undertake water related activities for their mutual benefit (King and Pienaar, 2011: 53, NWA 1998 
Chapter 8). The Act distinguishes between single sector WUAs, i.e. a group of users with similar 
interests (i.e. irrigators), and multi-sector WUAs. “The purpose of a WUA is to enable water users to 
cooperate and pool their resources (financial, human resources and expertise) to more effectively 
carry out water-related activities” (DWA 2005:39). Each WUA has a constitution and is regulated by 
the National Water Act. The Minister or the CMA may delegate powers and functions to the WUA. 
According to King and Pienaar (2011), the main intention for the creation of WUAs was to transform 
                                                          
4 Although the delineation of water management areas is based on hydrological boundaries, 
digressions exists because of economic, geographic and social constraints (for justifications 
why some areas have been divided or merged, see Herrfahrdt-Pähle, 2010) 
5
 According to the National Water Act, a CMA is responsible for “the protection, use, development, 














existing irrigation boards that were established under the water Act of 1956 to allow for the 




Municipalities do not have a clear legislative responsibility for water resource management (King 
and Pineaar, 2011). However, they play a key role in water management. It is for this reason that 
they have been included in the group of water management organizations in this study. Local and 
Metropolitan municipalities are so called Water Service Authorities (WSAs). They are responsible 
for managing water for domestic and industrial use.6 Besides water supply and sanitation services 
they are also responsible for storm water management, solid waste disposal and land use planning. 
All of those activities are interlinked with water management and have a direct impact on the water 
resources in a catchment area. Municipalities may also act as Water Service Provider (WSPs) or they 
contract third parties (e.g. district municipalities or a private service provider) to be the WSP for 
their municipal area. A WSP is responsible for the practical implementation including day-to-day 
operations.7  
 
Unlike the other WMOs (DWA, CMAs and WUAs), the municipalities are guided by the Water Service 
Act of 1997. They are also not directly responsible to the Minister of Water but to the Department of 
Local Government. An important planning instrument for municipalities is their Integrated 
Development Plans.8 Within the IDPs, it is the Water Service Development Plan (WSDP) that spells 
out all the responsibilities and tasks required in water service delivery. However, a key issue that has 
been recognized by experts and researchers is that the WSDP is only concerned with drinking water 
provision. It does not refer to the role of municipalities in water resource protection nor to any 
responsibilities as far as integrated water resource management is concerned (Herrfahrdt-Pähle, 
2010). According to the WRMS (2004), WSDPs should be in alignment with the CMS but since such 
strategies for most catchment areas do not exist, the vital integration between water service 




                                                          
6
 According to the Constitution of South Africa and the Water Service Act of 1997 it is the responsibility of local 
government to provide basic services such as sanitation and drinking water to their constituencies.  
7
 Among the tasks are the provision of potable water, treating wastewater and effluent, water infrastructure 
repairs, and preventative as well as revenue collection and related financial management. 
8
 They are intended to coordinate the work of local and other spheres of government as well as to align the 
sector plans. IDPs are also the result of public participation in its analyses and planning phases (Schreiner and 














Appendix 4.5: Water management in South Africa: sketching a historically embedded water 
governance system 
 
In this Appendix, historic processes are highlighted which will help in the understanding of the 
configuration of actor relations in the Berg catchment. 
 
During the Apartheid era water, management was highly centralized and served the interest of the 
white minority (Funke et al., 2007). Under the discriminatory apartheid rule, the majority of South 
Africans (mainly its non–white citizens) did not have access to water for productive use nor did they 
possess any legal claims with regard to land and water rights. This legacy of inequality that became 
institutionalized far beyond the water sector can be traced back more than 300 years to the period 
of colonial rule under the Dutch and later under the British (King and Pienaar, 2011). Based on the 
riparian principle first introduced through Dutch rule during the colonial period, water rights were 
tied to land rights (King and Pienaar, 2011). That is, the owner of a piece of land was entitled to all 
surface and ground water on his or her property. After the passing of the Native Land Act of 1913 
this meant that the majority of South Africans had no legal water rights since only whites could own 
land.   
 
Despite the fact that water management was centrally controlled by the state, which had adopted a 
technocratic approach based on engineering solutions, water management remained fragmented 
among a variety of state organizations (e.g. DWA, the Homeland governments responsible for 
service provision to non-white settlements and municipalities responsible for service provision for 
white settlements) (Herrfahrdt-Pähle, 2010). The result was huge discrepancies of water provisions 
to white and non-white communities but also between rural and urban areas (King and Pienaar, 
2011). 
 
Box 4.8.1 Critical historic events shaping South Africa’s water governance system 
 
Source: adapted from Funke et al., 2007 and King and Pienaar, 2011. 
 
After the end of the Apartheid era in South Africa, the newly democratically elected government 
started a water reform process which had the aim of redressing past racial discrimination and of 
establishing a more efficient water management system through which equity, sustainability and 
economic growth could be achieved. Under the Constitution of 1996 and the National Water Act of 
1998, water became a public good and a “commons” (Funke et al., 2007). The Constitution further 













Water Affairs and Forestry (now Water and Environmental Affairs (DWA)) became the custodian of 
South Africa’s water resources on behalf of the national government (King and Pienaar, 2011). 
Acting on behalf of the Minister, the role of the DWA was to develop and implement all policies and 
instruments related to the National Water Act. The regional offices of DWA were mandated to 
implement the policies in the nine regions (which match to a large extent the nine provinces) (King 
and Pienaar, 2011).  
 
A decentralization approach underpinned the institutional reform of South Africa’s water 
governance system. Hence, it was intended that important functions should be moved to 
appropriate regional and local organizations. The aim was to ensure that those previously excluded 
should have equitable access and also participate proactively in water resource management 
decision making; and to enable users and stakeholders to participate more effectively in the 
management of their water resources. The Act called for the establishment of new water 
management organizations at the regional and local level i.e. CMAs and WUAs. The CMAs operative 
at catchment scale are supposed to play a pivotal role in water management and are intended to 
take over much of the management functions from DWA.  Until their establishment, the regional 
offices of DWA will act as proto-CMAs. King and Pineaar (2011:53) state that “[t]he vision …was one 
of decentralized management of water resources, with DWA as the custodian of the nation’s water 
sources, decentralized CMAs as catchment-based management institutio s, and water user 
associations as locally-based organizations managing shared water resources on behalf of their 
members”. 
 
The institutional reform was also influenced by the new approaches to natural resource 
management that had gained momentum in the international area. The National Water Act 
embraces, for example, the integrated water resource management (IWRM) approach, which 
promotes the coordinated development and management of water and land so as to maximize 
economic and social welfare without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems (DWAF, 
2004). As a consequence, the catchment and its hydrological boundaries were identified to be the 
most appropriate unit for realizing participatory and inclusive water management in South Africa. 
Other important cornerstones of the institutional reform were the establishment of the human and 
the ecological reserve, and the introduction of compulsory licensing, i.e. water use rights were no 
longer attached to land rights. It is important to note that the institutional reform has been slow and 
patchy and which has had a direct impact on all actors involved in the water sector. 
 
Besides the National Water Act, South Africa’s water governance system is also been shaped by  the 
National Water Service Act. Under the Act, domestic and industrial water supply as well as sanitation 
has been assigned to local government (i.e. it has become the responsibility of the municipalities).9 
In recent years an apparent dichotomy between two acts (or the creation of a dual structure in the 
governance system) has been identified as one of the key obstacles in achieving an integrated 
management system.  This issue is also highlighted in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
The overarching instrument for managing South Africa’s water resources is the National Water 
Resources Strategy. Its purpose is to ‘‘set out the strategies, objectives, plans, guidelines and 
procedures of the Minister and institutional arrangements relating to the protection, use, 
development, conservation, management and control of water resources’’ (DWAF, 2004: 8). The 
Strategy is supposed to be renewed every five years. Key instruments at the catchment and local 
                                                          
9 In 1994 DWA was actually mandated to develop the necessary water supply infrastructure 
and to provide water services but this responsibility was moved to local government after 














level are supposed to be catchment management strategies (CMS)10 the Water Service Development 
Plan which form part of the Municipal Integrated Development Plans and local plans of WUAs. 
 
To summarize, during the Apartheid era a highly centralized water governance system existed with 
government controlling most aspects of water management and little engagement with 
stakeholders existed except to regulate their practices. Hence, no culture of participation was 
fostered. Only a limited number of non-state actors, namely commercial agriculture and later 
industry were able to actively influence water management (Meissner et al., 2013). Industry and 
commercial agriculture were, for example, given preferential treatment to ensure the self-
sufficiency of the South African state to counter international sanctions against apartheid 
government. Many stakeholders and their needs were not only marginalized but completely ignored 
by the state. All of this has had a significant impact on the current configuration of the actor 
relations in South Africa’s water governance system. Hence, while political change provided a great 
opportunity for a radical shift in water governance, the transition from a highly central and exclusive 













Appendix 4.6 Pre-study list of interviewees 
 
Name Organization Interview  Date 
1. Wilna Kloppers DWA 28.11.09 
2. Cathy Bill DEA&DP 20.01.10 
3. Willie Enright Wateright Consulting 12.4.10 
4. Rashid Kahn  DWA 15.7.09 
5. Jo Barnes Stellenbosch University 15.7.09 
6. JD Kirsten  Commercial farmer 14.7.09 
7. Boubon-Lefty Commercial farmer 14.7.09 
8. Bertrand van Zyl  DWA 12.11.09 
9. Dennis Boesak Emerging Farmer 15.01.10 
10. Jenny Day  Fresh water research Unit, UCT 16.11.09 
11. Jimmy Knaggs Drakenstein Municipality 14.7.09 
12. Doreen February Consultancy (CMA Ref. Group) 15.7.09 
13. Daniel  Seale NAFU 23.11.09 
 
  
                                                          
10 In catchments were no CMA exist, and consequently CMS, DWA uses their Internal 













Appendix 4.7: Arriving at the final actor set of 54 organizations-adding and removing organizations 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, in addition to organizations listed in the original recall list, the 
respondents were provided with the possibility of adding organizations that they considered to be 
important actors for the management of the Berg catchment area.11 New organizations were added 
to the original recall list only if they were mentioned by several other respondents. This technique 
increased the likelihood that important organizations are not missed while at the same time 
ensuring that the actor network is kept to a manageable size (Wasserman and Faust ,1994). 
 
In total, seven organizations were added to the original actor set that was listed on the recall list.  
Their active engagement in the management of the Berg River was affirmed by more than two 
survey respondents.   
 
Table 4.7.1 listing the organizations added to the additional recall list  
Organization Number of affirmations 
Woolworths 3 
Birdlife SA 3 
Natural Resources Ref group 
Drakenstein 
3 
Agter Groenberg conservancy 3 
Saldana Bay WQ Trust  3 
Westcoast Cape Biosphere Reserve 3 
Southern Waters 5 
 
Seven organizations that were part of the original recall list were not included in the analysis. Six of 
the organizations did not meet the requirements (affirmation by more than two organizations and 
one collaborative relation, either info exchange or collaboration, with at least one other 
organization).12 One actor who had received quite a few affirmations from other actors was also 
removed from the actor set because at the time of the study it no longer participated actively in the 
management of the Berg River.13 In addition, the three regional universities were also removed from 
the actor set. While the universities are quite important for knowledge production, none of them 
were directly involved (i.e. through targeted long term interactions) in collaborative activities 
focused on the Berg River.14 When compared to the consultancies, the knowledge created by the 
universities did not necessary feed back into the management of the Berg. Most of the 
consultancies, on the other hand, have actively contributed to reports and strategies that relate to 
the management of the Berg River.  
 
Table 4.7.2 Organizations from the original recall list which were removed from the actor set 
Organizations 
                                                          
11
 Prell (2011) states that vital for the accuracy of such an approach is to first identify the key informants who 
have a good understanding of the network. We used an extensive pre study to identify relevant key 
informants. 
12
 For the three government departments, the researcher could also not identify a representative that was 
involved in the management of the Berg River. The reason why the national departments had been identified 
by key informants from the pre study is because they should be involved in the management of the Berg River 
based on their mandates. 
13
 The reason why the actor was mention so often is because the organization was very involved in the 
management of the Berg River during the construction of the Berg River dam.  During this period, 2007 to 
2009, many organizations had interacted with this organization. However, these management activities have 
now been handed over to the Department of Water.  
14
 Although a number of researchers (mainly students) from the different universities are conducting specific 













Department of Local Government  (CoGTA) 
Department of Land Affairs 
Department of Public Works  
TCTA  
NAFU 
Goedverwacht Boervereinigung  
Women on Farms 
UCT 
Stellenbosch University 
University of the Western Cape  
 
Furthermore, it needs to be noted that of the 57 organizations from the original recall list, four did 
not complete the network survey. One actor decided not to participate in the study, stating time 
constraint as the main reason. For the other two organizations. representatives dedicated to 
activities in the Berg could not be identified at the time of the fieldwork. Individuals that previously 
were involved had left their positions. 
 
Dealing with the three non-participating actors required more consideration. It became evident from 
the qualitative data that all of them have made contributions to the network and the management 
of the catchment area. Indeed, the actor that was unable to partake in the survey because of time 
constraints was mentioned by as many as 12organizations with several of the respondents stating 
regular collaborative interaction. Based on the qualitative understanding of the network and after 
consulting the SNA literature on how to handle missing data (Borgatti et al 2013) it was decided to 
use the information provided by the other organizations in order to complete the network data for 
these three actors.  More specifically, the receiving ties that each actor received for the network 
relations ‘information exchange’ and Collaboration were transposed. For the relation  provide 
information to  the transpose of the relation receive information from  was used.  For the relation 
receive information from the transpose of provide information to  was used. For the relation 
collaboration the direct transpose was used.  
 
The handling of missing network data in this manner was an important step in ensuring that 
important relational data did not get lost. The network data obtained from the other survey 
respondents affirmed that actor (#39) was quite a critical actor (knowledge source) in the network. 
This was also supported by interviews and participant observation in a large number of meetings.  
While the other two organizations are more indirectly involved in management activities, their 
resources enhance the ability to manage the catchment area. The research institution (#47) is a key 
source for ecological knowledge in the region and the national department provides important 
financial resources to its provincial counterpart. If the relations of the three actors to other 
organizations in the Berg management network had been ignored, it would have distorted the 
analysis and interpretation of the network. After all the considerations mentioned above, the final 
actor set that makes up the Berg management network is comprised of 54 organizations.  
 
Table 4.7.3 List of included actors, using transpose method  




 Financial support to the 
landcare program 
J.B 49  WQ knowledge  




















Berg Estuary Management Plan 
 Berg Estuary Situation Assessment  
 Berg Estuary Draft Management Plan-Final October 2009 
 Konsepbestuursplan vir die Bergriviermond-Final October 2009 
Berg River Baseline Monitoring Reports 
 VOLUME 1. Introduction to the Berg River Catchment  
 VOLUME 2. Part 1. River Baseline Monitoring  
 VOLUME 2. Part 2. River Baseline Monitoring  
 VOLUME 3. Estuary and Floodplain Environment  
 VOLUME 4. Social and Cultural Aspects  
 VOLUME 5. Synthesis  
 VOLUME 6. Berg River Groundwater Atlas  
Drakenstein Municipality: 
 Pollution of the Berg River_Status of projects undertaken by Drakenstein Municipality July 
2008 
 Pollution of the Berg River_River Improvement Project_June 2007 
 River Environmental Management Plan_Draft_Feb. 2009 
 
DWA : 
 Profile on WA in the Berg, Breede, Gouritz & Olifants/Doorn WMAs March 2005 
 DWA (Department of Water Affairs). 2007. Western Cape Water Supply System 
Reconciliation Strategy Study.  Summary Report and Reconciliation Strategy Report 
 Green Drop report 
 River management strategy for the Berg water management area of Western Cape, Scoping 
report Oct. 2008 
 Berg Report 2004 Health River programme  
Western Cape: 
 Berg River Quality Task Team Report. 2009. Western Cape Department of the Premier 
Branch: March- April 2009 Governance  & Integration Chief Directorate Policy Development 
& Intergovernmental  Relations 
 WCDEA&DP (Department of Environmental Affairs & Development Planning), 2011. 
Integrated Water Resources Management Action Plan. Department of Environmental Affairs 
& Development Planning, Government of the Western Cape Province, Cape Town. 
Others: 
 Louw, D. 2008. Possible Impacts of water pollution in the Berg River irrigation region. Paper 
for the Upper Berg River Irrigation Board. 
 Colvin, J. et al 2010. FETWater CMA Expertise Development Network K5-1947-B.Report on 
Deliverable 5 
 Brown and Magoba. 2009. Rivers and Wetlands of Cape Town. WRC report 
 Winter et al. 2010. Sustainable options for community-level management of grey water in 

















APPENDIX 5.1.:  Overview of all SNA  Measures including findings 
 
 Analysis Method Aim Finding Network 
 Basic whole Network 
measures   




Identification of relevant 
actors and the level of 
interaction among them  
 
To assess how well the 
network is connected and 
how power and exchange 
(info and resources) are 
distributed in the network 
 Sparse network in which all actors are 
directly or indirectly connected  
 Composed of a large number of diverse 
organizations  









group analysis  
Group density and 
centralization 
(A) Core WMOs vs others 





(C) Sub-population IBs  
 Visualized sub-graph 
 Ego network central 
actor  
(D) Sub-population LG & DWA 
 Visualized Sub-graph 
 Ego network central 
actor 
 Assessing the cohesion 
among core WMOs 
o Their role in the 
network 
 
 Low interaction among WMOs 
 Cohesion based on tie distribution better 
among non-WMOs 
 Cohesion among WMOs dependent on 2 
central actors 
 Strong cohesion within IBs 
 Low interaction within group of 
municipalities  
 Non WMOs have on average more ties 
then WMOs 
 2 central actor are broker/gatekeeper 
within their groups as well as among the 
two groups of local WMOs 
 IBs star-like network structure 
 Diverse Ego network of Main IB 
 Structural difference btw WUA and 24 IB 
in comparison to rest of IBs 
 limited learning and collaboration 

















and collaboration  
Density and composition  How does the 
operational level self-
organize 




 Information exchange primary 
structured along formal relation 
 Collaboration seems to form along 
choice relations (informal???) 
    Shows location of  capacities and 
incentives structures  in the network 
 
Information 






Girvan-Newman Algorithm  To identify 
‘collaborative’ clusters 
i.e. organizations that 
have self-organized into 
groups  
 Network represents “choice” relations 
 Except for WQ Task team most relations 
within the groups are informal relations 
or trust relations  
 Heterogeneous groups  
 DWA occupies only a peripheral position 






Group density and 
centralization 
 To examine the 
interaction across 
cohesive sub-groups  
insight into catchment 
wide collective action 
 
 








 To identify actors 
important for linkages  




































to detect marginalized 
organizations 
 Dependent and major stakeholders take 
peripheral positions  
Network N(v) 
n/a  # of ties from eco sources 
to other non-eco actors  
 # of sources non-eco 
actors have direct access 
to (w/o considering DWA) 
Embeddedness of ecological 
knowledge sources 
 Ecological knowledge, in particular scientific 
ecological knowledge, not well embedded  
 Many core WMOs (14 of 24) have only access 
to ecological knowledge through DWA which 
currently is not a reliable knowledge source  
 Strong role of consultancies in generation of 
ecological knowledge  
 Municipalities with internal expertise have 





E-I Index (modes) To examine information 





 Organizations from the same governance 
mode tend to exchange more information  
with each other than with organizations from 
different modes  




To examine collaboration 
among modes of governance  
 
 
 There is strong tendency for organizations to 
form collaborative ties with organizations 
belonging to the same governance mode  
 Market actors are most collaborative actors 
(89%) actors have strong internal orientation 
for collaboration  
 Low collaboration exist between market and 
government actors 
 Organizations belonging to the hierarchical 




E-I Index (sectors) To examine information 
exchange among sectors  
 
 The tendency to exchange information within 

















To examine collaboration 
among sectors  
 
 Intra-sectoral collaboration is higher than 
inter-sectoral collaboration.  
 A certain level of inter-sectoral collaboration 
does exist  
 The agricultural sector appears to be the 
strongest sector with a very high level of 
internal collaboration and a significant 
number of external collaborative ties 
 The consultancy and research sector play a 
strong role in info provider to other sectors 
but are don’t maintain this role for 
collaboration 
 Very low information exchange and 






  G-F brokerage roles of specific 
actors  
Role of individual actors in 
establishing cross-scale 
linkages for: inter sectoral 
integration, bridging of 
governance modes and 
connecting cohesive 
subgroups 
 important bridging roles for inter-sectoral 
integration: DoA_WC, Cape Nature the Main 
IB the two district municipalities (WCDM, 
CWDM)  
o DWA does not contribute to intra or 
inter-sectoral collaboration 
 important bridging roles for modes: the Main 
IB, Cape Nature DoA_WC, , and BREF  
o brokerage roles do not seem to be 
mode dependent. 
 Bridging actors across cohesive sub-groups: 

















Appendix 5.2: Table of Degree and Betweenness centrality scores Network N 
 
ID Degree NrmDegree Share 
DWA 21 39.62264 0.067308 
Main IB 18 33.96227 0.057692 
IB pollution committee  17 32.07547 0.054487 
Wateright  14 26.41509 0.044872 
WCDM 13 24.5283 0.041667 
 CapeNature 13 24.5283 0.041667 
DS_M 12 22.64151 0.038462 
WfW 12 22.64151 0.038462 
DoA_wc 12 22.64151 0.038462 
CWDM 11 20.75472 0.035256 
DEADD 11 20.75472 0.035256 
Provincial WQ team 10 18.86792 0.032051 
Lower IB 10 18.86792 0.032051 
J.B. 8 15.09434 0.025641 
Upper IB 8 15.09434 0.025641 
BEMF 7 13.20755 0.022436 
SANBI 6 11.32076 0.019231 
WWF 6 11.32076 0.019231 
CWBR 6 11.32076 0.019231 
Aurecon  5 9.433962 0.016026 
24 IB 5 9.433962 0.016026 
CSIR 5 9.433962 0.016026 
SB_M 5 9.433962 0.016026 
AGRI WC 5 9.433962 0.016026 
SW 4 7.54717 0.012821 
BR_M 4 7.54717 0.012821 
CoCT 4 7.54717 0.012821 
St. H. WQ Trust 4 7.54717 0.012821 
Tulbagh WUA  4 7.54717 0.012821 
Anchor  3 5.660378 0.009615 
SDB_M 3 5.660378 0.009615 
 35 3 5.660378 0.009615 
AGC 3 5.660378 0.009615 
NR RGDS 3 5.660378 0.009615 
DoLG _wc 3 5.660378 0.009615 
WESSA 3 5.660378 0.009615 
28 3 5.660378 0.009615 
BL SA 2 3.773585 0.00641 
SL_M 2 3.773585 0.00641 
 IB Sb 2 3.773585 0.00641 
30 2 3.773585 0.00641 
31 2 3.773585 0.00641 













34 2 3.773585 0.00641 
WB_M 2 3.773585 0.00641 
Perdeberg IB 2 3.773585 0.00641 
 33 2 3.773585 0.00641 
 29 2 3.773585 0.00641 
WWs 1 1.886792 0.003205 
DoA_N 1 1.886792 0.003205 
OoP _wc 1 1.886792 0.003205 
SB WQ Trust  1 1.886792 0.003205 
Blue Science 1 1.886792 0.003205 
DoH _wc 1 1.886792 0.003205 
 
Betweenness Centrality 
ID Betweenness nBetweenness 
DWA 420.8877 30.54338 
Main IB 283.5919 20.57996 
IB pollution committee 158.6105 11.51019 
Provincial WQ team 133.8628 9.714284 
WCDM 128.5843 9.331224 
Wateright  124.988 9.070244 
 CapeNature 106.9162 7.758799 
WfW 101.2405 7.346917 
DS_M 97.16527 7.05118 
DoA_wc 94.80348 6.879788 
Lower IB 72.85413 5.286946 
DEA&DP 67.51672 4.899617 
CWDM 62.15449 4.510486 
SANBI 56.87794 4.127572 
WWF 52.45202 3.806387 
SDB_M 52 3.773585 
C W BR 40.72697 2.955513 
BMEF 36.80611 2.67098 
Aurecon  22.84802 1.658056 
CSIR 17.84614 1.295075 
J.B. 13.74806 0.997682 
CoCT 9.907936 0.719008 
Tulbagh WUA  8.87489 0.644041 
Upper IB 8.374352 0.607718 
24 IB 7.800045 0.566041 
Anchor  5.911143 0.428965 
AGRI WC 5.899707 0.428135 
SW 4.410256 0.320048 
BR_M 4.237285 0.307495 
St. H. WQ Trust 4.237285 0.307495 
SB_M 3.445238 0.250017 
















WESSA 0.833333 0.060474 
NR RGDS 0.4 0.029028 
DoLG_wc 0 0 
28 0 0 
33 0 0 
30 0 0 
SB IB 0 0 
SB WQ Trust  0 0 
34 0 0 
BL SA 0 0 
SL_M 0 0 
29 0 0 
Blue Science 0 0 
31 0 0 
32 0 0 
OoP_wc 0 0 
Perdeberg IB 0 0 
35 0 0 
AGC 0 0 
WWs 0 0 
DoA_N 0 0 













Appendix 5.3: Degree centrality ‘collective action’ network 
 
 
ID Degree NrmDegree Share 
Main IB 15 28.30189 0.10274 
CapeNature 11 20.75472 0.075342 
WCDM 8 15.09434 0.054795 
Provincial WQ team 8 15.09434 0.054795 
DoA_wc 8 15.09434 0.054795 
Wateright  7 13.20755 0.047945 
WfW 6 11.32076 0.041096 
CWDM 6 11.32076 0.041096 
Upper IB 5 9.433962 0.034247 
BMEF 5 9.433962 0.034247 
WWF 5 9.433962 0.034247 
Lower IB 5 9.433962 0.034247 
DS_M 4 7.54717 0.027397 
CWBR 4 7.54717 0.027397 
IB pollution commitee 4 7.54717 0.027397 
Consultancy JB 4 7.54717 0.027397 
Tulbagh WUA  3 5.660378 0.020548 
DEA&DP 3 5.660378 0.020548 
  28 2 3.773585 0.013699 
SB_M 2 3.773585 0.013699 
AGC 2 3.773585 0.013699 
SW 2 3.773585 0.013699 
BR_M 2 3.773585 0.013699 
AGRI WC 2 3.773585 0.013699 
DoLG _wc 2 3.773585 0.013699 
DWA 2 3.773585 0.013699 
Perdeberg IB 1 1.886792 0.006849 
WB_M 1 1.886792 0.006849 
  32 1 1.886792 0.006849 
  29 1 1.886792 0.006849 
  34 1 1.886792 0.006849 
  35 1 1.886792 0.006849 
  33 1 1.886792 0.006849 
CSIR 1 1.886792 0.006849 
WESSA 1 1.886792 0.006849 
SB  IB 1 1.886792 0.006849 
OoP _wc 1 1.886792 0.006849 
SANBI 1 1.886792 0.006849 
SB WQ Trust  1 1.886792 0.006849 
  31 1 1.886792 0.006849 
SDB_M 1 1.886792 0.006849 













Anchor  1 1.886792 0.006849 
Aurecon  1 1.886792 0.006849 
  30 1 1.886792 0.006849 
CoCT 0 0 0 
DoA_N 0 0 0 
WWs 0 0 0 
SL_M 0 0 0 
Blue Science 0 0 0 
St. H. WQ Trust 0 0 0 
BL SA 0 0 0 
NR RGDS 0 0 0 
















Appendix 5.4: List of SNA respondents - qualitative interview data 
 
ID Organisation  Date  
S-1  Wateright consulting 14.01.11 
S-2 Berg River Main IB 12.04.11 
S-3 Drakenstein Municipality 04.02.11 
S-4 IB Pollution committee 12.04.11 
S-5 Perdeberg IB 12.05.11 
S-6 Upper Berg IB 28.04.11 
S-7 Stellenbosch Municipality 24.02 11 
S-8 Drakenstein Municipality 04.02.11 
S-9 Saldanha Bay Water Quality Forum Trust 08.09.11 
S-10 West Coast District Municipality  04.04.11 
S-11 West Coast District Municipality 07.04.11 
S-12 Witzenberg Municipality 08.09.11 
S-13 St Helena Bay Water Quality Trust 08.08.11 
S-14 CapeNature  26.05.11 
S-15 DWA Regional office 
Resources Protection 
04.04.11 
S-16 Department of Agriculture, Western Cape  1.7.11 
 




Appendix 5.5 List of all Organizations and their IDs 
 
Organisation ID  
Department of Water Affairs  DWA 
 Working for Water  WfW 
Department of Agriculture, National  DoA 
Department of Agriculture, Western Cape DoA_wc 
Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning, Western Cape DEA&DP_wc 
 Office of the Premier Western Cape OoP_wc 
Department of Housing, Western Cape DoH_wc 
Department of Local Government, Western 
Cape DoLG_wc 
West Coast District Municipality WCDM 
 Cape Winelands District Municipality CWDM 
Bergriver Municipality BR_M 
Stellenbosch Municipality SB_M 
Drakenstein Municipality DS_M 
Witzenberg Municipality WB_M 
City of Cape Town CoCT 
Swartland Municipality SL_M 
Saldana Bay Municipality SDB_M 













Benede Berg River IB Lower IB 
Berg River Irrigation Board Upper IB 
Simonsberg IB SB IB 
Perdeberg IB Perdeberg IB 
Tulbagh WUA  Tulbagh WUA  
Vier en Twintigrivier IB 24 IB 
Nord Agter Paarl IB 28 
Suid Agter Paarl IB 29 
Riebeeck- Kasteel IB 30 
Riebeeck West IB Nr. 1 31 
Riebeeck West IB Nr. 2 32 
Simondium Irrigation Assosiation  33 
Groenberg IB Nr 1 34 
Groenberg IB Nr 2 35 
Berg Pollution Action Committee IB pollution  
AGRI WC AGRI WC 
WESSA  WESSA 
Cape Nature   CapeNature 
CSIR CSIR 
SANBI  SANBI 
WWF  WWF 
Prof Jo Barnes  J.B. 
Anchor Environmental Anchor  
Aurecon  Aurecon  
Blue Science Blue Science 
Waterright consulting  Wright 
St. Helena Water Quality Trust 
St. H. WQ 
Trust 
Berg River Estuary Forum BREF 
Provincial Berg River water quality task team  WQ task team 
Woolworths WWs 
Birdlife SA BL SA 
Natural Resources Ref. group Drakenstein NR RGDS 
Agter Groenberg conservancy AGC 
Saldana Bay WQ Trust  SB WQ Trust  
Cape Westcoast Biosphere Reserve C W BR 
















Appendix 6.1 List of Interviewees Collective Action Initiatives 
ID Organisation  Date  
I-1  Department of Water Affairs  08.04.11 
I-2 Department of Water Affairs   04.04.11 
I-3  Working for Water   24.04.12 
I-4  Working for Water  08.04.11 
I-5 Department of Agriculture WC 01.07.11 
I-6 Department of Agriculture WC 04.02.11 
I-7 West Coast District Municipality 07.04.11 
I-8 Stellenbosch Municipality 24.02 11 
I-9 Stellenbosch Municipality  31.01.13 
I-10 Stellenbosch Municipality  31.01.13 
I-11 Drakenstein Municipality  02.04.11 
I-12 Drakenstein Municipality  02.04.11 
I-13 Berg River Main IB 12.04.11 
I-14 Benede Berg River IB  20.05.10 
I-15 Berg River IB 28.04.11 
I-17 Perdeberg IB 12.05.12 
I-18 Vier en Twintigrivier IB 05.05.11 
I-19 Noord Agter Paarl IB 19.05.11 
I-20 Suid Agter Paarl IB 14.06.11 
I-21 Riebeek West IB Nr2  10.05.11 
I-22 Berg Pollution Committee 12.04.2011 
I-23  CapeNature 26.05.11  













I-25 WWF  0.06.05.11 
I-26 Waterright consulting 10.04.12 
I-27 IB Pollution Committee 17.03.12 
I-28  BMEF Member 03.06.11 
I-29 BMEF Member 15.05.13  
I-30 Office of the Premier 25.02.11 
I-31 DEA&DP 21.04.11 
I-32 WCDM 04.04.11 
I-33 DoA_wc 01.07.11 
I-34 DEA&DP 11.04.11 
I-35 DoA 18.04.11 
I-35 Stellenbosch 15.06.11 
 
 
